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Abstract 
This work considers the creation of two risk and decision support systems, one for the 
National Air Traffic Services of the UK and one for Unilever, a multi-national. Their 
development contributes to risk decision science in the area of decision support in particular. 
This contribution is based on the development real-life systems, it has three key elements. 
One, it addresses the fact that, for practical environments like these, the science of risk and 
decisions is insufficiently resolved to be accepted and easily used. Two, the systems share an 
arena with subjective Bayesian decision analysis. The benefits of a hybrid form of the two 
approaches to generate higher levels of user acceptance and organisational transfer is 
discussed. Three, they take the unique approach of being `for experts' systems rather than 
`expert systems'. This approach offers a number of benefits to applied user communities. 
These include: a decision support system which remains grounded within the reasoning 
worldview of the decision makers; an expansion and refinement of the existing `natural 
heuristics' that decision makers use currently; a scoring and visualisation environment which 
is both fast and flexible but allows for, previously unavailable, levels of reasoning 
transparency and comparison. Taken in total the combination of the tool design, the heuristic 
artefacts within them and their influence on the hosts organisations, the two systems have 
proven they can provide an effective and valued "heuristic reasoning platform" for risks and 
issues. A future research direction is to explore ways in which the highly transferable 
heuristic artefacts in these systems, particularly measurement and data manipulation, might be 
strengthened via hybridisation with more powerful, but less transferred, formal systems like 
Bayes decision analysis. 
3 
Contents 
Preface .................................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter 1: Literature Review on Decision Theory ......................................................... 10 
1.1 Summary of chapter 1 ................................................................................................. 10 
1.1.1 Digest of key points made in this chapter ................................................................ 13 
1.1.3 The problem of defining decision support ............................................................... 14 
1.2 The breadth of theory .................................................................................................. 15 
1.3 Biases and heuristics, the debates ................................................................................ 22 
1.4 Some Psychology of reasoning ..................................................................................... 29 
1.5 Observations on real world decision making .............................................................. 37 
1.6 Subjective Bayesian Decision Analysis ........................................................................ 41 
1.7 What benefits package should decision support provide? ......................................... 51 
Chapter 2: Literature review of risk theory ..................................................................... 54 
2.1 Summary of chapter two ............................................................................................. 54 
2.1.1 Summary of key points in this chapter ..................................................................... 55 
2.2 What is risk? ................................................................................................................ 56 
2.2.1 Risk expressed as science ........................................................................................ 60 
2.2.2 Risk expressed as science- and public policy ............................................................ 61 2.2.3 Risk expressed as a social construct ........................................................................ 66 
2.2.4 Risk expressed the psychology of the individual ...................................................... 70 2.2.5 Risk expressed as approaching post modernism ...................................................... 75 2.3 Risk and Decisions for whom? ..................... .. 80 . ............................................................ 2.3.1 Risk and the National Air Traffic Services .............................................................. 80 2.3.2 Risk and Unilever ............................. 82 ..................................................................... . 2.4 Conclusion from an applied perspective: Which risk model to prefer? .................... 85 2.4.1 Concluding remarks on the literature ...................................................................... . 86 Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 89 
3.1 Summary of chapter 3 ............................. . 89 . ................................................................. . 3.1.1 Some key points made in this chapter ..................................................................... . 
91 
3.2 The National Air Traffic Services Project: Case study one ....................................... . 93 3.2.1 Aims ...................................................................................................................... . 
93 
3.2.2 Objectives .............................................................................................................. . 93 3.2.3 Hypothesis development 
........................................................................................ . 94 3.2.4 Methodology .......................................................................................................... . 95 3.3 Results of case study one .......................... ... ............................ ... .. .. .. .. 98 . .. .. ... ... ... . .......... 3.4 Discussion of results ............................. ..................... ... ... .. .. .. .. 
. 
104 . .. ... ... ... ... . ................... 3.5 Conclusions and further research direction ............................................................. 108 3.6 The National Air Traffic Services Project: Case study two ..................................... 110 3.6.1 Aims ................................ .......................................... .. .. . ... 110 . ... ... .... . ....................... 6 2 Objectives 3 . . . ........................................................................ .................................... 3 6 3 Method l 
111 
. . o ogy ......................................................................................................... 112 3.7 Consideration of results ...................................................................... .. 113 .. ................... 3.7.1 Strain scoring and adjustment .............................................................. . 113 .. ............... 3.7.2 Risk scoring and adjustment ................................................................ . 122 .. ............... 3.7.3 Risk and strain measurement tools and visualisations ................................ . 126 . .......... 3.7.4 Lesson learning measurement ideas and visualisation ............................................ 137 3.7.5 Benchmarking within NATS ................................................................................. 148 3.8 Final consideration of results .................................................................................... 156 3.8.1 Key attributes of this system ................................................................................. 158 3.8.2 Where has this research taken us? ......................................................................... 167 4. The Unilever Projects .................................................................................................. 171 
4.1 Summary of Chapter 4 .............................................................................................. 173 
4 
4.1.1 Some key points from this chapter ......................................................................... 
175 
4.2 Case study one: Score-cards for issues prioritisation ............................................... 
177 
4.2.1 Aims 
..................................................................................................................... 
177 
4.2.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................. 
178 
4.2.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 
178 
4.3 Consideration of Results ............................................................................................ 
179 
4.3.1 A first score-card (HPCE category) ....................................................................... 
184 
4.3.2 A second score-card (embedding a multi-attribute measure) .................................. 
189 
4.3.3 A global issues prioritisation score-card ................................................................ 
194 
4.3.4 A strategic impact score-card ................................................................................ 
199 
4.4 Unilever case study two: The development of visualisation environments for issues 
prioritisation .................................................................................................................... 
205 
4.4.1 Aims ..................................................................................................................... 
205 
4.4.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................. 
205 
4.4.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 
206 
4.5 Consideration of results ............................................................................................. 
206 
4.5.1 A basic case in Unilever's HPCE category ............................................................ 
206 
4.5.2 Case two ICFE visualisation needs ........................................................................ 
209 
4.5.3 Case three: UIG visualisation needs ...................................................................... 
215 
4.6 Unilever case study three: A review of heuristic concepts developed for issues 
prioritisation .................................................................................................................... 222 
4.6.1 Aims ..................................................................................................................... 
223 
4.6.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................. 223 
4.6.3 Methods ................................................................................................................ 223 4.7 Discussion of results (heuristic concept development) ............................................. 225 
4.7.1 Working within, expanding and innovating heuristics ........................................... 
232 
4.7.2 The final global issues prioritisation process in summary ...................................... 
234 
5. Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 238 
5.1 General introduction to this discussion ..................................................................... 238 
5.1.1 Structuring this discussion ..................................................................................... 241 5.2 Discussion one: of Hurisk and Descartes .................................................................. 243 
5.2.1 Summary of this section ........................................................................................ 243 
5.2.2 Some key points raised in this discussion .............................................................. 246 
5.2.3 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 249 
5.3 Do these heuristic systems offer good decision support? .......................................... 257 
5.3.1 Application and workload ..................................................................................... 258 5.3.2 Human Centred ..................................................................................................... 
259 
5.3.3 Rationality ............................................................................................................ 260 5.3.4 Values / credibility ................................................................................................ 
263 
5.3.5 How did the systems compare? ............................................................................. 265 5.4 Do these heuristic risk measurement systems offer meaningful risk? ..................... 266 
5.4.1 Application of risk ............................................................................................... . 266 5.4.2. Perception of risk ................................................................................................ . 268 5.4.3 Does heuristic risk meet the standard? .................................................................. . 269 5.5 Conclusion to general discussion of Hurisk and Descartes .................................... . 270 5.6 Discussion two: Towards a proto-Bayes .................................................................. . 271 5.6.1 Summary of this section ....................................................................................... . 271 5.6.2 Discussion 
............................................................................................................ . 273 5.6.3 Combining heuristic reasoning and subjective Bayes? .......................................... . 286 5.6.4 Direct comparison with subjective Bayes approach .............................................. . 289 5.7 Discussion on possible advantages of a heuristic approach ................................... . 292 5.7.1 Summary of this section ...................... ................................................................. 
292 . 
5 
5.7.2 Introduction 
.......................................................................................................... 294 5.7.3 What Heuristics Have Proved Worthwhile? ........................................................... 298 5.8 Concluding argument ................................................................................................ 309 5.9 Future research direction .......................................................................................... 314 Appendix one: Unilever comment .................................................................................. 318 
6 
Preface 
This thesis is about risk. It is a contribution to answering the question: What are we to do 
about risk? I will suggest that the best thing we can do is harness it scientifically and socially 
to make it more than a dark force to be avoided, or an ephemeral goddess who may bestow 
fortune on the brave. This is not a new idea of course. I want to suggest however, that in the 
harnessing of it we have to understand it in some recognisable ways others will approve of. 
Attempts to support reasoning about risk have not always done this very well in the past. 
This thesis is also about reasoning support. Existing theorists have not always been able to 
prove that risk and decision concepts remain recognisable to the communities from whom 
understanding has been drawn, or on whom theory has been applied. If those communities no 
longer recognise "their risk" and "their decisions" when they see them reformulated in 
available approaches, then we have to question whether the "support" part of the decision 
support earns its name, or indeed pays its way. 
I hope to demonstrate in this thesis that I have created risk and decision support tools which 
address this problem and which span, comfortably or otherwise, the dilemma of normative 
versus descriptive decision science. The platform in this instance is risk, but I want to go 
beyond yet further theorising about the nature of risk and decisions, useful as this might be, to 
expanding the understanding of the concept of heuristic reasoning and applying it to risk. 
Heuristics have tended to be confined to a sub-branch of descriptive approaches to reasoning. 
They are a kind of test case. The test shows where, or why, people get reasoning wrong and 
hypothesises ways to fix the bias this introduces. I want to come out in favour of an entirely 
new form of heuristic reasoning which nonetheless remains firmly within the etymology of 
that term. These I will call "essential natural heuristics" of decision makers. I will argue that 
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it is possible in applied researching to formulate these into both a bridge and a conduit to 
better reasoning for real time and distributed industrial decision making. 
The "bridge" will take us to a better understanding of how industrial decision makers see the 
world of risk and decisions as communicable entities in strictly hierarchical and non-expert 
(in terms of risk) worlds. The "conduit" will allow decision support to create demonstrable 
increases in rationality. These increases I can prove were not only accepted by the 
communities as being about "their risk" and "their decisions" but the benefits these brought 
were valued. and used. 
As well as the essential natural heuristics of industrial decision makers I will argue that there 
is another group of "general natural heuristics" in evidence in these settings. These soft 
approaches, for example the use of "traffic lights", are widely considered to be satisfactory 
methods of reasoning to the groups I have observed. They tend, as I have seen, to be 
unquestioned and therefore generalised across decision types. These clearly inform and 
interact with the way people develop their own heuristics for reasoning. This has meant that 
strengthening the rationality of the general natural heuristics has been a key route to 
improving specific reasoning found in decision makers' essential natural heuristics. 
I will argue that the closest theoretical school to my approach is that of Bayesian decision 
modelling. This in and of itself cannot be surprising since this school sits firmly between 
normative and descriptive decision science and, as has been argued elsewhere, is itself a form 
of "prescriptive" decision science. 
Where I see the strongest parallel is in contending that Subjective Bayesian methods do not 
just "translate decisions into maths", but create a transition process for the decision maker to 
better reason about "self and world". This is a process that goes well beyond optimising 
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strategies based on expected utility. It goes so far beyond it that I could argue that the 
expected utility output is dwarfed by more useful organisational outputs caused by its strict 
pursuit. These might readily be of greater interest than they currently are. 
Where I perceive divergence between myself and Bayes is in terms of my "technology 
acceptance" argument. The decision maker, even with the softer Bayes methods, has to take 
their reasoning out of their own natural reference grammar and accept a new mathematical 
"technology" to describe it. In comparing my work with prescriptive (subjective) Bayes 
methods I will show that I achieve a loyalty to the indigenous reference grammar and provide 
the decision makers with a "technology" and tools which embody it. 
My approach could be described as a "near Bayes" or "pre-Bayes" modelling form. I will 
demonstrate that I have addressed the fundamentals of such modelling in common with Bayes 
e. g. eliciting attributes, utilities, combination and comparison rules and so on. I've done this 
to create a risk decision support which is quite formal but importantly, from the perspective of 
saying something new in this area, remains grounded within the reasoning worldview of the 
decision makers, their expertise and their own rationality. This I call `for experts' systems. 
I will argue, using two very different forms of risk as working examples, that moving outward 
from the essential natural heuristics of formal and distributed groups of decision makers is an 
equally valid path to decision support that ought to be considered and further formalised. My 
work shows this path to have yielded high levels of user acceptance. It may contribute to 
understanding and overcoming barriers to the use of powerful formal decision aids in real- 
world settings. These steps forward, particularly in risk decision support acceptance, may be 
a fertile ground for yet further developments in elicitation and decision science. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review on Decision Theory 
Overview 
This chapter will review a range of the literature concerned with the formal definition of 
decision theories. That definition will move along a continuum from some of the formal 
mathematical models to some of the more psychological. Approaches like Subjective Bayes 
which effectively recognise the need to combine the two will be explored in some detail. 
There is also a phenomenological end to this continuum found in so called "real world" 
decision making approaches. These will be briefly reviewed. 
1.1 Summary of chapter 1 
The mainstream roots of modern decision theory and the debates around "normative", 
"descriptive" and "prescriptive" approaches to human decision support are of particular 
interest. The notion of whether we have the right frame of reference to study human decision 
making and so called error patterns therein is debated. 
Normative decision theory has a "pure" statistical focus to create the rules and algorithms 
which exemplify normative axioms. Descriptive and prescriptive approaches introduce an 
applied psychological focus. This focus recognises that the satisfaction of normative axioms 
may need to compete with and/or be reconciled with observable decision-maker phenomena. 
The question of biases and heuristics will be addressed, in particular the limits of currently 
accepted definitions in the literature. The key tension in this science, whether laboratory- 
sourced observations of well-documented heuristics generalise to decision makers in a real- 
life setting, will be discussed. Newer evidence around the persistence of the accepted 
decision making biases when considered under different framing conditions will be evaluated. 
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The subjective Bayes modelling paradigm will be considered in some detail for two main 
reasons. First, subjective Bayes can be argued to be the point in the above continuum where 
normative models and subjective agents meet in search of a real world model of a decision 
space. Second, it is one of the key assertions of this thesis that the applied reasoning models 
put forward in this research are a potential development of this paradigm. 
Research situated at the social end of the scientific spectrum which goes beyond the 
introduction of subjective probabilities (considered contentious to some commentators on 
subjective Bayes approaches) is considered. These are seen as taking the argument for a 
continuum to a logical conclusion. These approaches can be seen to be highly task descriptive 
and focussed on the. human decision making process. Whether the evidence for the efficacy 
of so called `real world' decision support models is convincing remains in debate. 
Main conclusions 
Normative statistics currently remains the dominant frame in decision science. The discipline 
of Psychology increasingly contributes to the establishment of theories of decision making 
but this seems to focus on empirical experimentation. Some theorists discussed argue that 
this experimental approach introduces compromise by setting (necessarily) un-real test 
conditions. 
The field of heuristics and biases is an example of the influence of experimentally based 
thinking, being itself a kind of blend of statistics and empirical psychology. The narrow view 
this field produced (that human reasoning is highly faulty) has become increasingly 
challenged on philosophical and methodological grounds. 
There is a visible debate on "real world rationality" and the dominance of current statistical 
and empirical psychology frames of reference. Whether these frames provide an appropriate 
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sort of benchmark for reasoning in a real world setting is increasingly contested. Subjective 
Bayesian decision analysis could be considered a half way house in such a debate. It aims to 
fit normative models to real world decisions. What remains uncertain however, is whether the 
approach is entirely successful. That uncertainty hangs on the inherent complexity of its 
techniques. Even the so called real world decision theories can also be shown to be 
methodologically very top heavy for real world application. 
In common with the direction of some newer statistical research this thesis requires a decision 
support methodology aimed at `real time', `distributed', `high volume' and small-scale 
decision making tasks. This review concludes that this space would best be filled by a variant 
of subjective Bayes methods. The variation suggested exposes the potential efficacy of a new 
conceptualisation of heuristics in applied reasoning. 
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1.1.1 Digest of key points made in this chapter 
- Statistics and psychology together should be the dominant frame of reference to 
understand decision support about risk. These should provide a dual notion of 
"rational" decision making 
- Much extant work in each discipline is criticised for a failure to predict actual decision 
maker choices in real world conditions 
- In statistics "the normative ideal" can only apply to non-real settings 
- Heuristics and their effect on reasoning is shown not to be as well defined or 
understood as was previously believed 
- The accepted view of heuristics and biases research that human beings have faulty 
reasoning may itself be biased by a research premise which expects participants to be 
fluent in probabilistic representations 
- Later evidence from the same disciplines suggests the phrasing of problems in the 
original research phrased can account for some of the faulty reasoning 
- The most appropriate framework for studying human reasoning may not yet be 
available 
- Effective decision making using a subjective Bayes approach has many requisites for 
modelling which deliver a very large analytical burden 
- The tendency of the extant applied research to consider problem spaces which are very 
large, and amenable therefore to significant investment in complex modelling, is 
considered a weakness 
- The ideal features of a decision support system can however be synthesised 
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1.1.3 The problem of defining decision support 
The term decision analysis seems to have a fairly firm set of definitions and expectations 
around it. Goodwin and Wright suggest that: 
"Decision analysis therefore involves the decomposition of a decision problem into a set of 
smaller (and, hopefully, easier to handle) problems. After each smaller problem has been 
dealt with separately, decision analysis provides a formal mechanism for integrating the 
results. .. " 
(Goodwin and Wright, 2008. p3) 
Having begun with this definition however Goodwin and Wright begin to outline how 
decision analysis does not, in most cases, do this: 
"It should be stressed, however, that over the years the role of decision analysis has changed. 
No longer is it seen as a method for producing optimal solutions to decision problems. " (p4) 
The term decision support is perhaps less well defined. This may be because the highly 
technical decision literature, as we will see, is broken up into many specialist fields which do 
not have enough in common to be drawn under a banner like this. When attempts to define 
decision support are specifically made, because it is the support of decisions which is the field 
of interest, vague results can be seen, for example Baverstam has this to say: 
What is decision-making support? Although this must be a question of great relevance here 
(radiation protection, my brackets), it seems quite seldom asked. The answer is regarded as 
obvious and it is implied that it is the same to eve, yone. But is the answer the same to those 
who give support and those who receive it? .. 
The concept of `decision support' includes 
much more than we usually think. .. motivation and confidence are of vital importance in 
relation to decision making support for emergency management " (Baverstam, U., 1997, p 1). 
Searching for a better definition of this area than the four paragraph answer given by 
Baverstam results in the discovery of more long answers. The on-line encyclopaedia 
(http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Decision_support_system) has this to say: 
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Because there are many approaches to decision-making and because of the wide range of 
domains in which decisions are made, the concept of decision support system (DSS) is very 
broad. A DSS can take many different forms. In general, we can say that a DSS is a 
computerized system used for supporting rather than automating decisions. A decision is a 
choice between alternatives based on estimates of the values of those alternatives. Supporting 
a decision means helping people working alone or in a group gather intelligence, generate 
alternatives and make choices. Supporting the choice making process involves supporting the 
estimation, the evaluation and/or the comparison of alternatives. In practice, references to 
DSS are usually references to computer applications that perform such a supporting role. 
This article (available June 2008) does give a very informative definition, but it also then goes 
on to explain how the definition of this area is very polarised over a whole range of academic 
disciplines whose definitions may. or may not agree with or compliment each other. 
Decision support, as it pertains to the systems in this thesis, is perhaps best defined simply 
therefore as follows: 
Decision support systems are rational tools, methodologies and software which help 
people make better, more consistent, more transparent and more rational decisions 
across a range of problem types. 
I will adhere fairly closely to the terms in this definition throughout this work. 
1.2 The breadth of theory 
The subject of this thesis lies across the interface of decision support / decision analysis, 
human reasoning, applied occupational psychology and risk analysis. The breadth of the 
available literature, and the significant disagreements therein, mean that avoiding the trap of a 
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post-modern vortex is important. The landscape of the theory base can be described in the 
continuum summarised below. 
Normative ideal 
Increasing 
subjectivity 
Increasing 
ºhenomenology 
Increasing 
realism 
Game theories 
Game rules 
Subjective 
probabilities 
= True expected utility and value 
= One fixed value outcome 
= Choice and preference rules 
= Combination rules 
= Using bands of uncertainty 
= Accepting these may not match reality 
= Working with the best available model 
= Observation and analysis of actual 
behaviour to explain how decisions are 
made 
= Deviation from normative logic 
s and stylised hypotheses 
s of chance 
Prescriptive ideal = Guide the decision maker in the 
evolution of the decision 
= Sill using the axioms of probability 
= Assisted modelling of the decision 
space 
= Subjective but controlled reasoning 
Semantics = Back to the real world 
= Dilution of logical problems because of 
real world starting point 
Descriptive ideal 
Heuristics and biases 
Judgement experiments and stylised hypotheses 
Behaviour under games of chance 
All still trying to, 
stay within the 
normative axioms 
Still attempting to 
accept the world of 
normative logic and 
describing people as 
deviating from this 
Blending descriptive 
and normative 
approaches 
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The correct frame of reference for the theory 
Decision support is a statistical discipline. This is because there are a range of larger 
statistical themes (which remain fluid to this day) in areas such as axiomatic probability 
theory, subjective probability, expected value, expected utility, biases and paradoxes and the 
application of various functions and decision rules. These attempt to explain/assist reasoning 
process and produce/predict best outcomes. 
Decision support is also a psychological discipline. This is not least because without decision 
makers (notwithstanding the idea of artificial intelligence) there are no decisions. As 
O'Hagan et al point out in the case of eliciting expert judgements (O'Hagan et al, 2006 ): 
"the processes at play within elicitation fall fair and square within the remit of Psychology ". 
(p33) 
We might say that the frame of decision science is a kind of anthrocentric mathematics. This 
is because linked to, or perhaps reacting to, the complex statistical dimensions, there are a 
number of broad social and contextual themes. These include multi-criteria approaches (e. g. 
Stirling, 2001), naturalistic decision making (e. g. Beach, 1997) and heuristics and biases (e. g 
Pious, 1993). Presiding to some extent as a meta-filter over these is cognitive psychology 
(e. g. Oaksford and Chater, 2002). The applied psychologies would claim to deal with 
perceived shortcomings of formal decision theory to predict actual decision makers choices. 
To build an adequate decision support system one has to address the efficacy of these themes. 
Statistical theories are useful because they comply with explicit boundaries and conditions. 
Those theories are considered "normative" science and are therefore highly valued in 
scientific circles and in quasi-scientific forum such as government bodies. Psychological 
theories are, unsurprisingly, more social and behavioural these tend to be collected into an 
overall idea of "descriptive" science. This is valued also. In decision theory the normative - 
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descriptive continuum is however the subject of a number of tensions not the least of which is 
the rise of the idea of a third, intermediate, "prescriptive" form (e. g. French, 1985). 
Normative decision theory 
Normative decision theory is not really used as a theory, rather it's analyses are set in a 
utopian paradigm from which current decision methodologies can be judged. Models which 
score well in this judgement are at home in the controlled conditions of the laboratory. 
Normative axioms are also extensively used in various game theories. In these theories all 
players are assumed rational i. e. satisfying the normative ideal. 
The explanations of human rationality given by a normative approach are based on idealised 
decision pathways operating often on perfect information and using sophisticated maths. 
Decision theories in this school cluster around the concept of maximising expected utility of a 
decision. That utility can be a fixed value outcome e. g. financial reward, or it can be a 
strategic value outcome e. g. gains in competitiveness. 
The normative decision maker can build a utility function to operate on key decision variables 
using known probabilities and generating an exclusive expected utility for each outcome. 
This utility provides the basis of a rational decision and should therefore logically drive (the 
logical decision maker's) preference or indifference (e. g. Oliver and Smith, 1990). 
Challenges to a normative approach 
There are a number of challenges in taking the idealised world of the normative science 
outside into the manifestly non-ideal worlds of applied decision making. Not the least of 
these challenges is the necessity, in normative reasoning, to have a fixed, unitary decision as 
the end point. Industrial decision making, particularly when it concerns human behaviours 
18 
for safety and business competitive variables, doesn't typically benefit from this kind of fixed 
or closed system. Such decision making happens under conditions of constant change and 
uncertainty. 
In decision making under uncertainty a normative decision maker would be at a real world 
disadvantage. The outcomes, and their probability distributions, are not fully known, and so 
cannot have these explicit formal relationships. For example expected utilities cannot express 
in this setting mutually exclusive outcomes. Real world decisions have to be made without 
these levels of certainty and when that happens the normative approach has to be 
strengthened. 
To strengthen the normative approach one can introduce game theory based rules. The `max- 
min' rule is an example of this where the worst possible consequence of the chosen 
alternative is better than (Or equal to) the best possible consequence of any other alternative. 
More complex Schaffer-Demptster type rules are another route (Schaffer, 1990) where, 
simply put, one still uses probability but creates intervals of uncertainty rather than a 
(normative) fixed score. 
As an alternative solution one could attempt to elicit some stable form of subjective 
probabilities and use these as if they were normative. This solution comes with the (rather 
strained) caveat that these probabilities will still be admissible within the normative 
framework, an idea that remains contentious (Cooke, 1991). 
Descriptive decision theory 
A move away from the axiomatic model world of normative theorem e. g. by admitting 
subjective probability, is a move toward "descriptive theory". Descriptive theory is less 
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concerned with laws and rules and tries to describe, by various forms of observation and 
analysis, how decision makers are actually making decisions. Describing decision making 
and its processes in this way led to a school of thought on how and why we, often 
systematically, go wrong in decisions. A range of cognitive biases were first hypothesised 
from this method by Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. Tversky and kahneman, 1974,1981,1988). 
In the complex world of gaming theory, attempts were made to accommodate these "errors", 
for example Larkey and Kadane developed a hybrid gaming theory (Larkey and Kadane, 
1982,1983) where one's subjective beliefs about an opponent could be expressed 
descriptively whilst one's beliefs about one's own reasoning could conform to normative 
Bayes methods. This is an example of an interesting tension to re-affirm the applicability of 
objective (normative) rules to an increasingly subjective subject matter and keep it within the 
normative sphere. 
Descriptive methods studied judgements on stylised hypotheses or in games of chance in the 
fixed laboratory experiment. This approach might be considered to be "closer" to the real 
world, but clearly it is still not the real world. Normative science (both in decision making 
axioms and in the research methods chosen) still studied decision makers in "un-real" 
settings. This is perhaps just good stepwise science. 
Prescriptive decision theory? 
Early descriptive methods, especially those focussing on errors in reasoning, seemed 
motivated to develop "adjustment factors" which could re-align faulty human decision makers 
to a more normative model. If this has been more of a success, normative models could have 
gained ecological validity in controlled, but applied, decision making environments. 
Prescriptive approaches arrived perhaps because there was little evidence that this would be 
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the case. Still trying to utilise normative models, prescriptive methods aimed (more 
descriptively) to guide the "evolution" of decision makers' perceptions in the direction of 
agreed ideal consistency. This agreed consistency would of course never be a formal 
satisfaction of normative axioms. However, the normative appetite for'complete closed order 
was resisted, as was the descriptive appetite for focussing on errors. Prescriptive techniques 
therefore attempted to moderate the limitations of the decision makers actual cognitive 
processes whilst still capitalising on normative claims (Bell, 1988). 
This is a mark of the influence of normative science on the area and its practitioners. 
Descriptive methods were still holding onto normative logic and use it as a benchmark for 
their conclusions. Likewise prescriptive methods, whilst moving further along the spectrum 
were still placing a high value on the normative benchmark. 
The challenge of the applied perspective 
So far, staying within the mainstream classification of decision theory, we have three 
intersecting positions: normative, descriptive and prescriptive. The point of intersection is a 
desire to hold on to those powerful normative axioms and apply these into a form of "real 
world" decision space. A challenge arises if the decision makers in question are: 
a. not in laboratories considering closed rational systems 
b. concerned with the object of a decision not the subject of decision making 
c. unlikely to want to become mathematically adroit in order to make decisions 
One might argue a nuclear scientist, an industrial process engineer and an investment 
modeller would all fit well into (a) to (c) above professionally. That explains perhaps the 
prevalence of these sorts of disciplines in the applied theory. However, I would argue that the 
bulk of people who make decisions in industry are managers. Furthermore those managers 
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will not fit into (a) to (c) at all. Some of them, as we will see, make decisions which are 
causally linked to the daily safety (from life terminating events) of hundreds of people. Even 
in the case where things are not so dramatic, some of them will be managing situations which 
run to the hundreds of millions of euros, without themselves having any financial 
responsibilities or control. 
This first sweep of the general theory already raises important questions about what sort of 
validated systems such managers could seek to use for decision support and increased 
rationality? 
- If this field is as complicated and unresolved, where do real life systems begin? 
- Should a real life system increase formal rationality e. g. by accepting the need to 
decrease known biases? 
- Should system decisions be represented by formal logical rules, or should their 
idealised consistency be in a negotiated tension with their real-world application? 
1.3 Biases and heuristics, the debates 
In this next section 
I will look at the question of biases and the potential framing of real world decision making 
from the heuristics argument. I will examine some of the growing tension around the 
applicability of laboratory-sourced observations of well-known heuristics to a generalised 
human decision maker. I will also look briefly at the evidence for the persistence of the 
recognised decision making biases when decisions are framed more naturalistically and 
phenomenologically. 
I will conclude that there is a need to understand what sort of benchmark can be used for the 
notion of "rationality" in the real world decisions under question in this study. 
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Biases, rationality and real-world decisions 
Should applied decision support decrease known biases? Whether or not heuristics and biases 
are seen as naturally descriptive or as an improvement to the usability of normative theory the 
challenge must be to understand them in live application. Take a trivial example (nonetheless 
a key one for one of the case studies): a consumer choice. 
A consumer choosing a product on the shelf, be it satisfying a primary drive (like a food) or a 
socially constructed drive (like a de-odorant) will make that choice heuristically. It is argued 
that this heuristic choice will be a quick and adaptive one and only based on some of the 
available data. Although no elaborate calculated probabilities are used the choice does 
simplify an extremely complex environment (Feidler & Schmid, 1995) without the need or 
systematic and exhaustive analysis of all he available data. When heuristic processing is used 
to describe behaviour of this kind, rather than errors in stylised experiments, it can be argued 
to be a symptom of intelligence. 
Move out of the supermarket and into the more engineering/scientific world air traffic control 
tower however and scientists seem less convinced that heuristic decisions are intelligent with 
respect to safety'. An indication of this is the degree to which the famous study of this area 
the biases project (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) is used. This oft-quoted work is, of course, 
backed up by a considerable corpus of resultant study (their own and others). 
Tversky and Kahneman were among the first people to propose formal kinds of human 
heuristic with stylised rules. Three heuristics are most noted: 
- The availability heuristic refers to the tendency for an event to be rated more probable 
to the extent that it is more easily pictured or recalled. E. g. people over-estimate the 
1 This is not to underplay the largely invisible, but considerable, decision making in product safety science 
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risk to life posed by `sensational' events and underestimate of the risks associated with 
mundane events (Lichtenstein et al, 1978). 
- Representativeness heuristic is when people judge probabilities "by the degree to 
which A is representative of B". 
- Anchor and adjustment is the tendency for the decision maker to anchor on their own 
or a "first guess" at, or suggestions for, the answer to an uncertain problem and then 
adjust to that, as opposed to rejecting it completely. 
Were we to apply evidence of these to air traffic decision support we would be shaping a 
decision support system in a particular direction. However, it may not be too wise to do that. 
There is a profound (and growing? ) tension in this area of science. The work of Tversky and 
Kahneman remains (on a surface reading) the most oft quoted, but newer research is calling it 
into question. 
`Uncertain Judgements' (O'Hagan et al, 2006) is a multi-author book looking at eliciting 
experts' probabilities. Their review chapter on "The Psychology of Judgement Under 
Uncertainty" it thoughtfully questions the supremacy of Tversky and Kahneman's Prospect 
and other theories in human decision making. The book supports this by discussing newer 
successful research into a number of alternatives and counter positions. 
The introduction to a section on the psychology of judgement under uncertainty traces the 
change in zeitgeist from Peterson and Beach's 1967 view of humans as good "intuitive 
statisticians" to Hogarth's "selective, stepwise" and "limited" human in 1975. The catalyst 
for the change was of course compellingly directed by Tversky and Kahneman's work on 
judgement under uncertainty. O'Hagan et al, 31 years into the debate, do not seem as 
convinced: 
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"All agree that the demonstration ofjudgement can be flawed does not imply that it always 
will be flawed. Nevertheless there has been considerable difference of opinion expressed over 
just how good or bad judgement under uncertainty is.. " (P36). 
Tversky and Kahneman were interested in the instinctual processes people use to make 
judgements. Their most famous finding (which O'Hagan et al also call "oft cited") are certain 
proposed heuristics: availability (the tendency to associate higher probabilities and larger 
class sizes to things that come easily to mind), representativeness (judgements made 
according to similarity between instances) and the anchor and adjustment (the tendency to 
only make small step changes from your own, or other's initial quantifications). Their 
proposition being the first, and, given the state of the art at the time, the most compelling 
evidence, set the mould for the use of this term into quite a narrow band. That band was of 
essentially studying human error. Unlike Rasmussen's (Rasmussen, 1982) conceptualisation 
of error which was to look at known cognitive processes in real world task settings, Tversky 
and Kahneman were perhaps filtering theirs through unchallenged normative models of 
probabilistic judgement. That in itself made fluency with the notoriously difficult area of 
probability theories a prerequisite for criticism. 
O'Hagan et al come well equipped in that department. Having laid down a feeling that they 
may challenge these heuristics they catalogue a number of mechanisms in support of the 
availability heuristic and in support of broad anchoring effects in line with those highlighted 
by Tversky and Kahneman. Looking at representativeness however yields a more interesting 
debate. Rather than just accept "the conjunction fallacy" (where the apparently representative 
nature of data over-writes the logical use of probability) as an example of this bias, Fisk's 
(2004) alternative accounts are cited. Likewise in "base rate neglect" (e. g. where people 
ignore longer run average frequency in favour of frequency under review) also purported to 
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support representativeness bias, O'Hagan et al begin to consider other explanations, the 
cornerstone of which is a semantic solution. 
Semantic theories criticise the way in which humans are expected to operate in these 
experiments e. g. being given obscure, or unfamiliar, probabilities rather than, for example, 
transparent frequencies (which lessen some effects). A semantic approach questions the 
legitimacy of the framing of the solutions in purely mathematical terms (Cohen, 1981). In the 
"confusion of the inverse" (where people act as if an inverse probability has an 
interchangeable value with a stated probability) confusion resulting from the peculiar 
semantics required to discuss probability could be at the heart of a "poor conceptual grasp" 
(Koehler, 1996) of conditional probabilities. This is rather than being a consistent bias. 
Semantic approaches have the makings of a critique of the experimenters own framing of the 
explanation (Meyer and Booker, 1991). O'Hagan et al begin to look for evidence that: 
"perhaps errors in judgement... occur only because the questions that elicit them are phrased 
in such a way as to encourage biased reasoning. "(p46) 
Once detailed discussion deepens so does the authors' challenge to heuristics. Fieldler 
overturns the famous "Linda is a feminist bank-teller" conjunction fallacy example by using 
frequencies rather than probabilities reducing Tversky and Kahneman's 50% rates of error to 
20%. Adherence to Bayes rules in the "confusion of the inverse" problems likewise reduce 
when frequencies are used (Gigerenzer, 1996). The magnitude of the "base rate neglect" also 
dropped in the frequencies condition (Griffin and Buehler, 1999). 
Jones showed that frequency formats have a complex interaction with the heuristics. The 
availability heuristic is essentially a relative frequency paradigm and the representativeness, 
essentially a single case paradigm (Jones, 1995). In the latter case bias is reduced by 
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introducing frequencies and in the former it is actually increased. "Cueing effects" are 
prominent particularly those to do with the phrasing of questions in reasoning experiments 
(Schwartz and Strack, 1991). 
From a research methods point of view, a final criticism is levelled at Tvesky, Kahneman and 
others, perhaps "the lost assumption" of laboratory-based decision science. The tendency to 
conduct research on available populations of students creating an important (and rarely 
mentioned) sampling bias (Sears, 1996). 
In the face of criticism for heuristics? 
The heuristics and biases approach is, in and of itself, being challenged in many quarters now. 
The challenge comes close to suggesting that too rigid adherence to these explanations of 
behaviour is an example of a heuristic itself. Likewise the tendency to fit research design and 
findings only into this prevalent paradigm is starting to look like a bias. If a decision support 
system wanted to reduce bias there might be benefit in understanding some of the possible 
sources here and assessing their relevance. With this in mind, our second question becomes 
important: should the decisions be represented by formal logical rules, or should their 
idealised consistency be in a negotiated tension with their real-world application? 
Support Theory and how to describe decision spaces 
Support Theory is an example of a statistical theory, using a normative approach, which tries 
to addresses this. Support theory, is a mid 90's to the present day attempt (covered by 
O'Hagan et al), to try and gather up the psychology of the way that people assess probabilities 
(a key to unlocking any risk decision). O'Hagan has, in two of the famous heuristics, shown 
claims (from support theory) that: 
"different description of the same event can give rise to different probability judgements ". 
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This is a problem for Normative schools of decision support which would assume 
"description invariance". Support theory suggests there exists an "unpacking principle" 
which skews the ability of the individual to judge probability. For example, a more detailed 
hypothesis for a future event will earn a higher probability than a simple one and judgements 
for unique and exclusive events can exceed probabilities of one. 
Support theory shows that heuristics and biases can in fact be reversed by causing the 
individual to focus on, and admit, more data. The data `unpacked' in this way within the 
normative style probability statements ruins the logic of the probabilities people use. They 
are somehow lured into reading more probability into the situation than can logically be there. 
What kind of rational? 
What this demonstrates is there is a body of scholarly research which successfully undermines 
a simple acceptance of a Tversky and Kahneman's based (or indeed `style') biases approach 
to human reasoning. The early "definitive" work on heuristics and biases is now roundly 
challenged for its applicability to the sphere of decision support in question in this thesis. 
That challenge however, still comes from within the very traditions that generated the theory 
that is now being criticised. Therefore many of the framing assumptions surrounding decision 
makers, and their foci, remain i. e. a definition of rationality which is still normative in 
character and a definition of heuristics, with very few exceptions, which is still a faulty 
attempt at normative rationality. For a thesis like this is an important factor in the choice of 
decision support design. There is not only a lot of disagreement in this area, but there is still 
only really one area. 
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1.4 Some Psychology of reasoning 
In this next section 
In this next section I will review some of the more highly detailed work that has been built up 
about reasoning within the cognitive psychology paradigm. This is going to cover a 
broadening of the idea of heuristic reasoning looking briefly at comparisons with computer 
modelling. This will also show a deepening of the debate about whether heuristics are highly 
limiting of reasoning, very powerful aids to reasoning, or indeed whether we do not yet know 
enough to say. 
I will conclude that these studies illustrate how the area is highly academic and has potentially 
become about a nuanced debate around the philosophy of science. 
Cognitive approach? 
The significant recent work of psychologists Oaksford and Chater has done a great deal to 
further broaden the debate not just on heuristics, and their legitimacy in normative methods, 
but on the assumptions base of human reasoning research in toto. In so doing they challenge 
core principles which guide much of the research effort already reviewed. Their work opens 
up an important debate on the selection of a decision support method particularly because 
they suggest that the most appropriate framework to study human reasoning is, in fact, not yet 
available. In their book: Commonsense Reasoning, Logic and Human Rationality (Oaksford 
and Chater, 2002) they state: 
"Although many theorists have argued that deduction is at the core of cognition, we argue 
that it is at the periphery. From this point of view we shall argue that the "errors and 
biases" observed in "deductive" tasks in psychological experiments should be understood not 
as failed deductive reasoning but as successful non-deductive reasoning. Consequently these 
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"biases" do not provide evidence for human irrationality; rather the reveal the nature of 
people's commonsense reasoning strategies. " (P 179) 
In common with O'Hagan et al Oaksford and Chater suggest that the field of heuristics is not 
as well defined or understood as has been believed. An example of this would be the debate 
in Chater's peer review comments on Gigerenzer, Todd's (and the ABC group's) thesis on 
"simple and fast heuristics" (Chater, 1999). 1 will expand on this example (a critique of the 
`Take the best' heuristic) below but the argument between the theoretical peers is, in and of 
itself, very informative. 
Gigernezer and Todd seem at once to be praising and highlighting deficiencies in human 
reasoning with their "simple, fast and frugal heuristics" approach. On the one hand they 
suggest that heuristics people use to reason are actually very smart and efficient. On the other 
hand they note that a computer algorithm to replicate some of this reasoning is rather 
simplistic. The heuristics in question, and by implication human cognition itself, may 
therefore not be all that impressively complex after all (notwithstanding exceptions like 
language recognition). 
Chater's counter to this is that it ignores the evidence that in many other areas humans vastly 
out-perform computers. He criticizes Gigerenzer and Todd for tending to focus in 
(deliberately? ) on those laboratory tasks where humans are exceptionally weak to prove their 
heuristics thesis. Such a focus is considered unacceptable when it is to the detriment of 
research into understanding the great many tasks where humans have hugely powerful 
reasoning capability. Unfortunately this is research which is, lamentably, not available. 
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Ah. 
When reviewing a range of current theory from Epistemology, Psychology of reasoning and 
from computer science Oaksford and Chater are forced to conclude: 
"Nonetheless, only further research within each of these three approaches will provide an 
answer to the question of which is the most appropriate framework for studying human 
reasoning". (Oaksford and Chater, 2002, p 206) 
Is there a confusion between school and theory? 
This "fast and frugal" rationality argument pertains to have come from the "ecological" 
school of rationality. It says, if basic algorithms, which do not conform to classical 
('normative') decision rules, can match, or out-perform their `normative' equivalents then 
why are these equivalents given priority? A key example of this is the "Take the best" 
algorithm. This algorithm is not supported by rational norms, but, importantly, it has been 
shown to be as successful as linear regression methods in judgement tasks (Gigerenzer and 
Golstein, 1996). Not only is it a success but it uses less data, applies fewer rules and takes less 
time. Gigerenzer argues that these and other observations show that normative theory should 
not be the benchmark for human reasoning. 
Chater et al have argued very much the opposite from the same data (Chater et al, 2003): 
"... that norms of classical rationality are crucially involved in explaining why a particular 
behaviour is ecologically successful. Thus, we argue that classical and ecological notions of 
rationality are complementamy, rather than standing in competition. " (p65) 
This position suggests "the standard notion of rational explanation" does in fact, contrary to 
Gigerenzer's view, refer to a rationality which both stresses rather than ignores the 
environment and takes cognitive limitations into account. They also provide evidence that 
other- algorithms, from within the classical model, perform equally well compared with Take 
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the best. Thus they conclude that Gigerenzer's theory has "run ahead of rational 
explanation,... "(p82). The error has been to view "... the human mind only as a 
probabilistic or statistical calculating machine. " (p82) 
This argument is over the etymology of rationality itself where Chater et al conclude we must: 
"... emphasise the importance of the project of providing rational descriptive explanations 
that can explain when and why the cognitive system is adaptively successful. " (p82) 
Oaksford and Chater suggest work on the probabilistic approach is heading in this direction. 
(Oaksford and Chater, 2001). Again, in defence of a better formulation of reasoning with 
respect to biases and heuristics, they argue that reasoning failures can be understood from 
within a normative model. These are not based therefore on too selective a normative model 
for comparison, but on the way people make sense of the everyday world: 
"A probabilistic approach to these processes explains people's performance in the laboratory 
as a rational attempt to make sense of the tasks they are set, by applying strategies adapted 
for coping with the uncertainty of the eve, yday world. It is these strategies that create the 
appearance of biased and irrational reasoning when compared with the standard provided by 
formal logic. " (p. 356) 
Are reasoning theories adequate? 
In considering the debate above one can own up to a certain confusion. The trouble is this, 
theorists appear to swap places in these arguments. The normative and descriptive landscapes 
seem to be two and a half sides of the same coin. This argument is still taking place at the 
intersect between normative, descriptive and prescriptive decision theory although perhaps 
now we have to add ecological theory onto the continuum. In the introduction to the same 
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paper Evans and Over's dichotomy between "rationality 1" the sense in which people perform 
sensibly in achieving goals and "rationality 2" the kind provided by normative theory, is 
rightly described (Evans & Over, 1997, p. 1) but not convincingly applied. 
This sort of partial disagreement confusion was highlighted in the work of Evans in his four 
way (Evans, 1991) classification for reasoning theories: 
1. The mental-logic approach with formal inference rules (e. g. Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). 
2. Mental models theory, which emphasises the power of semantics to create more powerful 
representations in the cognitive system (e. g. Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). 
3. Pragmatic reasoning schema theory, proposing content specific inference rules (e. g. Cheng 
and Holyoak 1985). 
4. The Heuristic approach proposing systematic errors and biases due to cognitive short cuts 
(e. g. Evans himself 1989). 
Concerned that all of these theories offer "cognitive limitation" as a central tenet i. e. that the 
human brain cannot adequately process large or complex amounts of information in real time, 
Evans tried to get these theoretical schools to reach a consensus. This consensus was to be 
over how we in the outside world might judge the adequacy of these theories to: 
1. Explain human competence, the fact that human beings solve deductive problems all 
the time. 
2. Explain formal biases, how is it that many errors which are made are systematic i. e. 
not the result of random overload but somehow in a pattern. 
3. Explain content - context effects, why is it a fact that the same logical problem with 
different content or context can radically alter people's ability to solve it. 
33 
Evans' view was that the four main theoretical schools had founded their theories upon only 
answering one of these three questions. He appealed to the philosophy of science's historical 
standards for theory i. e. completeness, coherence, falsifiability and parsimony. 
Oaksford and Chater having described Evans' work (Oasksford and Chater, 2001) argue, over 
and above this, that all theories which imply cognitive limitations approaches to people's 
rationality fail to recognise the key inferential mode found in humans. That mode is of 
selecting appropriate information from long term memory for reasoning. Only Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) has broached this area, and then with a great deal of difficulty. 
Oaksford and Chater propose that the whole theory of reasoning that surrounds these famed 
demonstrable human cognitive limitations is for artificially limited laboratory tasks. These 
tasks are selected to the detriment of others which would be able to begin to explain the 
awesome power of human cognition to store and call upon a life-time's worth of long term 
memories and to reason from them. Most mainstream theory of reasoning might therefore be 
insufficiently generalisable to real humans. Chater notes that even in artificial intelligence the 
problems of "scaling up" support this. Simply put, Al programmes which can handle "toy" 
problems rather well, when using the database of information that would be required by a 
laboratory experiment, failed when scaled up to deal with the more realistic data sets facing 
every human every day. (e. g. McDermott, 1987). 
The nub of the matter seems to be a nuance of normative theory surrounding a focus on 
deduction and inference. Chater, Gigerenzer and others would seem to agree that since very 
little of human reasoning behaviour actually involves deductive reasoning, why should 
normative laboratory experiments focussed almost entirely on deductive tasks of logic be the 
bed of theory? Where the disagreement comes in seems to be that Chater and Oaksford wish 
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to maintain the normative proposition but steer it into other research, whereas theorists like 
Gigernezer and Todd wish to reject it in favour of new-wave heuristics. 
Taking stock from an applied perspective 
At the beginning of this section I asked should decisions be represented by formal logical 
rules, or should their idealised consistency be in a negotiated tension with their real-world 
application? This review of the work of some key authors has served to further open up that 
debate rather than answer the question. It has become a debate about the philosophy of 
science, the standards for evidence and the meaning of "reason". One school suggests the 
evidence supports the rejection of normative standards, another says the same evidence is 
actually in support of it, a third suggests that the theories are inadequately differentiated. 
These decision support approaches discussed so far, which might underpin a future 
application of heuristics in real world risk-decision support, clearly show some of the tensions 
of a post-modem paradox. The normative science as "pure science" (i. e. applies to an 
unattainable model world) the descriptive science as a bridge which attempts to realise it in 
real world settings. The over estimation of either turns explanation it into "an art", which is 
why the debate proceeds primarily at the philosophical interface. 
What I think we can say is clear in three areas: 
1. The classical rules of normative theory, particularly with respect to probabilistic 
reasoning, may be judiciously applied. 
2. A great deal of received wisdom on the "biased human" may itself be biased due to 
sampling, methodological and paradigmatic choices which seem to have placed it on 
the edge of being self-fulfilling. 
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3. Human beings have a huge power to reason in real world settings and these should 
shape the context of our understanding and support of decision making. 
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1.5 Observations on real world decision making 
In this next section 
There is a raft of research situated at the social end of the spectrum which is concerned not as 
much with logical reasoning forms as with reasoning efficacy in real world systems. I shall 
take a brief tour of this work. 
I will conclude however that, despite the best efforts of the field, a highly transferable and 
uniquely heuristic approach to the real world risk reasoning in question may not be easily 
found. These theories are methodologically very top heavy and all give serious problems of 
transferring these technique into a real time distributed system for the high volume small scale 
risk reasoning in question. 
Reasoning power in the real world 
Humans have huge power to reason. Many of the authors reviewed so far agree on the 
importance of the real world context to release this. There are a number of formal decision 
approaches which frequently cite their "real world" credentials. We will consider briefly: 
Naturalistic Decision Making; multi-criteria approaches; deliberative mapping; multi-attribute 
utility analysis and value based thinking. 
Naturalistic decision making 
The term "naturalistic decision making" (e. g. Klein et al, 1999) is used to refer to decision 
making as it occurs in certain classes of real-world situations rather than the rarefied 
experimental conditions or highly controlled studies. It is specially studied in tasks such as 
life saving, critical medical decision making and so on. These are typified by high 
risk/consequences, ill structured problem spaces and stressful conditions. What Klein and 
others have consistently been able to observe is that highly experienced decision makers tend 
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to make effective decisions under these conditions. Note how this runs counter to the idea 
that high risk settings require more formal methods due to the risks being managed. 
Furthermore, this performance does not translate to experiments with normative style 
conditions and data. This lends further support to the idea that people function very highly in 
the contexts where human rationality actually matters. 
Multi-criteria approaches 
Multi-criteria mapping approaches are a decision analysis technique which deals with 
perceived shortfalls in conventional decision analysis. For example the assumption that all 
relevant data is available, the consequences of actions are knowable and so on. Mapping 
approaches which are multi-criteria tend to hold in tension uncertainty and plurality in the 
search for alternatives. This is seen as particularly useful where there is no uniquely rational 
way to resolve contradictory perspectives (e. g. the sitting of waste incinerators). A key aim is 
to interact with the decision space, broadening the values base of the decision away from a 
focus on technical and scientific data and information. Theorists would argue that the 
technique "more realistically reflects the multi-dimensional nature of reality" (Stirling, 
2001). This lends further fuel, particularly when we come to discuss risk, to the idea of the 
real (scientific) reality and the perceived (or maybe that should be experienced) reality are 
considered different. 
Deliberative mapping 
Deliberative mapping', is an alternative form of multi-criteria mapping which brings together 
panels of citizens and specialists into joint discussions about how best to resolve highly 
complex problems. This complex process guides participants through a series of interviews 
and workshops, working together to evaluate a range of policy options. The deliberative 
process is: discussing a range of core options; developing a set of criteria or particular reasons 
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by which to judge the options; and then testing the options against the criteria; weighting the 
subjective importance of the criteria, providing a final ranking for each policy option where 
both criteria and weightings are recorded. 
"Rather than provide a single answer, it allows many policy options to be considered at once. 
It reveals the key issues amid the complexity and shows who thinks what. " (Stirling, 2000). 
The downside of such processes is in being very demanding of time, resources and effort. It is 
usually only applied to large-scale, long-term, multi-stakeholder decisions on complex issues. 
It is noted however that an important by-product of processes like this is that they change the 
way the participants reason about the problem space. 
Multi-attribute Utility Analysis 
Multi-attribute Utility Analysis is used in health and environmental decision problems. 
Leaning towards more normative techniques it's strength is to evaluate options against 
multiple and competing objectives. It has five basic steps: identify objectives, establish 
attributes, quantify uncertainties, calculate strategies for maximising expected utility. Formal 
influence diagrams can be used to structure the approach more carefully. Challenges in this 
technique include the number of variables and maintaining the credibility and 
comprehensibility of analysis to diverse experts who contribute. This is still a descriptive 
technique but it has more rigour than the multi-criteria processes above. The advantages of 
this analysis is in its top-down nature and its focus on problem structure "attention is focussed 
initially on key variables and their relationships, and only later on the details " (Merkhoffer, 
1990) 
Value Based Thinking 
Value based thinking, according to Ralph L Keeney (Keeney, 1992) suggests that: 
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`focussing early and deeply on values when facing difficult problems will lead to more 
desirable consequences... " 
In a clean break with other methods, values are seen as more fundamental to a decision 
problem than alternatives. Value based thinking takes issue with the crop of current decision 
theory because their primary focus is alternatives. The "alternatives focussed" decision 
making techniques, wrongly for Keeney, figure out what alternatives there are and then 
support the choice of an the optimal one (from those which are available). Value focussed 
thinking consists of two activities, first deciding what you want and, second, figuring out how 
to get it. Keeney argues that this is not only more relevant but mirrors more accurately what 
real people really do. On the basis of some of the evidence in the previous section humans 
might be at the heights of their reasoning prowess here. 
Taking stock from an applied perspective 
On the face of it many of these methodologies would seem to be good candidates for a risk 
reasoning system. However their specialist nature is also their Achilles heel for a general 
transfer argument to small scale risk based decision support. Naturalistic decision making is 
clearly to experientially driven requiring real time risk encounters to function. Multi-criteria 
mapping and deliberative mapping are both purpose designed for multi-stakeholder 
environments involving internal and external players with multiple conflicting value systems. 
Mutli-attribute utility analysis is still too highly focussed on one large scale decision or 
strategy. Lastly, value based thinking is perhaps too philosophical. Whilst it might free 
applied decision makers from fixed frames and error prone reasoning, it will still return a 
highly naturalistic and aesthetic decision as an output. 
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1.6 Subjective Bayesian Decision Analysis 
In this next section 
I suggested at the outset that the subjective Bayes modelling paradigm was going to be the 
most likely candidate from which ideas might transfer into my applied problem. With this in 
mind I shall take a fairly detailed look at the area, hopefully confining this to the reference 
points we have already established in this review so far. 
I will conclude at present that whether subjective Bayes decision analysis could be the model 
for the applied systems I need remains uncertain. This will be picked up again in my 
discussion. This argument will hang on ideas of complexity, acceptability, time and 
usefulness along with a blend of the ideas of focus and narrative. 
What subjective Bayes approaches do appear to do is come near to (and sometimes exceed) 
my approach in terms of their organisational and rational sympathies. However, as will be 
seen, they are rendered `top heavy' due to the possibility that there is an over-reliance on 
fitting the normative model to the real world. 
What is very interesting about this approach is the way in which the need to reconcile 
objective and subjective criteria in a simplified structure is very apparent. It is as important at 
this stage as at any other to understand that these concepts are themselves a kind of short-hand 
for a far more detailed debate about probabilistic reasoning itself. 
Subjective decision analysis 
In the eyes of a social scientist the subjective vs objective debate may seem to refer to a 
simple dichotomy of science itself. Such an over simplification belies the underlying 
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intellectual debate. Bruno De Finetti states as one of his "preliminary clarifications" on the 
theory of probability: 
". .. the important thing is not the 
difference in philosophical position on the subject of 
probability between `objective' and `subjective ", but rather the resulting reversals of the 
roles and meanings of many concepts, and, above all, of what is `rigorous, both logically and 
mathematically. It might seem paradoxical, but the fact is that the subjectivistic conception 
distinguishes itself precisely by a more rigorous respect for that which is really objective, and 
which it calls, therefore, objective ... The subjective opinion, as something known by the 
individual under consideration, is, at least in this sense, something objective and can be a 
reasonable object of a rigorous study. " (De Finetti, 1974, p6) 
Interesting to note here is that De Finetti does not fall into the standard trap of assuming that 
subjective judgements are to be rated the inferior of so called objective ones. He is cognisant 
of the idea that users themselves may do this: 
"You should be aware of super f ciality. The danger is two fold: on one hand, You might think 
that the choice, being subjective, and therefore arbitrary, does not require too much of an 
effort in pinpointing one particular value rather than a different one; on the other hand it 
might be thought that no mental effort is required, since it can be avoided by the mechanical 
application of some standardized procedure. " (De Finetti, 1974, p. 179) 
Frank Lad, rather more metaphysically at times discusses the "ill ease felt by subjectivist 
statisticians who attempt to engage in the professional arena of scientific statistical analysis, 
still dominated by directed activities ofsearchingfor true, unobservable, randomness 
generating structures. 
When challenged, the proponents of the subjectivist construction cannot solve the myriad 
well-known methodological problems of statistics that have arisen during the recent half 
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century of the dominating for-7rzalist-objectivist alliance. The reason is that form the 
subjectivist perspective, many of the proclaimed problems evaporate in their own 
metaphysical airs. We have no language with which to resolve them, as none is needed. The 
can merely be dismissed. " (Lad, 1953) 
Lad goes on to discuss an intellectual oppression of subjectivist approaches within which he 
suggests the victim is actually statistical modellers who "have increasingly secluded 
themselves" to the detriment of the believability of their science. 
It is important as we come to discuss different subjective approaches that these three pitfalls, 
that of simplistic judgement of subjective data, that of allowing reasoning systems to provide 
this data for us be used and that of ignoring the lack of fit between objective science and the 
realities to which it pertains to help scrutinise what is being said. 
Subjective Bayesian approaches 
Bayesian analysis attempts to "utilise", or combine, the information in a decision problem 
which is a blend of scientific and experiential or judgemental data into the best course of 
action. To a true Bayesian the result is not just that course of action itself, but the ability to 
communicate the rationale for why it is believed to be so. This is the first key area where the 
thoughts in my system resonate with this approach. A Bayes decision maker will be able to: 
"provide a framework within which is ideas can be critically appraised and modifred, 
especially in the light of new information not originally incorporated into his model " 
(Smith, 1988). 
This desire for a rationale to be generated along with a decision and the admissibility of new 
data is what fundamentally separates Bayesian analysis from normative models. Early 
applications of Bayes were still within a normative paradigm, Rational Bayes works using the 
theorem but with a set of utilities and probabilities. The paradigm soon widened. The 
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application of the theorem to belief nets and associated decision tree approaches have 
attempted a fusion of descriptive techniques with normative problems of expected utility. 
Subjective Bayesians would argue that rather than being a formal theory of decision analysis 
per se, it should provide an underpinning theoretical construct. This means that a number of 
different decision support activities now carry the name and their relative merits still divide 
the science (Cooke, 1991). 
Goldstein and Wooff attempt to summarise "the Bayes linear approach" which is situated 
neatly at the crossover point between formal normative Bayes models and allowing more 
subjective judgements to enter an analysis. They state: 
"... we may view the Bayes linear approach either as offering a simple approximation to a 
fill Bayes analysis, for problems where a full Bayes analysis would be too difficult or time 
consuming ... or as a generalization of the full Bayes approach, where we lift the artificial 
constraint that we require fill probabilistic prior specification before we may learn anything 
f "om data. ( Goldstein & Wooff, 2008, p6. ) 
Goldstein and Wooff attempt to formalise their approximation of Bayes in a description with 
thirteen features. These emphasise a subjective starting point. Interestingly it is seen as 
important that the analyses have to be "within the ability of the individual to make". 
Expectation is substituted for probability in order to avoid the need to determine all 
probabilities in advance and allowing a focus on uncertainties allowing a "partial belief 
structure" to be constructed. Beliefs in this approach are fitted by linear fitting which is an 
approximation and computationally more simple, although this retains the structure of a 
Bayes model. The computational burden is therefore reduced. Over their systematic 
structuring of the approach what becomes evident is that the simplification is intended to " 
develop methods to assess whether "belief judgements appear intuitively reasonable. " 
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Subjective Bayes decision analysis can be differentiated therefore as a modelling cycle, not 
the application of a model. As a whole process (both psychological and statistical) it is not a 
computational method alone. It works with ones beliefs about the probability of future under 
uncertain conditions. As such subjective Bayes modelling runs against classical statistics. 
Where the former attempts to interpret the evidence against a real world model, even if that is 
intuitive, the latter interprets the evidence through a series of laws independently of the world. 
A Bäyes approach admits openly that a scientist interprets her evidence in the light of a 
world-view, in some circles this is seen as a serious bias of the method (Meyer and Booker, 
1991). Classical statistics omits this possibility on the grounds that it cannot conform to 
statistical rules. 
Subjective Bayesians would argue that a judgement based use of probability can escape its 
data by introducing updated, judgement-based uncertainty. To prevent a rationality loss 
Bayesian probability judgements, like those in normative models, are still linked back to 
axioms (often stylised here as betting preferences). 
All so called subjective probabilities can be shown to suffer from biases under certain 
conditions (Hogarth, 1987, Kahnemann et al, 1983., Wright and Ayton, 1994) in this way 
they are very like normative / descriptive models suffering from biases of : availability; 
`imaginabilty'; anchoring ; conservatism; base rate neglect; misconceptions of randomness; 
poor cognitive information processing; affective discomfort and so on. The subjective 
Bayesian would argue that scientific consistency is achievable in overcoming these biases via 
the judgement support procedures the technique puts in place. 
Towards Prescriptive Analysis 
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"Most decision analysts now talk of prescriptive decision support and prescriptive decision 
analysis as being the application of normative ideas, mindful of the findings of descriptive : 
decision studies, to guide real decision making. " (French, unpublished notes 1998) 
A good example of another analytical approach to fitting Bayes models to the needs of the 
decision support space what has been called `the expert problem' (French, 1985). There are 
three classes of problem space, I have named them consultants, consensus group and bench- 
markers 
1. Consultants: A group of experts is approached by a decision maker for advice (e. g. a 
share buyer consults a group of stock brokers). Here the decision maker is not the 
expert but must assimilate the expert judgements into a decision 
2. Consensus group: A group who is responsible for a decision to the outside world (e. g. 
a series of managers assessing the safety of an air traffic control technology) who will 
look for a structured, rational, fair and democratic way to combine their judgements. 
3. Bench-markers, a group of experts who may simply be setting a benchmark to be used 
in as yet un-revealed circumstances. 
For 1 and 2 the focus is the decision and how to combine judgements. For 3 the focus is 
summarisation. In the combination of expert judgements (like risk and issues) calibration is 
therefore important. This calibration is done formally in Bayes elicitation and is even called 
de-biasing: comparing the experts predictions with the real outcomes (assuming one has 
them). A refinement to that technique relates to how informative (i. e. accurate) the experts 
judgements are in any given instance not just averaged over a long run (which might show 
high calibration value). This sorts of highly detailed thinking to provide support systems for 
possible irrationalities take us back through the descriptive norms and into a more fully 
developed idea of prescriptive analysis. 
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Prescriptive analyses use normative models to deliberately effect an evolution of decision 
makers' perceptions. It is one of the purposes of the analysis that the modelling process 
should be creative, dynamic and cyclic following a process of preference assessment and 
modelling, insights based on model exploration which leads to revised judgements which 
themselves lead to a revised model. This process is supposed to cycle until no new insights 
are found. This is a clear reaction to decision analyses based on a fixed or immutable view of 
preferences. 
In attempting to build fully prescriptive systems there is something fundamentally 
sympathetic about the way prescriptive Bayesians set about supporting decision makers 
towards having a coherent model. French outlines a series of criteria in the choice of 
prescriptive methodology. In brief: 
- Axiomatic basis: assumptions underpinning normative methods used need to be clear 
explicit and acceptable to decision makers and deciding behaviour reflects the ideals 
that decision makers aspire to 
- Lack of counterexamples: the absence of any unsettling counterexamples 
- Feasibility: the choice of practicable methods, i. e. not too many inputs, no over 
powered computations needed and no high dimensional representations 
- Transparency: the users must understand what the inputs mean how the calculations 
have been performed and what the results'mean. Not a black box. 
- Robust: sensitivity of the analysis should be understood and a lack of arbitrary 
assumption 
- Philosophically compatible: should fit with the decision makers view of the world and 
help them explore perspectives within that worldview. 
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"In short the acceptability of a prescriptive methodology will depend upon the philosophical 
outlook of the users. " 
If there remains a lack of decision making clarity, problem formulation tools can be used to 
reduce the lack of clarity (e. g. Soft OR methods Rosenhead, 1989). 
On the use of subjective probability 
Before we discuss some well understood problems with the use of subjective probability it is 
important to contextualise this further within the debate raised by De Finetti and others 
earlier. Whilst we are critiquing the use of subjective probability to inform decision making, 
that has to be seen as coming within an overall critique of probability itself. In the 
introduction to his book on the foundations of statistics Savage ruefully points out: 
"It is unanimously agreed that statistics depends somehow on probability. But, as to what 
probability is and how it is connected with statistics, there has seldom been such complete 
disagreement and breakdown of communication since, the Tower of Babel. There must be 
dozens of different interpretations of probability defined by living authorities, and some 
authorities hold that several different interpretations may be useful, that is, that the concept 
of probability may have different meaningful senses in different contexts. " (Savage, 1954, p3) 
Nonetheless, there are some well recognised problems with using subjective probabilities. 
We have already mentioned phenomena such as conservatism, see Smith's version of the 
tennis match example (p45). Here, in the face-of clear logic, individuals using probabilities 
under guidance, rather than as experts, still produce exclusive probability spaces which do not 
sum to one. The assumption is that subjective probabilities can be fitted to a classical model 
with relative ease, according to Smith this assumption has been "criticized as being too 
strong" but as he says "it forms one of the cornerstones of Bayesian decision analysis ". 
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There are a number of fixes the decision analyst can introduce to stiffen up subjective 
probabilities such as: Using betting schemes which are very similar to your clients problem; 
breaking down events into components; avoid probabilities which are either very large or very 
small; differentiation of joint probabilities. 
The counterarguments from within subjective Bayes to the challenge that the use of subjective 
probability (or non axiomatic) is manifestly "illogical" seem to appeal to some kind of 
intangible not being picked up in the decision analysis, for example self esteem. They also to 
appeal to some kind of cognitive connectedness to the subject matter which doesn't happen 
when the subject matter is raw immaterial, such as tossing a coin. There is enough debate 
highlighted about this to suggest that it is at a bit of an impasse. This impasse raises questions 
about how much support (and how long lived) clients would really need. As Smith says: 
"In practice the probabilities you elicit will invariably not satisfy the probability aXIOmS if 
you happen to ask enough questions, though the client is usually prepared to adjust them 
when you point this out and treat the inconsistencies as measurement errors" (p47) 
A question of process and content 
As is clear from this detailed consideration, subjective Bayes modelling is attempting a 
thoroughness which goes beyond the application of a decision making theory and into the 
heart of what an organisation is trying to achieve by clarifying the decision space. Philips 
called this "requisite modelling" (Phillips, 1989), looking at large scale technological 
processes he proposed that "decision conferencing", an intensive two day problem solving 
exercise facing complex issues, was a form of "social decision analysis" and that adequately 
conducted these produced "requisite models". A facilitated process the aim is to arrive at a 
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simplified, though not simplistic, structural form for representing the problem. This is used to 
house both firm data and subjective judgements about the problem. 
Phillips concludes that decision conferencing: 
"... lends structure to thinking, and allows all perspectives on a problem to be represented 
and discussed ... 
the process facilitates communication among participants providing "a way 
to talk differently"". (p 108) 
The reason that Phillips suggests that a more lateral and intuitive complex of ideas is 
necessary to model a group's thinking processes and support their decisions is because: 
"Effective decision making requires a balance between content, structure and process. 
Content refers to data, information and value judgements that are relevant to the problem at 
hand; structure shows how items of content are related; and process concerns how content 
and structure are generated and used in taking decisions. If any of these three elements is 
neglected, the quality of decision making suffers. " (p 108) 
Taking stock from an applied perspective 
As I suggested at the outset of this section, subjective Bayes approaches do encounter some 
difficulties. Consider what sort of process one would need to deliver the substance of 
everything discussed above. Consider that these are not seen, on the whole, as alternatives 
but as "requisite" for effective decision modelling. Notwithstanding the need for a skilled 
facilitator and a fast computer at all times, there is simply a feeling here that over-engineering 
is essential to assure success within the normative world-view in the subjective setting. 
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1.7 What benefits package should decision support provide? 
Looking at all the landscapes I have drawn (some rough sketches, some more detailed) we can 
see the science divided along the fairly classical lines from the laboratory to the field (and 
sometimes even the field is, critically, just outside a convenient laboratory). There is a lot of 
nuanced discussion which is really about definition. Whilst we see a lot of applied crossover 
of the dominant normative basis to the arguably more ethnographic descriptive approaches, 
there is also a lot of direct challenge in the opposite direction i. e. that descriptive or real world 
approaches perhaps should define the area themselves. 
In the real to life decision theories above we also see a raft of very "methodologically rich" 
solutions which are problem oriented rather than theory facing. These aim to take decision 
support into a deliberative, or value oriented, direction and away from logical positivism. 
Naturally where these use probabilities or combination rules which are statistical, they close 
the circle again. 
As a review focussing on the practicality of applying heuristic reasoning to safety and 
business critical settings there is perhaps the basis to ask what standards could we apply to a 
perfect reasoning system. Arguably these could be expressed in a dubious syncretism. The 
perfect system would go some way to meeting the shortlist overleaf: 
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Eighteen features of an ideal decision support system 
1. Mirrors accurately what people really do but in rationality terms 
2. Reflects explicitly the values that are being brought to bear 
3. Has credibility with users 
4. Is sufficiently comprehensive 
5. Uses weighted subjective criteria and objective 
6. Allows decision making to take place under conventional circumstances 
7. Includes the best available mathematics suited to the problem space 
8. Involves some formal logical rules for decision closure (choice, acceptance) 
9. Phrases propositions in favour of long term memory use 
10. Remains transparent to and explicable by decision makers at all times 
11. Rests on semantic and narrative descriptions of problems 
12. Takes cognitive limitations into account 
13. Bases decisions on a bridge between induction and deduction 
14. Does not have too many variables 
15. Is not highly demanding of time and resources 
16. Can address small scale few stakeholder problems 
17. Is able to identify and counter biases in reasoning, or at least inconsistencies 
18. Allows individuals to compare reasoning on a common platform with each other 
Eighteen features is an accurate summary of the literature reviewed so far, but it is also a very 
long list. On closer inspection certain commonalities can be viewed and the list can be 
revised under some more inclusive headings as shown: 
Core concept Eighteen features of an ideal decision support system 
Can address small scale few stakeholder problems Application / 
kl d Does not have too many variables oa wor Is not highly demanding of time and resources 
Phrases propositions in favour of long term memory use 
human centred Rests on semantic and narrative descriptions of problems 
Takes cognitive limitations into account 
Mirrors accurately what people really do but in rationality terms 
Is sufficiently comprehensive 
Uses weighted subjective criteria and objective 
Includes the best available mathematics suited to the problem space 
Rationality Involves some formal logical rules for decision closure (choice, 
_acceptance) Bases decisions on a bridge between induction and deduction 
Is able to identify and counter biases in reasoning, or at least 
inconsistencies 
Has credibility with users 
Allows decision making to take place under conventional circumstances 
Values / Remains transparent to and explicable by decision makers at all times 
credibility Allows individuals to compare reasoning on a common platform with 
each other 
Reflects explicitly the values that are being brought to bear 
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To design a system which faces up to such a short-list for a real-time distributed decision 
support system is all very well. However since this system is aimed squarely at the 
prioritisation of risks, we have a second key scientific area to consider. This area of risk will 
prove equally disputed, equally at times on the horizon of a post modern vortex of theory and 
counter theory, equally given to reductionist and expansionist world-views. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review of risk theory 
2.1 Summary of chapter two 
The landscape of risk is one of the most dense areas in recent social psychological history. 
This chapter will consider the complex literature of `risk'. Risk will be shown to have always 
been complex. The meta-themes of the area can be shown to have shifted a great deal over 
three decades of research and these are considered. 
The prevalent theoretical positions on risk will be compared. This covers risk expressed as: 
science (e. g. the physical hazards); public policy (e. g. the debate in various safety and 
environmental arena on acceptable / tolerable risk); social construct (e. g. the scrutiny of 
science and scientists as part of the debate); psychology of the individual (e. g. the various 
cognitive and psychometric paradigms) and finally post modern (e. g. the idea that one might 
hold `risk as science' and `risk as emotion' in some kind of tension). The various schisms in 
the definition risk resulting from it being such a complex, socially constructed idea will also 
be explored. 
Social science will be shown to be the dominant frame for risk research and for risk 
definition. One key debate in the field is discussed in the light of an early nineties controversy 
between "scientific" risk and so called "perceived risk". This controversy effectively split the 
discipline and the effects of that split can still be seen cutting across the literature. 
The problem of there being little hope of a unified understanding of risk is an important theme 
to consider. Major representative works ranging across global economics, cultural theory, 
social science/philosophy, engineering and health science are explored for an explanation. 
54 
_` 
What is clear is that these fields are distinguished by asserting a different form for risk and a 
different method for its operation. 
The conclusion will be unsurprisingly that risk is a vitally important applied concept however 
ill defined it may be. This means that, judged within the context of an the applied system for 
reasoning in the setting like the ones in this study, a definition is still required. The solution 
given to that problem in this review is, similar to that discussed for decision support, the 
application of an innovative form of heuristics. 
In this chapter we will also touch on literature in the subject matter areas of the two case 
studies. This material will reveal a small sample of the pressures the organisations face. This 
awareness will help to contextualise this thesis. 
2.1.1 Summary of key points in this chapter 
- Conceptual clarity in risk is elusive and at the same time important 
- Risk, like normative decision theory, can have a purely model world theory base 
- Risk, like descriptive decision theory, being social in nature must accommodate 
subjectivity within all its conceptions 
- That subjectivity still requires rigour of definition to be a sound scientific application, 
but the definitions have to be "local" to the problem field 
- The schism between real and perceived risk can be shown to be a fallacy 
-A clear form of risk which can be applied in all settings would never be available from 
a synthesis of the extant theory 
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2.2 What is risk? 
ýý 
What is risk? The briefest scan of the works researching this area will show that we might as 
well ask what is art, how does one recognise quality, or what is the essential nature of time? 
The more that is written on the subject, and indeed the more it becomes absorbed into our 
schools, hospitals, offices and factories as "a thing" which is measured by assessment and to 
which we are answerable under law, the more post-modern a concept I would argue that risk 
becomes. 
Thinking of risk as post modern is not dangerous. Post modernism itself is of course hard to 
define, it relates to the demise of any absolute truths into relativity. More importantly, for my 
use of the term, it relates to the fragmentation and division of all academic subjects into a 
variety of perspectives - with no 'answers' or agreement. It is in this sense that I want to 
suggest that risk is a post modem concept. It is not that there is no definition of it, it is that 
there is so much dispute about it. Seeing it as post-modern therefore does not mean that it is 
unimportant, quite the reverse. It is very important for any system that wants to measure and 
use risk, particularly if that system promotes human safety, to attain conceptual clarity. 
Extant grouping the major themes of risk 
Risk is a very large and conceptually complex area as the core concept of risk takes many 
forms, a sample like those in the list below could go some way to illustrate that: 
Statistical and scientific meanings 
Statistical likelihoods can make comparisons from historical data, e. g. the numbers of 
people killed and injured annually, as complex proportions of those who travel where, 
when and how 
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0 Exposure a concept which although personally qualifying risk still does so with 
respect to statistical distributions e. g. the actual number of times one flies/drives etc. 
0 Technical risk of hazard derived from humans coming into contact with complex 
technical (or natural) systems, the hazards these present both in normal operation and 
in their failure modes 
0 Observable track record implies that objects or processes e. g. safe performance, are 
subject to empirical rules of observation in time 
0 Uncertainty and the degree to which causes and effects are observable in complex, 
changing, or novel, systems makes establishing formal `risk rules' very difficult 
Human centred meanings 
0 Perception of risk can be highly paradoxical and will vary with context 
" Culture, the degree to which decision makers, e. g. in industrial safety, can have the 
luxury of rigorous application of the frequently changing scientifically rational 
evidence 
This thesis will go on to explore the operational use of a combination of risk and risk concepts 
like those above in two very different industries. The first industry is safety critical, the 
National Air Traffic Services of the UK. The other is one of the worlds largest fast moving 
consumer goods companies, Unilever. To span the potential "risk usage" of two such diverse 
industries a wide range of risk theories will need to be considered. It is advantageous to have 
some kind of controlling model (however incomplete) within which to examine them. I will 
consider the major risk theories, as regards the problem space of this thesis, in five distinct 
clusters: 
1. Risk expressed as science 
2. Risk expressed as the interface between science and public policy 
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3. Risk expressed as a social construct 
4. Risk expressed as the psychology of the individual 
5. Risk expressed as approaching post modernism 
The treatment of these clusters are summarised overleaf: 
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Risk expressed Identification of physical hazards Factual and physical 
as science Description of threat sciences bias hidden Quantification of probabilistic elements assumptions, closed Linked to control behaviours debate 
Risk expressed Rise of the critique of perceptions 
as science and Challenges to the authority of science 
public policy Introduction and legitimisation of subjective 
judgements and reasoning 
Plural definitions of risk in the same decision 
spaces Social and political 
Rise of emphasis on communication sciences important, 
Rise of tolerability transparent assumptions, 
Rejection of the idea of a single truth held in tension 
mathematical construct 
Dispute between the physical and the social 
sciences 
Risk expressed Geo-political framework application 
as social Culturally constructed and seeks more 
construct serious cross cultural explanation 
Value driven control mechanisms 
Constructed for society not emergent Social and cultural 
property from it sciences important, Multiply framed even within a single society multiple permissible Persistent view that risk is about human assumptions, open health 
questioning Social consciousness not a private process 
Places science and scientists within the frame 
of scrutiny 
Risk expressed Risk is about cognition and problem solving 
as the Risk is about a the forces which frame Cognitive and emotive 
psychology of perceptions individual and group 
the individual Risk can be measured along existing processes, behavioural 
psychological lines decision theory is key 
Risk is a model held by the individual reference point, highly 
Risk has to refer to the self and others diversified and 
Risk is an expected utility artefact conflicting schools 
Risk as post Lay persons' perceptions and judgements 
modern carry equal weight with experts 
construct Framing risk outside of expert models is 
valid 
Emotional and scientific responses to risk in Questioning is key, 
the same person at different times are equally plural realities can co- 
valid exist, the construct has 
Risk in toto is challenged as potentially not no fixed meaning 
meaningful 
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2.2.1 Risk expressed as science 
In the 1970s the focus for risk was on developing scientific methods for identifying and 
describing hazards and assessing the statistical probability of adverse outcomes. "Risk 
analysis" became a scientific discipline which focussed on threats to health such as chemical 
exposures, road traffic accidents, and disasters. By the early 1980s, risk analysis had evolved 
to give rise to "risk assessment and risk management". These disciplines started a focus on 
hazard and risk factor control. Probability became coupled to an assessment of scale in a 
classic conceptualisation of risk as probability multiplied by effect (Carter, 1995). More and 
more focus was being placed on managing risk by reducing the scientific measurement 
uncertainties of risk. This approach was in pursuit of a clearer definition of the form and 
function of a risk construct which was still very scientific. (World Health Organisation, 2002). 
Risk, according to institutions such as the U. K. 's Health and Safety Executive, (HSE, 1999) 
and academics who advised and supported them, was a scientific question. Risk became `the 
realisation' of the concept of industrial health and safety. If one can adequately identify, rank, 
manage and monitor all threats in the industrial environment, that environment will be "safe". 
On a societal level this safety would be expressed as stopping factories exploding and 
poisoning people, stopping aircraft crashing and so on. This would have to be expressed at 
the individual level as controls on behaviours linked to the preservation of self and others. 
For theorists like James Reason (Reason, 1997) the problems of the risks endemic in industrial 
processes have an industrial solution, that of computational fluid dynamics. Risk, like a gas 
in a chemical factory pipe, has to be contained and it must not escape through "holes". The 
identification of these holes and the factors which cause them would lead to better and better 
risk potential mitigation. "Safety" would be the result. "Human error" remains a key (and 
ever present) "hole" in such a systems approach, but this too can be quantified (one times ten 
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to the minus seven in any large engineered system) and can be factored therefore into a 
"safety equation". Risk, for HSE and other safety engineers acting on this kind of advice, is 
best assessed by physical science using engineering process control metaphors. 
2.2.2 Risk expressed as science and public policy 
The 1980s saw the rise of greater government involvement in legislating risk controls. The 
80's was also a time of conflict over risk. Challenges were being levelled at the authority of 
quantitative science to own, describe and measure it. The rebuttal was that scientific 
predictions were still seen to be rational, while public perceptions were believed to be largely 
subjective (the so called `real and perceived' risk debate). Policies to "correct" and "educate" 
the public however met successful resistance in the era of rising distrust in governments and 
industry. Scientists too, now in the same spotlight, revealed the high levels of scientific 
uncertainty that were inherent in the risk field. Challenges insisting on alternative 
assessments and alternative interpretations of `risk' gathered momentum in environmental and 
public health debates. 
Commenting on these debates the WHO concluded that governments and politicians had a 
major role to play in handling conflicts over trust in risk policies by promoting open and 
transparent dialogue. 
"The so-called scientific or quantitative approach to health risk assessment aims to produce 
the best possible numerical estimates of the chance or probability of adverse health outcomes 
for use in policy-making. Although high credibility is usually given to this approach, how 
valid is this assumption? Why is this approach often seen as more valid than the judgements 
made by the public or social scientists? " (WHO 2002, p30) 
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The WHO comments how "in practice there are considerable difficulties in making 
"objective" decisions at each step in the (risk) calculations. " (My brackets). Thus any risk 
modeller has to adopt (and declare? ) a specific definition of risk and needs to introduce into 
the model a series of more subjective judgements and assumptions (Carter, 1995, Slovic, 
2000). 
By the early 1990s, particularly through the failure of scientific approaches to control and 
explain risks, it became accepted that risks had to be understood within the larger social, 
cultural and economic context (Gifford, 1986, Pidgeon, 1992, Stem and Fineberg, 1996). 
Risk became seen as embedded within societies and their cultures. Determining that . 
individuals perceive and control risks within a cultural frame was not actually an entirely new 
idea (Douglas M, Wildavsky, A 1982). 
Increasing disillusionment that the "lifestyles" approach to risk, based on health belief models 
(see Janz and Becker, 1984), had singularly failed to yield sufficient behavioural change (in 
the global context of the rapid emergence of / failure to stem the rise of HIV/AIDS) further 
weakened accepted scientific norms. This became an era where the public and NGOs, 
particularly those in the environmental movements, became better organized and more 
effective lobbyists. 
In post BSE Britain, improving public risk communication, rather than the science of its 
measurement, was seen as the essential focus of the debate. Powel and Leiss in their book 
`Mad Cows and Mothers milk' commented: 
"Good risk communication practice exists in the zone that separates the languages of expert 
risk assessment and public risk perception... both languages are necessary, because the daily 
business about managing risks - both the personal business of individuals and the social 
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allocations of risk reduction resources - cannot be conducted in either one alone'. (Powel 
and Leiss, 1997, p29) 
It was in this intellectual environment that, in 1992, the Royal Society had released a report 
entitled `Risk Analysis Perception and Management'. This was a further investigation into 
risk following on from their 1983 report entitled `Risk Assessment'. A key difference 
obvious from the titles was in the proportion of social scientists now present (and recognised) 
in the risk area. The 1992 report's intent of providing a state of the art review of risk was 
somewhat doomed by one argument, how does one define risk, as excerpts from an early 
chapter on risk definition show: 
- "The word risky is undefined, and it not to be used as a synonym for dangerous. All 
risks are conditional, although often the conditions are implied by context rather than 
explicitly stated. 
- Although detriment may represent the only numerical way of comparing different 
events associated with the same hazard, or the combined events of different hazards, 
the fact that any such comparison is an arbitrarily weighted total of 
incommensurables must never be forgotten. (p3) 
- There are serious difficulties in attempting to review risk as a one-dimensional 
objective concept. In particular risk perception cannot be reduced to a single 
subjective correlate of a particular mathematical aspect of risk, such as the product of 
the probabilities and consequences of any one event. " (p7) 
- Given the essentially conditional nature of all risk assessment, one should accept that 
assessments of risk are derived from social and institutional assumptions and 
processes; that is, risk is socially constructed" (p7) 
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These and other factors led to a philosophical shift from a focus on absolute risk to that of 
"tolerable risk". This debate is credited as having began in earnest (in the U. K. ) when Sir 
Frank Layfield's 1983-85 public enquiry into Sizewell B (O'Rierden, Kemp, Purdue, 1988) 
concluded that he disliked the term "acceptable" because some risks, given their benefits, 
were "tolerable". One could foresee a "willingness to live with a risk to secure certain 
benefits ". Thus the ALARP ('As Low As is Reasonably Practicable') principle was born. 
The ALARP principle was being taken forward as a matter of public policy by the U. K. 
Health and Safety Executive. They stated in 1991: "the judgement on what is tolerable is not 
a scientific but a political matter" (HSE, 1991, p 13). This reasoning would give rise to a 
competitor notion, "the precautionary principle" (that one should not izo ahead with a risky 
venture until reasonable proof of its safety was scientifically available). Pressure groups 
would use this principle to place the onus back onto the risk scientists to provide proof of 
safety as a necessary condition for a course of action. 
What is important to see is that the debate between science and public policy made risk into a 
more complicated interface between the two. The science was now firmly in the social 
science arena (not solely the physical or statistical) and the public policy debate opened the 
door to a very wide set of publics to discuss the purpose of risk reasoning. 
Fischoff et al had originally suggested there may be three generic institutional approaches to 
`acceptable risk' (Fishchoff et al, 1981). These were: professional judgement (by individual 
or using `standards'); formal analysis (e. g. cost benefit, decision analysis) and `bootstrapping' 
(revealed preferences from hazard tables etc. ). A decade later, the authors in the Royal 
Society's report suggested there were now seven criteria for acceptable risk, these were: 
- Comprehensive 
- Logically consistent 
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- Practical 
- Open to evaluation 
- Politically acceptable 
- Compatible with existing institutions 
- Conducive to society learning about risk 
- Improving of decision making in the long run 
The public policy debate had created the need for an expanding social science framing of risk 
which was nearing absurd levels of complexity. 
Risk science had suggested a controlled application of a well defined measurement concept in 
well understood decision problems. Risk social science, particularly at the public policy 
level, suggests the need for any measure to take account of tensions between values (agreed 
and disputed), agreed facts and disputed facts. Risk science had estimated risk as a statistical 
value. Risk social science somehow had to be able to reflect these values in a more complex 
`consistency'. Importantly that consistency was a construct and not a number. "There are 
serious difficulties in defining a single measure of objective risk itself " (HSE, 1991, p90) 
The problem, according to Adams, with the well intentioned Royal Society's approach 
(Adams, 1995) was that between 1983 when it published the "authoritative, confident and 
purposeful" Risk Assessment and 1992 when this second report came out, something tectonic 
had happened in the world of risk, or more precisely in the scientific perception of risk. 
Adams relates the 1992 report thus: 
"Although it was published by the Royal Society, the Society was sufficiently embarrassed by 
its contents to insist in the preface that it was "not a report of the Society ", that "the views 
expressed are those of the authors alone" and it was "merely a contribution to the ongoing 
debate " ". (p7) 
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Adams suggests that by 1992 the Royal Society was no longer capable of taking a collective 
scientific view about risk. He attributes this squarely within an irresolvable dispute between 
the social and the physical sciences. To his view they simply could not agree about the 
meaning of risk because risk could not be a unitary concept. 
2.2.3 Risk expressed as a social construct 
The debate on the social construction of risk spans the entire time-period of the changes in 
public policy outlined above. Since the early eighties, serious effort had gone in to looking at 
the construction of this concept and establishing the arena of its impact. This has a range 
extending from geo-political to socio cultural dimensions. Some of the key theories are 
discussed. 
Geo-political Risk: Risk, according to the sociologist Ulrich Beck, (Beck, 1986) is a global 
force, like economics. To him it is a "rising" force which will become the dominant factor in 
shaping the future of the human race. He argues this bold point extremely effectively when 
he discusses the way in which science and technology has harnessed forces which can 
incinerate or poison the whole human race. The core essentials of life, he argues, like food 
and water, are no longer subject, as they were historically, to economic forces which dictate 
who has control over access to these. Rather, the global forces of risk will dictate whether all 
food and all water (and all air for that matter) are safe for consumption by all human beings 
irrespective of geographical position or economic wealth. Risk, in Beck's overall conclusion, 
will be satisfied in what he calls "reflexive modernity": that is where humanity better 
harnesses science and technology to learn all the faster how not to threaten the geosphere. 
For Beck risk is assessed by awareness of social phenomenology and dominated by science 
and technology. 
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Culturally Constructed Risk: Risk, according to Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983) is essentially a cultural phenomena. It is value driven and is 
used primarily for control of a stabilised society which is normative. What any society 
believes about economic forces and indeed the "myths" it holds about the functioning of the 
natural world, are aa control mechanism of the powerful. How things go together, and what 
to fear therefore, is defined by these agents according to cultural theory. 
The current debates in 2007 about the realities of global warming and climate change would 
fit very nicely into such an interpretation. For Douglas and Wildavsky one must understand 
who is using risk and what they are using it for to understand what it is. Risk can, in their 
view, only be seen through the filter of an anthro-centric world which may or may not have 
any contact with the real world. For Douglas and Wildavsky risk is assessed by those who 
have social power and is dominated by myths of nature when these are dressed as 
indefatigable scientific truth. 
Social Scientific Risk: This debate has been touched on in the previous section. Risk, 
according to Statistician and Geographer John Adams, (Adams, 1995) is a social construction. 
Borrowing what he considers the best from cultural theories he uses the statistical observation 
of society to prove that risk can only be seen as socially constructed and multiply framed 
within that. This construction and framing remains elusive as it is somewhat dynamic. 
Like the cultural theorists Adams suggests that risk is about societal control, for example over 
our beliefs and behaviours in driving on the roads. Adams explores what he sees as society' 
odyssey with risk. This is taken from the point of view of who it is that wants to control the 
definition of risk. In particular he reviews the desire to make risk in the image of other 
measurable values with which society is more familiar and comfortable such as assessing the 
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financial value of "a risk". Risk, in Adams view, has to be assessed through the same filters 
of any other social construction and will be dominated (in the west at least) by utility and 
measurability. 
Societal Welfare Risk: Risk, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2002) risk 
is a problem for society. Getting a better understanding of how risk works politically, 
economically and socially and where the key risks are in the food chain and in the health 
promotion cycle of modernising society is seen as the key task. The WHO is not 
philosophically very far from Beck in this regard. To the WHO, risk has to be dealing 
primarily with accepted and obvious risk to life, be assessed through measurable human 
health realities and be dominated by governance decisions. 
Socio Cultural models: A back-lash against the dominance of cognition and decision 
theories these models consider intuitive and emotional aspects of risk. Cognitive type models 
would suggest that risk is driven by private understanding, socio cultural models would 
emphasise the product of continuous process of interaction in a social context. Douglas 
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) developed the use of a world-view approach and see different 
social groups as selecting different risks to pay attention to. This would explain differences in 
perception and those which they are pre-disposed to select. 
The agent as selector of risk (paying selective attention) is influenced by cultural bias i. e. 
worldview and the arrangement of social relations across five axes: Hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualist, fatalist and hermit. So people do not focus on risks primarily to protect their 
safety but as a means of protecting their way of life. Douglas has suggested that the heuristics 
of risk can be re-phrased not just to be individual cognitive strategies, but to be a medium to 
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clarify options and expectations related to other individuals and thus predict what they will do 
along agreed cultural values. 
Many failings of such a soft approach have been pointed out, for example it doesn't explain 
how culture changes over time and it perhaps oversimplifies things. Its key strength has 
probably been to drive a pluralist wedge into the hinges of the scientific doors. It has perhaps 
helped theorists like Wynne (Wynne, 1992) to subject science and scientists to the same 
scrutiny and critique normally reserved for lay people in scientific models. Wynne suggest 
that scientists too are biased, selective, normative etc.: 
"What is taken by technical experts and policy makers to be an irrational rejection of 
scientific information inay instead by a rejection [by the lay populous] of naive assumptions 
[within expert models] about an ideal world, both social and material, which is embedded in 
the 'expert' model of risk taking ". (Wynne 1992, -p. 32) 
Cross Cultural Models: Boholm attempted to make an overarching review of the cross 
cultural aspects of risk perception over the twenty years up to 1998 (Boholm, 1998). As a 
result he encouraged deeper and more moral and inclusive forms of research. Boholm felt 
this research should face up to the richness of cross cultural issues rather than trying to 
sublimate them in trivialising generalisations. He was frustrated by the psychometric 
paradigm and its over emphasis on measurement. He was also frustrated by the fact that 
extant cross cultural studies: 
`form a heterogeneous field of research, with little agreement on basic theoretical issues, an 
low consensus on problems in their research or on methodology... as a matter of urgency, we 
should be systematising results and theoretical frameworks, thus generating new research 
which will lead to more poweifid statements about the perceptions of risks as social and 
psychological phenomena. " (p 153) 
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Boholm was heavily critical of circular social science argumentation where the answers to 
questionnaires are corroborated against "superficial characteristics of the society in question". 
Linking these characteristics to objectively observable phenomena pointed, as far as he is 
concerned, to merely asserting that social science has found exactly what it might have 
expected. Boholm suggests a new paradigm is needed: 
"about the way in which risks are embedded in the social fabric, taking into account 
`conceptions of morality, equity, justice, and honour; religious doctrine; ideas concerning . 
sovereignty; property, and rights and duties; and aesthetic values and what constitutes 
quality in life' (Rappaprot, 1996: 65). " 
With this he wishes to do away with the: 
`fallacy of unrestrained empiricism, producing new empirical results accompanied by trivial 
explanations for the sake of it (Fauchaeaux, 1976) " (p 160) 
2.2.4 Risk expressed the psychology of the individual 
Risk, irrespective of the prejudices that have been filtered into our scientific world-view and 
assumptions base, is a human construct. Risk therefore, whether it is through science or 
through experience, is always perceived. A number of critical perception theories have been 
put forward in the psychology of individual risk. In 1999, the UK Health and Safety 
Executive, conducted an excellent and wide-ranging review of these entitled: `Risk Perception 
and Risk Communication: a review of the literature'. 
That review suggested that to understand risk and how it functions one must question how the 
construct is appropriated by individual human agents. This appropriation however can be 
seen through a number of theoretical filters. An in-exhaustive list of these would include: 
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Cognitive; Psychometric; Mental Models, Value Expectancy Models and their application in 
industrial "safety culture" models. 
Cognitive: The cognitive paradigm accepts that people actively evaluate risks in some from 
of costs benefits trade off. Until more recent research (see earlier critique on elicitation and 
heuristics) this approach emphasised lapses from optimal rationality. Tversky and 
Kahneman's laboratory studies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974,1981) were highly influential 
showing that human decision making did not follow Bayesian logic and that much of human 
decision making is typified by biases, errors and misconceptions. Tversky and Kahneman 
and others suggested "cognitive heuristics" were being used by decision makers. These 
heuristics created a useful reduction in the cognitive processing load for a decision. However, 
the heuristics were prone to `misconception' and `misapplication' which lowered the decision 
quality. 
A number of other theorists (Slovic, 1987., Lindberg and Frost, 1992., Doyle, 1997. ) took the 
area forward to conclude: 
- sources of bias can be directly introduced from the way risk information 
is portrayed 
- framing can be a key factor e. g. where there is a generalised preference 
for options 
phrased as gains rather than losses. 
- ownership of the risk outcome is an important mediator 
- people tend to see risks as discrete exposure rather 
than increased exposure. 
These cognitive framing issues had achieved the status of normal science of 
the 90's but 
remain in dispute. 
Psychometric: Perceived dread and perceived familiarity 
are key factors in expressed 
preference for risks. Risk in this approach is considered 
inherently subjective. Risks are only 
i, 
.i 
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il 
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seen through the social filters of the way people apprehend them. For example, people 
underestimate likely risks and overestimate unlikely (Lichtenstein. 1989) and people are better 
risk judges when rank orders were used (e. g. Pidgeon 1992). 
The underlying rules which people might have be using to understand risk were written from 
a factor analytic approach leading to sets of widely used `key factors' of personal risk 
assessment as being: 
- Perceived dread (how much is the object feared) 
- Unknown risks (to what degree is the object alien to comparison) 
- Number of people exposed (to what degree does this potentially impact) 
Cross cultural differences have emerged in these factors however (Englander, 1986) and there 
was much criticism of the pre-selection of hazards by the researchers ensued (in much the 
same vein as the pre-selection of decision problems in the related heuristics research). Slovic 
(Slovic, 1983) attempted an organic approach emphasising the inherent weaknesses of 
psychology experiments (sample size, representativeness, control of variables etc. ) and the 
factor analytic approach which was so frequently used. The unsurprising conclusion one 
comes to when the core methodology is undermined in this way is of course: 
"... the concept of risk means different thing to different people" (Slovic 1986) 
Mental models approach: This approach explores people's declarative knowledge through 
free elicitation techniques and compares experts and non experts through the development of 
mental maps. The study of errors and biases in this context has shown that the inferential 
processes of lay people are different to those of experts. Where experts will differentiate 
between correlation (a relationship) and contiguity (the juxtaposition of unrelated events) lay 
people generally did not. Lay people tended to class all cases more deterministically this is 
perhaps because people want to understand and control threatening uncertainties. The 
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tendency, apparent in this model, to reference lay views to experts remains very strong as 
does the assumption that the expert has the correct view. 
The correctness assumption has been challenged by Wynne (Wynne et al, 1992). Wynne tried 
to expose misconceptions and biases also present in the expert mental models. Disunity in 
science over things like food scares was seen as contributing to a new view of science, a view 
of distrust and an erosion of the perceived credibility of the sources of risk communication 
(MacGregor and Flemming, 1996) 
"... lay models of Toxicology, and of chemical risk, are not only less complex [than the 
experts] they are primarily composed of beliefs, attitudes; perceptions and impressions that 
are loosely organised according to intuitive principles" (MacGregor and Flemming, 1996) 
Value expectancy models: These models were aimed at unpacking cautionary motivation 
and self protective behaviour. Their application is to do with health promoting behaviour 
with a central notion of perceived vulnerability. This work relies on a strong (but contested) 
relationship between behaviour and attitudes and is underpinned by behavioural decision 
theory. In value expectancy models risk behaviours reflect a conscious decision process 
involving the utility of outcomes. The individual wishes to minimise harm, through action 
based on perceived seriousness. That motivation is said to be based on perceived likelihood 
of event. Benefits must be weighed up in terms of costs. There are three dominant theories in 
this area: 
- Theory of reasoned action; Fihsbein and Ajzen, 1975 
- Theory of planned behaviour; Ajzen, 1991 
- The health belief model; Janz and Becker, 1984 
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There is considerable overlap in the models as all three theories have a common ancestry, 
being based on Subjective Expected Utility Theory. The theories also share a belief that 
subjective cost benefit assessment takes place in the form of some sort of function. 
Later research (Harrison et al, 1992., Van der Pligt, 1998. ) heavily criticises these approaches. 
Problems highlighted included "cognitive framing issues" relating to framing, 
misinterpretation of probabilistic information and cognitive availability issues e. g. over- 
estimation of sensational or dramatic risks (Van der Velde et al, 1994). Likewise, perceived. 
susceptibility was mediated by the ease of visualising yourself as a victim. The `self and 
other referent' bias and `unrealistic optimism' are both cited as complications. These are both 
complex psychological entities with attribution biases which preserve the self image. Asking 
people to do comparative risk assessments on themselves seems to trigger social comparison 
processes rather than risk or health precautionary assessments (Van der Pligt, 1998). 
Safety Culture models: Safety culture models are more of a theoretical emphasis than a new 
theory. These models emphasise the importance of culture in the workplace when trying to 
identify what makes it safe. The role of culture and sub cultures (e. g. professional groups). 
has to qualify how risk functions. This tends to be a framework type approach. There is 
support for the idea that people actually have an accurate idea of risks in industrial contexts 
(e. g. Fleming et al, 1998) although this perhaps relates best to more physical risks found in 
high hazard environments. That accuracy may drop in more complex environments. 
How risk is assessed and by whom is the key issue in a safety culture assessment. Managers 
might be pressed by alternative worries which places them farther away from the centre of the 
risk itself. Thus their decisions may underestimate risk. Safety culture research, being 
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predominantly psychometric in nature, suffers the same criticisms of those approaches already 
discussed (attitudinal measurement and drawback of factor analytic approach). 
The HSE (HSE, 1999) comments that it is not the conceptualisation of risk which is at issue 
amongst differing social theorists, this is generally accepted within the psychometric tradition 
(Fishchoff, 1995). It is the status which is ascribed to lay knowledge and the extent to which 
subjectivity is accepted as being present which differentiates the `psychology of the 
individual' theories of risk. 
What is interesting about almost all of these psychological theories'is how heavily they draw 
from the concepts of wider decision theory. Some concepts are taken directly from decision 
and game theories. Notice a common emphasis on a range of human cognitive biases, for 
example the failure to understand set theory. Subjective attitudinal approaches emphasise 
cognitive emotional framing (e. g. the impact of dread) as if it were a factor in a risk 
judgement calculation. Inferential process approaches compare expert and non expert 
judgement on (largely probabilistically framed) risk choices. Health beliefs and value 
expectancy approaches emphasise conscious utility-driven behaviours in risk choices. Many 
of these approaches point out lay people are inconsistent in using statistical and scientific 
judgements to inform behaviour. 
2.2.5 Risk expressed as approaching post modernism 
Post modernism as I have already pointed out is a complex concept concerning the collapse of 
academic study of an area into a arena where there are no answers, only competing 
conceptualisations. As has been seen risk can be argued to be suffering from this problem. A 
further common use of post modernism asserts the validity of an individual's "own" reading 
of reality. Risk in some more recent research has also adopted this flavour. 
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Lay Risk: Theorists like Andy Stirling and Brian Wynne have made a lot of headway with 
the notion of `lay persons risk'. They have argued that this risk is equally admissible in 
applied industrial problem solving e. g. in the location of waste incineration facilities, the 
response to genetic modification of foodstuffs. This is arguing for a more post-modern 
understanding of risk. Stirling and Wynne and theorists like them are saying risk cannot be 
conceptualised outside of the individual's experience and that groups of individuals should be 
allowed to set the essential frame for their risks outside of "expert scientific models". 
For these sorts of theorists lay risk has equal weight with scientific risk. Risk is assessed as a 
group rationality process (with scientists as one player) and dominated by a relative 
expression of preferences surrounding commonly agreed fears. The problem for governments 
and industry in particular is that this is a break with the authority of science to determine the 
factual truth of a situation. 
Emotional Risk: A relatively recent innovation in the risk area which is appropriate to add to 
this section on post modern readings is Slovic's notion of "emotional risk". In this attempt is 
to tease out risk behaviours in a more classically philosophical taxonomy (Slovic et at, 2002) 
he would argue that we are none of us, scientists or lay people, bound by any one 
appropriation mechanism for risk. Rather, we sometimes see risk as science and behave 
appropriately. We sometimes see risk as emotion and then we behave differently. In the 
latter case we are not behaving inappropriately to contest or reject scientific views on 
environment, safety etc., it is just that our "risk affect" is the focus of our rationality for 
reasons which are entirely explicable. 
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Risk Communication: Once the model for understanding risk has been selected another 
model for communicating it will be important. As we noted earlier the late 1990s saw a rise 
in the emphasis of risks being adequately communicated suggesting that this was not a trivial 
matter of disclosure to a receptive audience. Two debates around risk communication which 
unsurprisingly mirror the debate around risk these are: 
1. The idea that risk communication has no meaning 
2. The idea that risk is the key currency to educate the health perceiving public 
I've chosen two more idiosyncratic sources from among the many alternatives to examine this 
debate. My reason for doing this is two fold. First, these considerations have the same 
essential qualities to offer the debate as any of the more mainstream ideas, as they are well 
reasoned and adequately contextualised. Second, using them as sources highlight just what 
degree of penetration the risk debate has had: 
In two papers, both published in 1999, Jack Dowie was an interesting dissenting voice on the 
need for risk at all. His paper "Against Risk" he says this: 
"'Risk', whether used separately or in conjunction with other terms (as in expressions such 
risk assessment, risk factors, acceptable risk, and risk communication) is an obstacle to 
improved decision and policy making. Its multiple and ambiguous usages persistently 
jeopardize the separation of the tasks of identifying and evaluating relevant evidence on the 
one hand, and eliciting and processing necessamy value judgements on the other". (p57) 
Again in 1999, this time particularly focussing on risk communication being meaningless, he 
says that risk is a "conceptual pollutant": 
"... it encourages people to assume that they know what they are talking about when they use 
it - but, much worse and much more significant, to assume that they know what others are 
talking about when they hear or see it used. It is a highly dangerous chimera which can be 
dispatched without loss". (p42) 
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Dowie, in no uncertain terms, feels that risk used in a decision analytic setting should be 
"replaced by a term, or terns capable of carrying the requisite analytical burden" 
These pleas were published in journals whose names included risk. They were published at a 
time when risk was being more and more highly diversified and nuanced. History found in 
favour of this diversification and our desire to carry on using this term coupled to 
"communication" remains. The problems of defining the communicative intent persist also. 
Risk has clearly become a plurality which conveys its diverse meanings to a range of publics 
who have internalised some part of it. Scott Ratzan, in his editorial for the Journal of Health 
Communication in 2003 entitled "Making sense of Risk" took a very pro-science and anti- 
precautionary principle approach. He tours medical advances which would not have been 
possible if the precautionary principle (more and more he risk regulatory norm) had held 
sway. He suggests that a precautionary approach to risk hampers progress on stem cell and 
GMO research and a host of other areas and is "threatening the future of scientific 
innovation". After highlighting an embattled government (over SARS or Acrylamide) and 
the "media frenzy" which leads to public mis-trust his plea to health communicators is this: 
"Al all of us are health communicators, we ought to be aware of the role we play in the 
proactive and reactive approaches to risk Such areas of Knowledge Management, 
Knowledge Sharing, and Knowledge Utilization are amongst our arsenal to approach a wary 
public. " (p399) 
Recognising the need for "discrimination between evidence and values" he goes on in his 
short address to cover risk communication (on health) which must: 
- Tailor language to needs and interests of users 
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- Be clear reliable relevant and credible 
- Sensitive to cross cultural variation in risk acceptability 
- Sensitive to individual variation in risk acceptability 
- Discriminating of voluntary and involuntary risk 
- Sensitive to differing emotional responses 
Hopefully, the strain of ever producing adequate risk communication which just this one sub- 
sector list requires is a point in itself. Ratzan has provided yet further evidence of a post 
modern, individualistic reading of risk (and risk benefit analysis). 
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2.3 Risk and Decisions for whom? 
The National Air Traffic Services of the UK and Unilever are "corporations" and need to 
have a stable, useful and corporate concept of risk to reason from and make policy within. 
Whilst the actual work of these organisations is not the subject of this thesis, it is appropriate 
to very briefly and incompletely position some headline themes: 
2.3.1 Risk and the National Air Traffic. Services 
NATS is a provider of air traffic control services for the mainstream of air traffic in the UK. 
Much of the literature surrounding this sort of operation is, not surprisingly, fascinated by the 
preservation of safety and the reduction of (classical) risk in that environment. This is done 
through safety technology. It has been argued (Arthur and Sonander, 2000) for NATS that 
there has been a tendency to design this safety in isolation: 
"... safety is in a complex and dynamic relationship with the whole system utility, within 
which it has plural definitions and rationality. "(p3) 
NATS, like its counterparts around the world, was somewhat worried by trends in air traffic 
such as exponential rises in air travel, the speed of new technology and growing competitive 
and commercial demands on historically single-minded (safety) air traffic organisation. A 
key analysis of the situation in America by T. S. Perry had sent some early shockwaves (Perry, 
1997). He predicted: 
`If the U. S. air transportation system does not change in any significant way, there could be a 
major aviation accident every seven to 10 days. " (p19) 
This, Perry was careful to unpack, was simply a statistical prediction in the face of 
burgeoning air travel and a statistically flat accident rate for over 15 years. He also saw that 
the historically safety critical nature of air traffic system had created unintended side effects 
of technology which couldn't change for fear of knock on effects. 
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The "host" system for U. S. air traffic control, at that time, contained half a million lines of a 
software language (jovial) which was no longer in use, ergo there were no experts. This 
computer, at the centre of detecting all safety critical aircraft data to prevent collisions, had 
only 16MB of RAM, and this was in 1997. Quoting from an air traffic controller interviewee 
Perry points out that this software was now so old and "patched" that it had to be left alone: 
"There are so many patches, no-one knows how it works. We can't change anything, no-one 
dares touch it... " 
The approach to this problem was to build better and more powerful peripheral systems to 
support the ageing central one. Perry points out what a short term risk strategy that could be. 
Perry goes wider in his substantial paper to develop a detailed analysis of the possible 
technological and ethos changes facing air traffic in the coming decades e. g. the proposed 
introduction of free (not controlled by air traffic) flight, the changes to air traffic technology 
and so on. What his particular paper did at this time was to `raise the stone' on the 
impeccable idea that safety was in safe hands and free from commercial consideration: 
"Pilots throughout the world think free f ight is a great idea, if implemented correctly. 
Airline managers are enamored of the concept because it has the potential of saving 
billions. " (p33) 
In July of 2000, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation published an 
investigation: "Investigating the Air Traffic Complexity: Potential impacts on workload and 
costs". In this project they attempted to develop an algorithm to compare air traffic centres 
across Europe equitably on the effects of their traffic, airspace and controller workload 
complexity. Notice two things, the assumption that this was not only possible but that an 
scientific algorithmic approach was the desirable solution space. The report concluded that 
complexity was now at the stage where it too must be measured: 
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"complexity has to be incorporated if meaningful and cost effective metrics are to be 
developed. " (p27) 
Colin Chisolm, the then Chief Executive of NATS, in his 2001 strategy suggested that the 
pressures from sustained traffic growth, the transition to a brand new air traffic centre 
(Swanwick), the transformation of NATS into a Public Private Partnership will: 
"... all place demands on the company. The plan, therefore, is centred on a programme of 
improvement and development, supported by mature and effective safety management 
processes and undei pinned by an increasingly comprehensive analysis of the sources of risk. " 
Notice the idea of an "increasingly comprehensive" response to risk. It was that idea that led 
to my research into less conventional human factors in risk and decision making being 
commissioned. 
2.3.2 Risk and Unilever 
Unilever is one of the world's largest Fast Moving Consumer Goods companies, or FMCG 
for short. It has two large product categories in foods e. g. Lipton tea, Walls ice-cream, Flora 
margarine, and in home and personal care e. g. Domestos, Dove and Lynx-axe. It owns and 
manufactures some of the largest and most popular brands in the world operating 
manufacturing and distribution in over 100 countries. It is a "corporate giant". 
Reputation management 
So, other than stock market and supply chain considerations, why would Unilever have an 
interest in risk? Bakan's book "The Corporation" (Bakan, 2005) is an example of the "paper- 
back army" who routinely attack large companies and engender distrust in them. Tracking 
the rise of corporate social responsibility, which Bakan considers a smoke-screen to 
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hoodwink the public into supporting the psychopathic tendency of companies to pursue power 
and profit, he says this: 
"Despite this shift, the corporation itself has not changed. It remains ... a 
"legally" 
designated person designed to valorize self interest and invalidate moral concern. Most 
people would find its "personality" abhorrent, even psychopathic in a human being yet 
curiously we accept it in society's most powerful institution. " (p30) 
In its report "Power Hungry: Six Reasons to regulate global food corporations", Action Aid (a 
Non Governmental Organisation) suggests, whilst citing direct examples of Unilever alleged 
unethical practices: 
"Global food companies have grown too powerful and are undermining the fight against 
poverty in developing countries. They are draining wealth firom rural communities, 
marginalising small-scale farming, and infringing people's rights. " 
Conversely in the World Wildlife Fund website one finds: 
"Unilever, with advice from WWF, is taking a global lead in the development of sustainable 
agriculture. " 
Unilever works in close partnership with WWF and is in regular factual dispute with Action 
Aid over its allegations and its tactics. However, in its report "Still Dirty: A review of action 
against toxic products in Europe" The World Wildlife Fund still holds a position that : 
"Chemicals are an integral part of modern life: eve, yday products from computers to food 
packaging and detergents contain chemicals which can contaminate our environment and our 
bodies. Few have been adequately assessed for safety, yet exposure to these substances may 
be a key factor in rising rates of cancer; declining fertility and other reproductive problems 
affecting western societies ". 
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Food safety 
In his review of trends in food safety Korthals suggests that. there are fundamental problems 
for global companies like Unilever (Korthals, 2004) because: 
"The definition offood safety and risk differs by culture and age group. A certain product 
can thus be identified as hazardous and unsafe within one culture, but not within another. 
This cultural multiformity of scientific and lay perceptions of risks and food safety leads to 
problems when even yone can appeal to the right to a personal definition of risk" (p503) 
In "Risk Management in Post Trust Societies" (Lofstedt, 2006) the wider changing face of 
trust in industry, governments, regulators and other organisations in the public apprehension 
of risk is explored. It concludes " an increasing decline of public trust in both local and 
national policy-makers" (p 108). With this decline he also notes trust is "increasing towards 
other groups most notably environmental NGOs " (p 109) 
Throughout his book Lofstedt explores the relativism with which scientist, technocrats, civil 
servants and national and supra-national regulatory bodies are viewed in the matter of risk and 
the regulation of large companies. Who to trust and whom to believe over matters of national 
and global importance in responding to risk, modernity and globalised industry, Lofstedt and 
others will argue, is a very variable and unpredictable space. To be a key player in that space 
companies like Unilever must understand and skilfully manage a new portfolio of corporate 
reputation risks. 
It was in this growing realisation that Unilever set up its global Unilever Issues Steering 
Group. This group commissioned me to build an issues prioritisation process and tool to 
track and support the management of global issues. 
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2.4 Conclusion from an applied perspective: Which risk model to prefer? 
What is highly evident here is that risk is a pervasive. but enormously diverse concept, all of 
the mainstream models for its action are criticised in one way or another for omitting 
elements of each others framing and omitting (non western) social and cultural differences in 
their schema. Risk offers a banquet of overlapping sets of motivators for human beings who 
must measure it conscious of discontinuity between perceiving, managing, communicating or 
reducing the inherent risk. This measurement takes place under the need for any given 
measurement proposition to make sense also. 
Risk has to be assessed by examining and by contextualising belief and is dominated by the 
conflicting stories that goal-oriented persons and groups of persons tell themselves about it. 
These individuals tell such stories in the face of other individuals who might appropriate the 
same nomenclature to challenge or undermine the authority or acceptability of the primary 
goals. If one is going to make use of risk concepts in an applied field, a question looms large: 
Which model to choose? 
At the beginning of this section I suggested that risk is now a post-modem concept. In my 
usage I wanted to say that risk suffers from academic fragmentation and division into a 
multiplicity of perspectives - with no 'answers' or agreement. As the evidence here shows I 
can quite firmly back such an assertion, doubly so if I want to take risk and start applying it 
(as others have before me) to real situations. 
Where that situation, like one of the cases in this thesis, is actually about the loss of life of 
hundreds of people, and where the risk in question is a new formulation to compliment the 
contribution of established "risks" already at work, it is very important to attain conceptual 
clarity. What is abundantly clear is that this clarity is not available from a synthesis of the 
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extant theory. If we were to adopt therefore the (questionable) syncretism which we used in 
the case of decision theory earlier, perhaps we could attempt to synthesise at least some 
governing principles into a similar qualitative framework for risk. An idealised form of risk, . 
arguably from the debates above, would have nine attributes: 
1. Risk is about measurement and management 
2. Risk has to convey multiple perceptions 
3. Risk has to be about control features 
4. Risk ownership and risk framing are key essentials 
5. Risk is about communication 
6. Risk should be able to inform actions and influences 
7. Risk should focus on culturally important things 
8. Risk should contain a value idea and have an affect component 
9. Risk is about decision making 
These attributes might further cluster under two main headings 
Core concept Nine features of an ideal risk system 
Risk is about measurement and management 
Risk is about communication 
Application Risk should be able to inform actions and influences 
Risk is about decision making 
Risk has to be about control features 
Risk has to convey multiple perceptions 
i Risk ownership and risk framing are key essentials on Percept Risk should focus on culturally important things 
Risk should contain a value idea and have an affect component 
2.4.1 Concluding remarks on the literature 
What is obvious from this whole review is that risk, heuristics, decision making and human 
reasoning have a number of common platforms which are typified by debate, not consensus. 
Not only are the debate platforms similar but many of the researchers in one area appear in 
the other. Point number nine above remains key. Risk has its expression, according to the 
prevailing literature, not so much in hazard quantification or the summing of fears any longer 
(although there is a clear case for this in industrial process control), but in discriminating 
which (rationally coherent) decisions people do or don't take in consequence of quantified 
hazards etc. Not surprisingly, although it is not phrased in these terms, elements of 
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normative, descriptive and prescriptive theory for risk are clear in the literature. Also not 
surprisingly risk theory is demonstrable in its disunity to the point of post modernism. At the 
one extreme statisticians are offering to calculate the risk of anything at all with a universal 
formula, at the other philosophers are still arguing over mind body dualism. 
Towards an applied heuristic decision system for risk 
In the debates above I have attempted to find a grounding set of ideas for a risk decision 
support system in mainstream decision theory, in mainstream risk and in mainstream 
heuristics. 
The theoretical position for the use of heuristics contains such heavy caveats of definition that 
it is simply too dense an idea to use from a utilitarian perspective without significant revision. 
The theoretical position for the use of risk contains the necessity of choice from a multiply 
overlapping and, as yet, unresolved, concept over which no definitive position can defensibly 
be assumed. 
The theoretical position for the use of decision theory is certainly a challenge, not least 
because much of the theory which might apply to a reasoning system, even that which claims 
to be applied, is still based in a paradigm of definitional and intellectual control over "a 
decision" rather than "reasoning" per se. The closest candidate remains a revision of 
subjective Bayes attribute elicitation. 
That said, at the general level I think I have perhaps achieved four things. First, I have 
demonstrated that this is an impossibly complex and contradictory area of science to sell to an 
applied audience. Second, there is a sort of research-based Gestalt by which one might 
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qualitatively guide and judge a decision support tool. Third, there is second, Gestalt for 
considering qualitatively whether its risk elements are sufficiently meaningful. Fourth, this 
area is ripe for an applied innovation aimed not so much at simplification as at "elegance". 
The context for the innovation has to be that there is a real world where dealing with risks and 
their impacts is not the core business of most industry. The experts in industry who have to . 
deal with risks are often not risk experts but domain experts who have to master a 
contextualised form of risk. Professional decision making involving risks will tend to form 
around pre-existing business decision making processes and argument forms. The 
persistence of beliefs in hunches, luck and judgement in the execution of expertise has to 
remain in any attempt to frame decision support. 
The innovation itself should be able to describe a system to support decision makers (who are 
not the subject of theoretically aligned research) in making better and (to their own standards) 
more rational decisions about their risks (formulated in their own reference grammar for that). 
I think it remains possible to develop a hybrid idea of decision support and risk utilising 
heuristics to take this field in an innovative applied direction. 
In the light of the highly fragmented and unresolved nature of the risk and decision sciences, 
it would not be wise, or indeed possible, to build, in any global sense, an expert risk system 
for the National Air Traffic Services, and thereafter for Unilever. I decided in both cases to 
take a chance on entrusting the expertise to the subject matter owners. This left me free to 
build an upstream system focussing solely on improved reasoning, enhanced rationality of 
decisions and transparent communication of reasoning rationale. This would form around an 
exposition of the existing natural heuristics of these two decision maker communities. 
This would not therefore be an expert system, it would be a system `for experts'. 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Summary of chapter 3 
Two pieces of applied research were undertaken with the National Air Traffic Services 
(hereafter NATS) supervised by a steering committee of NATS experts. These case studies 
investigated risks potentially introduced to the UK air traffic system through human decision 
making. The decisions primarily surrounded new technology projects and strategic planning. 
The first project (Hurisk 1) was a highly explorative piece of work covering nine small case 
studies into a representative range of NATS decision spaces and project types. A 
hypothesised novel form of human-centred risk was tested and fully endorsed by the data. 
The evidence for these concepts was validated by an expert panel in NATS. An early form of 
heuristic notation designed to help decision makers conceptualise the content of those risks 
failed to be transferred for reasons which are discussed. 
The second project (Hurisk 2) was a system development project. The aim of this was to 
provide a tangible tool to measure the "potential of safety attrition". This drew on data for the 
risk forms uncovered in Hurisk 1 case studies and expert workshops. Further interview and 
review work produced a set of working models for safety attrition and this create a "concept 
house" in the form of a software prototype, also called Hurisk. 
This prototype were developed and tested via further NATS case studies. The results of these 
gave support to three sub formal, or heuristic, reasoning models. NATS experts were able to 
validate and use these in live project tests. Those models mapped to two domains, these were 
specific risks to projects and safe operations, which could be articulated as events, and a 
i 
89 
bespoke concept which was called "strain". Measurement and visualisation concepts for 
these underwent further user trials and expert review. The proof of concept was established. 
A number of soft concepts were tested to develop ideas for lesson learning approaches and 
tools. These were less successful, but their concepts remain of interest. A brief treatment of 
their design and the discussion of some validation data is given. 
Hurisk tools were compared with the, largely engineering based, safety tools which were 
already in operation in NATS at that time was tested. A direct comparison between Hurisk 
and NATS' own TRACER, itself a decision monitoring device, was made. Hurisk was also 
compared with the requirements of a sample of NATS' own specific safety standards. This 
was done to give insight into the potential support a tool like Hurisk might give to their 
execution. These exercises, in management speak, helped create a "value proposition" for 
Hurisk. A basic description of the outcome of this process is given. 
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3.1.1 Some key points made in this chapter 
- NATS operations managers found themselves to be arbiters of a new form of risk 
which they had no measurement system for. 
- This new form of risk lay outside their considerable expertise in dealing with well 
defined human and technical risks. 
- NATS found itself responding to `modernity risk' in the form of increasing commercial 
pressures competing with a heretofore non negotiable level of safety. 
- NATS was willing to look for an undetermined risk source in the form of `reasoning 
deficiencies' which might be endemic in its management system, for example the long 
held belief in brainstorming as a good judgement process. 
- It was not the significant or obvious risks which were the important object of NATS' 
attention in this project it was the many `grains of sand' risk that might lead to an 
imperceptible attrition of safety. 
- Initial attempts at a risk notation form for heuristic risk proved to be too far outside the 
reference grammar of the users and hence it was rejected. 
- There was a change in reasoning focus between the two projects from risk 
identification to the management of risk knowledge. 
- In the case of operational and engineering strain measurement a "journey system" i. e. 
one which took the user on a rational exploration of the complexities of the area was 
proved to be highly transferable even though it was a lengthy process. 
- The use of simple weighting structures as an indication of preference was very easily 
achieved and produced an elegant form of comparison within and between users over 
time. 
- The acceptability of the explicit use of a heuristic concept is shown in the 
"risk 
tolerance" measure which was purposely designed to operate emotionally and was 
accepted by users to do such. 
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- NATS had experimented already with heuristic measures for sensitive areas of risk, but 
these were deliberately' not attempting to measure these risks. 
- NATS documented safety requirements would, in many cases, be heavily supported by 
the introduction of a tool like Hurisk. 
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3.2 The National Air Traffic Services Project: Case study one 
Introduction 
An explorative research project on the attributes of human risk in air traffic control 
management decision making (Hurisk) was conducted using psychological field research 
tools. The research question surrounded the feasibility and acceptability of "non technical", 
"human centred" forms of risk measurement. The project was constructed from a number of 
smaller case studies. These were used to further develop and test a hypothesised descriptive 
model for the function of risk in air traffic (management) decisions. 
Following investigative case studies a prototype tool was designed for use by decision 
makers. This introduced and tested a novel form of risk notation as a `heuristic reasoning' 
device. An expert panel from the target population assessed the tool and its utility in the 
assessment of potential loss of safety through human judgemental processes. The notation 
was rejected by the users. The hypotheses however were supported. 
3.2.1 Aims 
The project had two aims: 
1. Perform a series of representative case studies on current forms of risk-based decision 
making for key projects and map out key reasoning deficiencies. 
2. Provide a new form of decision support for management and mitigation of risks. 
3.2.2 Objectives 
The project had three objectives 
1. To articulate the `human element' of risks and their associated decisions 
2. To propose a risk-decision support notation tool 
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3. To assess the viability of the use of heuristic devices for assessing safety in relation to 
human decisions (to change the air traffic system). 
3.2.3 Hypothesis development 
Working closely with NATS experts on a steering committee three working hypotheses were 
formed. Two were developed from expert suggestions, the third was developed in a brief case 
study (not described). 
1. Conventional safety tools measured "what safety tools measure" and that 
configuration left potential 'gaps' at the human behavioural interface. 
2. A process of "safety attrition" could go undetected given the complex, interdependent 
and dynamic nature of modem air traffic control provision. 
The third hypothesis comes from a simplified structure exemplifying NATS' three-fold 
mission to be safe, to meet the airline demand for service and to be efficient represented as a 
dynamic triad (figure 1). The key influences on the elements of this triad were made up of 
elements from a second order triad (figure 2) 
Figure 1: SEC triad 
SAFETY 
pp- 
CAPACITY 
EFFICIENCY 
The SEC triad 
Figure 2: The PPT Triad 
PEOPLE 
PROCEDURES 
The PPT triad 
TECHNOLOGY 
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3. Triads hypothesis: Air traffic control system could be summarised in a simple triad 
structure in which safety, efficiency and capacity were related, and could be in 
competition. Within each arm of the triad a similar, second order, triad existed 
representing the relationship between decisions to change people, decisions to change 
procedures and decisions to change technologies. 
3.2.4 Methodology 
The research was conducted into two sections. Section one was a series of case studies. 
Section two was two structured workshops. Techniques used in the case studies were: 
- explorative and depth interviews 
- observations (including observer participant mode when appropriate) 
- group discussions 
- in-house document review 
- structured workshop 
Table 1 overleaf shows a map of each of the smaller case studies linked to the strategic 
decision area it would exemplify. 
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Table 1: Case Studies in Hurisk 1 
Strategic Decisions affecting operating air traffic 
Re-organisation of There was a perceived need to re-organise the way training took place and this was 
Air Traffic Control being planned during the Hurisk project. The `human risk' element of the training at 
Training that time was described. 
Emergency Training In service Emergency Continuation Training (ECT) is a required element of every air 
in Air Traffic Control traffic controllers career. Annually controllers must re-train to remain fit to deal with 
rare anomalies and emergencies which nonetheless do turn up. ECT requirement is an 
example of the risk averse nature of the ATC system as a whole. 
Combined Control In the 1990's air traffic volume growth was described as "phenomenal". A concept to 
Function integrate radar approach for Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted was launched to deal 
with the fact that, given new traffic volumes, these three airports were too close 
together. This *combined function would be called Terminal Control (TC). The 
relocation of the control function and its controllers was part of a larger planned 
strategy anticipating (stimulating? ) growth at Stansted dating from the late eighties. 
The plan attempted to learn from the U. S. model with this problem which was to co- 
locate approach controllers and Terminal Manoeuvring Area outbound controllers with 
an underpinning assumption was that there would be capacity benefits. Co-ordinating 
of these functions was part of a larger five stage rationalisation plan for the airspace. 
Divergence from the predictions led to some of the scheme being "effectively 
scrapped". There were at the time calls for that whole ethos to be re-visited. A 
dispersed and evolutionary model was eventually adopted to cope with air traffic 
growth. 
TCUPPER Observations were made over a day of a simulation trial for TC Upper resectorisation 
`Resectorisation' . Reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) took effect in the U. K. in Feb 2001. 
The changes to the terminal control upper sector came in response to the huge growth 
of Luton and Stansted. There was already a lot of congestion in terminal control north 
and delays in the London upper and London middle sectors were increasing. 
2.5 Nautical Miles Previously the safe limit set on the distance between aircraft was three nautical 
Separation miles(nm). This 3nm represents limitations of technology, primarily radar, and so 
called "wake vortex separation" i. e. the necessary distance between certain types of 
aircraft in sequence. These distances interact, depending on aircraft type and traffic 
configuration. For certain situations, this distance was been reduced to 2.5nm during 
complex (well understood) manoeuvring in the approach to land. 
Technology Innovations and Engineering Projects 
Semi Automatic Cloud cover (height and type or mix), the visibility (runway and airport) and present 
Meteorological weather, are key measurements which may change dramatically in an hour. At the 
Observation System time of the project all 13 UK airports had an assistant air traffic controller (AFTS a 
semi-clerical role). This person made weather observations every hour and reported 
these via computer data known as a METAR. These observations were partly 
automated e. g. remote temperature sensing. Cloud cover and the airport visibility are key information which require an observer. AFTS were trained by the MET office for 
this. The cost of employing these staff was high and other automation was shrinking 
their role. If the weather observations could be automated, a justification for 
abolishing the role would be high on financial reasoning. 
Minimum Safe Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is an important issue and the rate was still Altitude Warning relatively high. These are where most fatalities occur. MSAW is a system which 
takes radar track information and detects aircraft proximity to terrain, or obstacles, and 
then alerts ATC in time to safely manoeuvre the plane. Designed as a safety net, the 
system catches incidents all other systems fail to. At the time the U. K. was considering 
committing to MSAW. 
Final Approach The Final Approach Sequencing Tool (FAST) was aimed at Heathrow where aircraft 
Sequencing Tool landed at a rate of 47 per hour during the busy periods on a tight application of 
existing rules and restrictions. Delays had the capacity to create large scale "ripple 
effects". Three controllers run four holding stacks at Heathrow in an involved 
arrangement. Final directions to the aircraft rely on "path stretching", and delicate 
control of turns married to standardised speed and headings. Controllers fine tune 
spacing with deceleration. This is sophisticated controlling unique, in the U. K., to 
Heathrow. Perturbations in the order would greatly increase controller workload. 
FAST was a semi-automation of some of these tasks and had been demonstrated in 
real time trials to show a reduction in some workload. 
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General 
The views of air 
traffic controllers 
A series of one to one and group interviews with Air Traffic Controllers covering their 
views on the safety of air traffic and the "human element" of risk was conducted. 
Testing the triad structure in case studies 
A protocol in eight of these case studies was used to assess how the case study content area 
could be phrased within the grammar of the hypothesised triad elements.. The following case 
studies were mapped to the triads: 
3.2.1 Case study one: Combined Control Function 
3.2.2 Case study two: Re-organisation of Air Traffic Control training 
3.2.3 Case study three: SAMOS 
3.2.4 Case study four: FAST 
3.2.5 Case study five: MSAW 
3.2.6 Case study six: 2.5 Nautical miles separation 
3.2.7 Case study seven: Accident training in Air Traffic Control 
3.2.8 Case study eight: The feasibility of safety attrition metrics, a workshop 
These case studies were specifically chosen to map to the hypothesised interactions between 
the two triads. This is shown in the table 2 below. 
Table 2: Mapping case studies to Triads 
People Technology Procedures 
Safety 3.2.7 3.2.5 3.2.6 
Efficiency 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.1 3.2.8 
Capacity 3.2.1 3.2.4 3.2.1 
3.2.8 
Validating the findings in workshops 
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The findings of the case studies and the triad notation results were formulated into a field 
report. A panel of NATS experts assessed this report to look for any "modelling value" from 
the case study conclusions. The panel was chosen from the target decision maker population. 
Operational air traffic controllers now also joined the review team. The review work was 
done in two structured workshops, these were: 
1. Hurisk Concepts (preliminary findings review) 
2. The Feasibility of Safety Attrition Metrics (a tool design workshop) 
3.3 Results of case study one 
The results, for the purposes of this thesis, will focus on 
- The success of the notation technique 
- The heuristic reasoning devices proposed 
- Evaluation of the three hypotheses. 
Treatment of case study results 
These case studies, given their highly explorative nature, generated lengthy and detailed 
descriptive accounts of many the inner workings of the air traffic professions' decision taking. 
These narrative accounts were subject to a three stage content analysis (resolved by facilitated 
expert panel discussion). The stages were: 
1. A coarse filter looking at whether a specific finding was indicative of a "barrier" to 
risk entering the system or an "inducer". This categorisation was guided by assessing 
the participant responses to two interview questions common to all case studies: 
a. What evidence was there to support the idea that case study X was 
presenting effective barriers to stem the flow of risks in the air traffic system? 
b. What evidence was there to support the idea that case study X was 
potentially inducing risk within the air traffic system? 
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2. An assessment of the contents of the individual enablers and barriers fitted to the triad 
notation. 
1 3. A combination exercise to assess the fit between the resultant elements and three 
"narrative schemes" underscoring hypothetical relationships between the triad 
elements. 
Risk notation 
These content analyses gave and overall risk notation heuristic. This scheme is shown in 
figure three below. The first order triads show Safety (S), Efficiency (E) and Capacity (C). 
The second order triads is the degree to which the risk relates primarily to People (Pe), 
Technology (T) or Procedures (P). Three possible relationships between these elements were 
given as: hierarchical; interaction; compound 
Fig 3 Triad notation 
FS] 
Safety pe People 
QE Efficiency © Procedure 
© Capacity Ft Technology 
Hierarchical Interaction Compound 
S 
pext pext 
s 
Examples of risk content analysis findings 
It is informative to look at examples of barriers and inducers. A representative range of these 
taken from each case study result is shown in table three below. 
Table 3: Examples of risk inducing and risk barriers 
Case Study Example Risk Barrier Example risk inducer 
Re-organisation 
of Air Traffic 
The fact that ability spreading takes place 
is a risk strategy 
The fact that the training is received from 
non operational personnel and that the 
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Control live environment is highly dynamic may 
Training introduce risks but they would be very 
difficult to uncover and trace. 
Emergency Air traffic controllers who fail their The design and execution of emergency 
Training in Air emergency and continuation training lose training at the units bears the burden of 
Traffic Control their certification for the site the risk of poor training design and poor 
or negative transfer of training. 
Combined Generalised problems with U. K. airspace Generalised problems with U. K. airspace 
Control were envisaged and action taken were envisaged but impetus for large 
Function scale revision was lost 
TCUPPER Constant recognition of factors which Acceptance of and acquiescence to 
'Resectorisation' induce high workload growing congestion levels with no core 
questioning of the rationale 
2.5 Nautical We won' t take something we can't do controllers make their own safety analysis 
Miles safely" 2.5 Nm separation was seen as an on when to use 2.5 
Separation example of where this happened and that 
was why all the additional criteria were 
added to mediate safety in its use. 
SAMOS The ideal is a 100% correct METAR. In it needs the specification of its parameters 
an automatic system the risk is and these have to be managed in a safety 
technology based. The error source is critical way, it is run by software which 
systematic not subjective. will have to be implemented with the 
reliability issues this suggests and it is 
susceptible to common mode failures 
MSAW The system is designed as a safety net, it Technology induced role conflicts e. g. 
catches those incidents when all other between pilots and controllers over height 
systems fail to detect the proximity. responsibility due to MSAW 
FAST Heathrow and Gatwick are recognised as If FAST does not guarantee conflict free 
near capacity trajectories who is responsible for 
policing its advice? 
The views of air Safety is felt to be eroding when it is no Controllers who operate a "climbing 
traffic longer easy to do the comforting things mentality" were felt to be misguided. 
controllers e. g. winding the radar out to 60 miles (as 
opposed to standard 45) to take a look for 
upcoming trafc. 
Examples of triad notation 
An example set of the results of the triad content exercise is shown in table four below. As 
well as the three triad element relationship schemes simple forms of barrier and inducer, i. e. 
where the barrier or inducer relates merely to one arm of the notation, were also observed. 
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Table 4: Examples from triad breakdown of risk inducement (first pass) 
  Technology diversity issues e. g. black and white screens 
  The introduction of "solely advisory" technologies with no testing on their actual use 
by the target users 
  The knowledge risk associated with not knowing how to track the development of 
cutting edge technology applications e. g. neural nets in SAMOS 
  If the forecast is not seen as reliable why is it factored in when reducing the required 
minimum separation? In wake vortex terms this is only permissible in favourable 
weather 
  Maintaining a competitive edge through acquiring better technology than rival service 
providers is not a safety centric activity 
  The interaction of new procedures with old procedures given familiarity index 
of air traffic behaviour as a help to good controlling 
  The threat of having your product (project) shot down by controllers is a 
difficult issue to factor in 
  The lack of human factors centred training upgrades is problematic 
pe 
  Those who never re-certificate but continue to train have a risk of skills 
degradation and skill shelf life 
  The fact that the training is received from non operational personnel and that 
the live environment is highly dynamic may introduce risks (these would be 
very difficult to uncover and trace). 
  The subject matter of training e. g. "decisiveness" has no apparent associated 
objective measurement criteria 
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  The possible interactions between skill equalising tools º, 
  The need to avert low acceptance technology transfer failure leads to convoluted 
(and therefore potentially more political and risk inducing) commissioning 
per t 
routes 
  The use of human performance benchmarking (when it is poorly understood) for 
technology specification 
  Assumptions of technology competence and presumptuous commissioning 
decisions which are made in "systemic isolation" 
  The use of controller optimiser technology raises serious questions not only 
about who is the beneficiary but how stable the benefit is. 
  Increasing the number of absolute error sources in automating a human function 
pe xp 
The interaction of new procedures with old procedures given the lack of 
understanding of the implications cf software rusting as a parallel. 
  The lack of parsimonious integration of technologies e. g. FAST and STCA for 
E 
engineering design expedience 
  Lost expedience risk e. g. if SAMOS reduced the movements at an airport by one t 
per hour the cost savings would be wiped from the project 
  Unintended side effects e. g. SAMOS measures weather and weather is factored C 
into capacity so SAMOS reliability has a non explicit) impact on capacity, h' t e. g. 
MSAW may have runway shutdown side effects (capacity again) 
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  Failure to be cautioned by existing systems functioning e. g. without 
FAST existing capacity gives a tight result using existing safety rules. 
S at 
This is an immediate cause for concern rather than a justification for a 
new piece of technology 
  Safety critical parameter specification by non safety critical technologies 
e. g. SAMOS 
  Technology which is not supposed to be for safety but wishes to impact 
efficiency e. g. SAMOS 
  The presupposition of a predictive relationship between research 
E 
pe ýt 
investment and technology implementation e. g. SAMOS, FAST. The 
pressure to commission is very great and may skew the analysis of the 
utility per se and the added value in the long term. 
  The credibility of advisory systems e. g. FAST does not guarantee 
E conflict free trajectories. Who is responsible for policing its advice? 
pext 
  Data structure weak links e. g. FAST depends on weather but the 
forecast at Heathrow is not reputed to be very good and decisions are 
taken to disregard it, how will the technology take such a decision? 
  Planned shutdown in order to keep skill and awareness up would almost 
never happen at the busy periods which creates a risk hot spot. 
S 
pext 
  Alert saturation mitigation lowering system functionality 
S 
pext E 
  General skill decay of the human base through automation 
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  The evidence relating to recovery from technology failure e. g. if 
E 
pe xt 
FAST was to go down the stacks lose their pattern for 
predictability with an adversely effect on workload even for 
experienced controllers. 
3.4 Discussion of results 
In modern air transport airport pressures primarily surround capacity and efficiency. Whilst 
meeting responsibilities to deliver the `safe and expeditious movement of aircraft' NATS has 
a duty to assess every change in their systems with respect to safety. Whereas historically 
"the system" referred to the technological system (mediated by air traffic controller 
behaviour), this project was an attempt to expand that notion to the management decision 
making system also. 
These case studies considered in conjunction with the outcomes two other risk programmes 
(Atcon and Softcon2), were an attempt to clarify how to support decision makers faced with 
increasing pressures in the real world of burgeoning air travel. NATS hoped this clarification 
would bring about concepts for tools to manage that risk. 
The dominant tool in NATS safety management, at the non technical level, was the "safety 
brainstorming meeting". This is a semi formal technique where professionals explore safety 
implications of changes to the air traffic systems. These assessments were observed to be 
based an informal kind of optimisation based around consensual compromise. Risk 
measurement was observed to feature in this process, but it was little more than discussion 
concluded by a simple high, medium and low ranking scheme in a consensus process. 
2 Atcon and Softcon were major re-organisation projects in NATS looking at air traffic controller organisation 
and the new air traffic control systems and computer tools 
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A more formal tool, such as that which could be derived from the investigation into these 
triads, could be used to assess the nature of the "decision spaces" around these changes and 
developments. Such a tool could create some kind of enhanced structure for reasoning within 
which a primary regard for air traffic safety would always be maintained. Explicitly 
verbalising and developing management plans framed in the relationship between the two 
hypothetical risk triads, it was argued, could have been an important source of improved 
safety rationality. This would preserve but "tighten" the sub-formal reasoning which already 
took place. Certainly, it could cause a richer form of safety discussion than brainstorming 
risks for a higher order proposition and assigning one of three scores to them. 
Having an improved structure to managers' thinking, like the one the triad model was 
proposing, could cover off the sources of human risk thrown up by management decision 
making. This was hypothesised by the expert panel as an important blind spot. These risks, if 
they were there, would currently be invisible to mainstream quantitative assessment 
techniques. Decision making and decision interpretation of human operators interacting with 
the content of the triads above could transform into an important, but usable, schema to focus 
risk measurement and control. 
It was clear that this research was exploring a tension between the three parts of NATS 
mission (safety, efficiency, capacity) These could be seen as contradictory, for example large 
increases in airport capacity can dramatically affect an airport's safety in a negative direction. 
Furthermore failure modes in one area were highly likely to generate failures in the others. 
The development of the interacting triads represents a heuristic simplification of the dynamic 
"socio-technical system" which the NATS experts were describing. Their intended use of the 
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triads notation was to exemplify key problem spaces. For example, the development of 
technology is vital for increased capacity. Fitting that new technology however is a safety 
critical exercise. The equipment must be highly reliable, highly usable, highly compatible 
and have an "at least zero" impact on safety. Likewise changes to procedures and human 
factors, e. g. the use of training and simulation, are also safety critical even if they are 
essentially aimed at efficiency or capacity. 
Hypotheses one and two in the study were generally supported by the descriptive data. 
Significant gaps in risk reasoning were agreed to be present at the human decision interface. 
Any one risk thus caused, if it was considered in isolation, would seem small. However over 
the case studies as a whole there were large numbers of them. This volume issue would 
support the notion of a process of "attrition". 
The triad notation applied to the "risk inducers" (as these were a key worry), attempted to 
ascertain two things. 
- Could this notation create a decision short-hand to differentiate and cluster risk types 
meaningfully? 
- Would this form of summary reasoning be accepted by air traffic control decision 
makers? 
As has been demonstrated in a range of examples above, the triad structure did work 
descriptively. Perhaps it was at its weakest across such diverse case studies in being able to 
identify any "pure" procedural problems. Only one real example was uncovered. This might 
lead us to believe that the idea of procedural problems is not well enough defined. There are 
two alternative explanations, one is that the procedural area of NATS is so strong and stable 
the only risks it produces are in its own evolution. The second is that procedural risks are 
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being expressed better in the other levels of the triads. If so the legitimacy of a procedure arm 
of equal importance to the others seems weak. 
Where the triads give their strongest indication of predictive power is clearly when they are 
anything to do with people. The majority of the stand alone and interactive risks surround 
people. This is perhaps not surprising, but again a model where equal weight might be given 
to a people arm would seem to undermine its explanatory value for risk. That said as a risk 
highlighting mechanism it would of course serve an important purpose. 
Why didn't this notation system work? 
The results of the expert review into the findings were that the triad notation would not go 
forward as a working concept. These early heuristic conceptualisations of risk were simply 
not informative or compelling enough to be seen as valuable to aid decision making. They 
did not differentiate risk magnitude when linked back to air traffic safety. A first major failure 
therefore was that they just didn't say enough comparatively. Whilst being relatively good at 
unearthing the complexity of problems, they were not perceived to "add any value" over 
normal narrative forms of discussion or reasoning. In short they did not really aid prescriptive 
rationality. 
A second reason for the failure was that they were simply too alien to air traffic control 
decision makers. The metaphor, although comprehensible, proved in a workshop with NATS 
experts that it did not gel with their other forms of description or reasoning. The notation left 
people rather cold. Something better, and importantly, something closer to the home 
reasoning forms which people were already using was required. 
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3.5 Conclusions and further research direction 
Although Hurisk missed the mark in terms of offering a new risk reasoning tool, the sponsors 
recognised with certainty that it hit the mark dead centre when it came to describing risk 
exposure that had never been described before. The long-hand forms of describing the risks 
posed by these technological and organisational case studies caused quite a stir in the 
organisation3. This is precisely because they were recognised for their validity. 
The key finding of Hurisk was that it was indeed possible to articulate risk types that were 
below the radar of normal safety systems. NATS safety professionals had agreed that this 
worried them. Three conclusions were important for this thesis. 
1. The important risks almost all came from new projects and the strain these added to 
previously secured safe working arrangements. 
2. These risks were heavily biased towards "the human judgement" element of the 
projects, not the technical. 
3. A way of summarising and scaling these risks was proven to be highly desirable. 
The Hurisk 1 triads were based on an a priori assumption that safety, efficiency and capacity 
were in some sort of fixed relationship structure i. e. you couldn't change one without 
effecting the others. This assumption extended to the idea that people, procedure and 
technology considerations were in a similar relationship. Whilst these relationships might be 
parsimonious, measurement of their effects had not proved viable. 
A second project (Hurisk 2) project was commissioned to focus on a single hypothesis. There 
was a source of risk, which is invisible to mainstream qualitative assessment techniques, 
3 The field report used for the two workshops was a collection of all the main findings from the work so far. When a senior 
manager in NATS saw a copy, his initial reaction was to insist that every copy be accounted for immediately and confiscated. 
This done, the same manager, after some further thought, photocopied the entire report to send to his seniors. 
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found in the decision making and decision interpretation of human operators and decision 
makers. It was agreed by the NATS expert panel that the Hurisk one concepts, if developed, 
might support decision makers to use their expert judgement to mitigate these risks. The 
result could be an increased sensitivity to air traffic safety from a human perspective. 
`Concept clean up' and further in-depth research was commissioned around three assertions: 
1. The air traffic control system was shown through Hurisk one to be under "strain" and it was 
desirable for that strain to be formally measured and controlled. 
2. Risk assessment within NATS would benefit from and expansion of its definition to take 
into account those sorts of risks thrown up in Hurisk, and these should be formally measured 
and controlled in the future. 
3. NATS was still not good at learning lessons from the past. 
The aim of a second Hurisk project would be to deliver a heuristic `reasoning system', this 
time as a computer-based risk and decision support prototype, to : 
- Measure `operational strain' caused by air traffic engineering projects 
- Measure/compare risk posed by "the human element" of air traffic control project 
decision making 
- Create usable, sub-formal, lesson learning capability 
Provide a raft of "culturally acceptable" visualisation environments to support on-line 
reasoning. 
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3.6 The National Air Traffic Services Project: Case study two 
Introduction 
Detailed evidence for new sources of risk in air traffic control had been produced in an 
explorative project (Hurisk 1). This evidence, validated by an expert panel inside of NATS, 
highlighted that the decision making processes and decision maker behaviours were a key 
mediator of an emergent form of operational risk brought on by increasing commercial 
pressure. This risk was invisible to current mainstream qualitative assessment techniques. 
Modelling from the evidence base of Hurisk 1, a detection and monitoring system for this new 
decision making risk was designed. This system utilised novel psychological modelling 
approaches and developed software prototypes to test these. A tool to support decision 
makers mitigate risks was the main outcome. 
The results of the interviews, modelling methods and bench-testing work which will be 
referenced in this case study are not being reported as a part of this thesis. The reason for this 
is that, interesting though this research is, it is not the primary focus. Also, a consideration of 
those findings would be extremely lengthy and involved. 
The discussion below is primarily a description of the system and not the wide research base 
used to create it. The following sections will focus therefore on some of the technical 
outcomes which are pertinent to the decision support concepts being explored later in this 
thesis. 
3.6.1 Aims 
Hurisk 2 focussed on types of risk introduced into the air traffic system in two main areas. 
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- "Strain" or perturbations that new air traffic control projects added to previously 
secured safe working arrangements. 
- The introduction of risk through "the human judgement" element of these projects. 
The task of the project was to investigate a useful way of measuring, scaling and 
communicating these risks. The aim of Hurisk 2 would therefore be to deliver a heuristic 
`reasoning system', in a computer-based risk and decision support model, to: 
1. Measure `operational strain' caused by air traffic projects 
2. Measure/compare risk posed by "the human element" of air traffic control project 
decision making 
3. Provide a raft of "culturally acceptable" visualisation environments to support better 
risk reasoning 
4. Create usable, sub-formal, lesson learning capability. 
3.6.2 Objectives 
Hurisk 2 aimed to develop a `risk knowledge management system' rather than a risk 
identification system. Such a reasoning tool would have to augment the rationality, 
transparency and intuitiveness of group decisions on projects. A software system was 
considered to have the highest chance of success. To create the highest resonance for air 
traffic control a suitable metaphor was needed. The two strongest metaphors in that culture 
are gauges and checklists. The project undertook: 
1. the development and testing of "strain gauges" to integrate existing strain style data 
into thinking 
2. the development and testing of "risk gauges" to integrate risk data into decision 
making 
3. the development and testing of a checklist based "lessons tool" to fold forward lessons 
learned 
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4. the development of one overall interface to house the above concepts 
This large project was sub-divided into a number of systems development objectives. Table 
five below gives a summary of these. 
Table 5: Summary of Hurisk 2 objectives 
- Investigate feasibility of enhancing (by some form of aggregation or comparison) 
engineered measures in existence e. g. proximity, Safety Significant Events 
- Look for `factors' associated with controllers and their managers which predicate the 
Strain Gauges above 
- Comparison for parallels with existing incident investigation tool (TRACER) 
- Find a suitable case study to test concepts 
- Define user groups and needs through interview and workshop 
- Develop a methodology to elicit key risks 
Risk Gauges - 
Develop a usable and acceptable measurement form for risk 
- Find suitable case study to test concepts 
- Define user groups and needs through interview and workshop 
- Describe a lesson learning tool built upon: 
- Interviews with decision makers and potential users. 
Lesson learning - Adaptation of strain and risk data. 
- Reviewing existing projects for potentially generic material. 
- Define different user groups and needs for such a tool at strategic and operational level 
- Develop the mathematical underpinnings of the models 
- Develop culturally valid look and feel prototypes 
System - Work with software provider to build system prototype 
development - Test system in real test case 
- Generally assess Human Computer Interaction profile of system using verbal protocol 
technique 
Working within a software development metaphor provide 
Document system - 
System Architecture 
- Functional Specification 
- User scenario 
Describe - Understand the factors affecting the dissemination of such a tool within NATS 
dissemination plan 
3.6.3 Methodology 
Hurisk 2 was a larger and much more intuitive development project than Hurisk 1. Hurisk 2 
two used seven methods to develop and test a prototype: 
1. Working with the results from Hurisk 1 and combining these with new and extant risk 
measurement concepts. 
2. Observation and interviews with decision maker groups (management and 
engineering) to develop strain measurement concepts and prototypes. 
3. Modelling with past projects (management and engineering) to fit and refine Hurisk 
measurement concepts. 
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. 
4. Interviews and workshops with potential end users to test acceptability of 
measurement and visualisation concepts. 
5. Bench-testing of prototype tool in controlled trials with end users (management and 
engineering). 
6. The development of suitable algorithms to reflect the heuristics embedded in the 
systems (e. g. risk tolerance, strain normalisation). 
7. Benchmarking the final tool against an existing NATS tool and NATS safety standard 
requirements 
3.7 Consideration of results 
The results of Hurisk 2 development will be explained and then discussed in the following 
areas: 
1. Strain scoring and adjustment 
2. Risk scoring and adjustment 
3. Risk and strain measurement tools and visualisations 
4. Lesson learning measurement ideas and visualisation 
3.7.1 Strain scoring and adjustment 
From interviews and modelling of past projects it was clear that a questionnaire tool would be 
the final form of any capture mechanism for a strain concept. The final structure of the 
categories and questions (all scored on a scale from 1-100) will be discussed in section three. 
The questionnaires were designed in two forms, a short and a long. The algorithm for the 
final strain score (expressed as 1-100) in the short form was: 
Short mean Si 
Using category weighting 
113 
In the long version of the questionnaires the categories can be weighted in a number of ways 
so that the usefulness of a weightings structure to reflect preferences could be explored. The 
examples below show weighting data was used to aid understanding. These were: 
1. Rank order comparison of high level category weighting choices between 
organisations (table 6) 
2. A two tier weighting method allocating weights to lower and higher order categories 
(table 7) 
3. Comparison of weighting between trials (shown as a delta value) (table 8) 
4. A comparison of weighting between individuals (table 9) 
These tables below shows actual weighting patterns from the development case studies. 
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Table 6: Mean weighting structure ATC centres 1 (3 participants) &2 (6 participants) 
Weighting order study I mean 
Controller working patterns 87 
Uncertainty from decision making 85 
Sressors 78 
Controller role and function 73 
Decision attributes 73 
Perceptions of stressors 72 
Stability of relationships 63 
Decision/project planning 57 
Controller skill impacts 57 
Decision consultation issues 42 
Perceptions of decision making 42 
Weighting order study 2 mean 
Controller working patterns 83 
Controller skill impacts 82 
Perceptions of stressors 79 
Controller role and function 78 
Uncertainty from decision making 73 
Decision attributes 72 
Perceptions of decision making 72 
Decision consultation issues 71 
Stability of relationships 71 
Sressors 70 
Decision/project planning 68 
A two tier weighting pattern was experimented with, weighting high level categories and 
main categories. This is shown in the table below. 
Table 7: Comparison of two tier weights 
participant 1 participant 2 
Human Factors 0.26 0.20 
Controller skill 0.1 na 
Controller role and function 0.5 0.5 
Controller working patterns 0.4 0.5 
Planning 0.26 . 0.50 Decision project planning 0.5 0.3 
Consultation issues 0.5 0.7 
Stäbility änd stress 0.16 0.20 
Relationships 0.2 0.333 
Stressors 0.2 0.333 
Perceptions 0.6 0.333 
Decision making 0.32 0.10 
Decision attributes 0.2 0.25 
Perceptions 0.2 0.25 
Uncertainty 0.6 0.5 
Weights were also used to highlight changes in priority within participants. The table below 
shows weighting patterns used to compare within a subject over time in an engineering strain 
project. 
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Table 8: Comparison of shifts in priority for strain categories 
Strain category T1 T2 Diff 
Staff Roles and Responsibilities 1 1 0 
Managing re-specification 2 2 0 
Re-specification 3 6 -3 
Reference points 4 14 -10 
Time management 5 3 2 
Consultation 6 5 1 
Politics and Management 7 11 -4 
Pressure and uncertainty 8 9 -1 
User "preferences" 9 7 2 
Complexity 10 12 -2 
Specification 11 4 7 
Non standard processes and technology 12 13 -1 
Forces in equipment change 13 15 -2 
Time and technology 14 8 6 
'State 
of affairs 15 10 5 
Weighting patterns were also used to make rank order comparisons between users on the 
same project as the comparison between an engineer manager and a project engineer on the 
same project. 
Table 9: Weighting differential between users 
Attributes Proj man Engineer dill 
Staff Roles and Responsibilities 1 1 0 
I Managing re-specification .9 -7 Re-specification 3. 7 -4 
Reference points 4 8- ` -4 
Time management 5 3 2 
Consultation 6 4 2 
Politics and Management 7 5 2 
Pressure and uncertainty '.. 8 2- g. 
User "Preferences" 9 
Complexity 10 10 0 
Specification 11 11 0 
Non standard processes and technology 12 13 -1 
Forces in equipment change 13 15 -2 
Time and technology 14 14 0 
State of affairs 15 12 3 
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Individual strain score weighting calibration 
Due to the heuristic nature of strains (see discussion) a simple mechanism to normalise the 
contribution of any one strain to the overall score was sought. 
Simple strain scoring 
Hurisk returns a grand score in the scale of 1-100 for strain. The simplest example of this is 
where the short forms of the checklists are used. Here all the raw scores are simply summed 
and divided by the number of questions. 
Weighted strain scoring 
In the case of the long versions of the checklists users are permitted to add subjective 
importance weights to individual categories. These are also scores from 1-100. This presents 
the need to translate both the weights and the resultant data to preserve the scale. In the case 
of the weights the transformation is a simple one, all weights must sum to one. Thus, the 
weights act in an unsurprising way to modify relative contribution. 
In the case of the resultant data the final mean score has to be multiplied by the number of 
weight transformations, in this case, the number of categories. This has the effect of returning 
the final score into the same scale as the raw scores, i. e. from 1-100. The final mean is now 
affected by a relative contribution of scores based on weightings but remains in the same 
scale. Figure six below shows a simplified worked example of this principle. 
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Figure 4: Weighted means explained 
fights are giNen as a Then tanslated to 
score out of 100 sum to one 
Category Actual Weighted 
Category Raw scores Wei hts Wei hts Scores 
Cat1 
88.00 80 0.44 39.11 
77.00 34.22 
Cat 2 
20.00 60 0.33 6.67 
20.00. 6.67 
Cat 3 
45.00: 40 0.22 10.00 
45.00 10.00 
Mean score ['. : '"49.17 Mean score 17.78 
The mean has to be adjusted to keep the Juste Mean 
final score in the same scale asthe Score 33.33 
original. The weights effect relative 
contribution to the mean 
Category Actual Weighted 
Category Raw scores Weights Weights Scores 
Cat1 
88.00 
40 0.22 19.56 77.00 17.11 
20: 00 
Cat 2 80 8.89 0.44 20.00 8.89 
Cat 3 
45.00 
60 0.33 15.00 
40 15.00 
Mean score Mean score 14.07. 
Juste can 
Inlhiscasethelargerweightingon Score 
ý 
.' 
4222 7 
the lower scoring category has given 
F 
_- 
a lower overall mean 
A possible problem 
In figure one above the system explained works, but it has a simple weakness, all of the raw 
data is contained in categories of equal size. All strains in Hurisk are designed to be of equal 
importance before the user weights are added. However the Hurisk categories do not contain 
equal numbers of strains. Using the method in figure one above would give the following 
problem: 
Strain X is in category Y. Y contains 13 strains in total. A score for strain X will contribute 
one over thirteen of the strain derived from category Y. 
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Strain B is in category W. B contains 5 strains in total. A score for strain B will contribute 
one over five of the strain derived from category W. 
Strain category scores Y and W will, in turn, be averaged into the final strain score. 
Simply put, strain X has less "power" than strain B to effect this final strain score. Strain X, 
by default, is less important than B. As all strains in Hurisk have to be of equal importance 
before user weights are added. A simple solution to this problem is needed. 
A simple solution 
The simple solution might be to generate a final strain score not as a grand mean expression 
of each category mean but as a grand mean of the total number of checklist items once they 
have been weighted. Thus all the weighted scores are treated as being in one large category 
for the purposes of generating the final strain score. This solution, however, may make the 
weighting and scoring process a little less intuitive. It also has the disadvantage of not 
allowing the mean scores for categories to be examined in the fish eyed lens principle at a 
level in the hierarchy one above that of individual strains. 
A more elegant solution: balance weights 
To get around the above problem each strain can be given a balance weight. This weight is a 
reflection of the size of family to which the strain belongs. This means that strains from large 
families are given a mathematical boost. This boost is precisely relative to the size of the 
family compared with the total number of strains in the checklists. Conversely strains from 
small families are suppressed slightly relative to the size of the family compared with the total 
number of strains in the checklist. 
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For example, imagine a total checklist made up of 15 items with the scores shown in table 
one. A problem occurs when mean scores derived from families of unequal size are 
combined to form a grand mean. Compare case 1 and case 2, in case one the score of 50 is 
increased by 10 (shown by the bold figure in column three), in case two likewise a score of 50 
is increased by 10. In case I double the effect on the grand mean is observed for the same 
unit change in one strain only. Effectively changes to the strain in the smaller family are 
twice as effective. 
Table 10: Illustrating the need for balance weights 
CASE 1 CASE 2 
cat I cat 2 cat I Cat 2 cat I cat 2 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
50.00 100.00 60.00 100.00 50.00 100.00 
60.00 50.00 60.00 50.00 60.00 50.00 
70.00 50.00 70.00 50.00 70.00 60.00 
80.00 60.00 80.00 60.00 80.00 60.00 
60.00 60.00 60.00 
70.00 70.00 70.00 
70.00 70.00 70.00 
80.00 80.00 80.00 
80.00 80.00 80.00 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
72.00 72.00 74.00 72.00 72.00 73.00 
Grand 
mean 
72.00 Grand 
mean 
73.00 Grand 
mean 
72.50 
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Table 11: Balance weights based on family size 
Adjustment 
X5115 I X 10/15 CASE 1 CASE 2 
cat 1 cat 2 cat I Cat 2 cat 1 cat 2 
33.33 66.67 33.33 66.67 33.33 66.67 
16.67 66.67 20.00 66.67 16.67 66.67 
20.00 33.33 20.00 33.33 20.00 33.33 
23.33 33.33 23.33 33.33 23.33 40.00 
26.67 40.00 26.67 40.00 26.67 40.00 
40.00 40.00 40.00 
46.67 46.67 46.67 
46.67 46.67 46.67 
53.33 53.33 53.33 
53.33 53.33 53.33 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
24.00 48.00 24.67 48.00 24.00 48.67 
Grand 
mean 
36.00 Grand 
mean 
36.33 
Grand 
mean 
36.33 
Adj 
Grand 
mean 
72.00 
Adj 
Grand 
mean 
72.67 
Adj 
Grand 
mean 
72.67 
In the design principles of Hurisk the family to which a strain belongs is serendipitous not 
deterministic. Thus all strains must be equal. Table two shows the effect of balance 
weighting. The scores are multiplied by a factor based on the group number (5/15 or 10/15) 
and the resultant means have to be adjusted, as in the previous example, to re-scale them. 
The solution 
Strains from the small family are suppressed and strains from the large are boosted relative to 
the total number of items (in this case 15) and a unit change in the strain value is not sensitive 
to the number of strains in the category. The user does not see this algorithm at work it is 
hard wired into the calculations. Importantly if new strains were added or different strains 
used, this algorithm would require re-calibration. The means are given by the following: 
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3.7.2 Risk scoring and adjustment 
Risk events in the system are scored, as strain events are, on a scale of 1-100. The system 
returns a final single risk score in this range for every risk. The calculation of this risk score 
can involve a seven part system. The various scoring options are described. 
One component scoring 
A single overall risk score can be given a score in the form of `high' (returns a value of 75), 
`medium' (returns a value of 50) or `low' (returns a value of 25). Alternatively this overall 
risk score could be given a discrete value from I to 100. 
Two component scoring 
The overall risk score can be made up of two components. These can be scored in exactly the 
same way and their scores combined to give the overall score as a function of their values. 
Six component scoring 
Each of the two component scores can be made up of three other scores using the same 
principle above. These, lowest level, scores propagate the two level scores above which in 
turn propagate the single overall score. These scores relate to 
- Probability (P) 
- Control (C) 
- Effect (E) 
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- Knowledge of probability (kP) 
- Knowledge of control (kC) 
- Knowledge of effect (kE) 
Risk tolerance scoring 
The two component scores are combined to make overall score by a rule which is governed 
by an algorithm. This user controls the application of this rule by applying a score of 1-100 to 
indicate their risk tolerance. This variable sets the sensitivity of the algorithm. 
How the risk score is calculated 
Risk R=aP**E 
Confidence K=/ kP * kC * kE 
Adjusted Risk A= min {R+ A' (I oo t. / . 100 
} 
Adjusting Risk: risk tolerance explained in lay terms 
The combination of confidence and risk scores is mediated as discussed above by a score for 
risk tolerance. Take the example of a risk score of 50 with an associated confidence score of 
100. In such a case Hurisk would be happy to return a score of 50. If the confidence was 50 
however, things become more complex since this score reflects the fact that the user is 
uncertain if their risk estimate is correct. It could, in fact be lower, it could be higher. Hurisk 
adjusts the risk summary in three steps: 
1. The distance between confidence and 100 is calculated and divided by two. This represents 
the uncertainty that the score could be larger or smaller and attributes half the difference to 
each possibility. 
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2. The score from Step I is weighted by the risk tolerance score (to increase or decrease the 
effect) 
3. the weighted score is added to the risk score and compared to 100, the minimum score is 
used. 
Risk distance plotting 
The distance between two risk users' scores (confidence K and risk R) is plotted in one of the 
system's visualisations (see description below). The coordinates are given by: 
RiskDis D=V -(P9 - P1)2 + (C2 - C1)2 + (E1 - E2)2 
ConfDis B=3 (kP2 - kP1)2 + (kC2 - kCl)2 + (kEl - kE2)2 
The calculation of a decay function in the audit bar 
The system contains a visualisation to express "depth of analysis". One, if users have used 
the minimum scoring methods this would return a low score. To reflect the shelf life of 
scores (however generated) a decay function begins. This is given by the explanation 
overleaf: 
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Decay Zi = Zt-1 + ý, where the perturbations ef, f=1, '?, : i, .. ire all 
inde- 
pendent mid normally distributed et , N(O, 'ui ) 
{T11e last equation reads that the measurement Zt taken . it time t is the Inea- 
surement Z1_1 Waken at, the previous time point t-1 plus a Ilorlnully distributed 
error ct having a zero mean and a known variance v2. It id often appropriate to 
assume that v2 does not depend on the time t of the obsewrvation. This lkypoth- 
esis is sometimes stated as saying that the sequence {ZI :t >_ 0} is .º "rancioln 
walk". This assumption is xvidel used in statistics and probability and is one 
of the simplest ways of saving, that the current measurement is similar to what 
it was previously laut potentially perturbed up or down. The larger the variance 
the bigger the potential perturbation. The zero mean assumption ensures that. 
an upward perturbation is equally likely to a downward perburbation. The final 
equation demonstrates that under the random walk hypothesis the longer we 
w. dt the more different time current Iueusuretnent Zink k+1 time steps ahead 
of the Ineasurclnent we last observed Zt_1 might be. Thus this should read} 
Zt+t: = Zc-i ; et + _r+i + .. -+ ei+j = Zr-i ± =c (L ) 
where et(k) , ßr(0, v2(1, k)) and where the variance vii (k) = vi + v2 + ... -}- 
{ This can be seen as IL logical eonseciuence of the rzuicloiii walk hypothesis 
and Gill be Calculated by simple substitution. For example for 1: =1 
Zr+l = Zr ; Etmal 
but. we know that 
Zt = Zt_j +Et 
so substituting for Zi in the equator above gives 
Zc=1 = zt-i "Et + Er±1 
-Tote that when v= v2 for all time theft v? (k) _ (k -{-1)u` so tlt. tf, the variance 
of the perturbation ittcrca cs linearly with the interval of time between the two 
ol)sen at iOILS. ) 
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3.7.3 Risk and strain measurement tools and visualisations 
Strain measurement and visualisation 
The strains measurement tool took the form of a questionnaire. The questions were 
developed from a content analysis of Hurisk 1 data coupled to new data from interviews with 
engineering and management users and from modelling with past examples of projects. The 
questionnaires came in different forms. 
The Hurisk "fish-eyed lens"4 principle applies to strain checklists and risks similarly. There 
are two forms of strain questionnaire, a short and a long version. The short version is 
typically 20 - 25 items, the long 80-90. 
Below is an example of a section of the short version of engineering strain. This relates to the 
category of "complexity and demands". Scorers were asked to provide a percentage value for 
the degree to which this strain is "present" in the project in question (previous scores shown 
in brackets) 
Figure 5: Example firom the strain tool 
Short, Engineering strain questions 
Complexity and demands category (118) 
Key decision makers have many differences on a variety okain issues for this project (20) L1 
This is a large and or complex project (45) 
This project has an effect on many other systems (60) j 
This project is addressing a system or state of affairs which has been under a lot of (70) 
strain fora long time l-J 
Next Category> 
° The fish eyed lens is the way in which all data in Hurisk can be scored and viewed either at the very high level, 
often one score, or the very detailed level. Whichever level is chosen the scores are propagated up and down the 
system. 
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Below is an example of a category (controller skills impacts) from the long version of the 
generic operational questionnaire. Note a key difference that the entire category (one of 
eleven categories of questions) is allowed to be independently weighted. This questionnaire 
is used as a general health check on the operation in question. 
Figure 6: Example two from strain tool 
Long, Operational (general) strain questions 
Controller skill impacts category (1111) Weight 100 
Controllers are losing their controlling skills through changes and technology (none) 
Changes and technology can mean there is a possibility of over-skilling some (none) 
controllers 
Because of the possibility of loss of skill, we should have skill maintenance fixes (none) (e. g. random shutdown of certain technologies) 
The natural skill differential between controllers Is being more hidden by 
t h (none) ec nology and changes 
More and more changes and technology require more new, non standard, skills 
f o (none) rom the perating controllers 
The relationship between changes, technology and controller error is not 
t (none) unders ood 
Next Category > 
Strain Visualisation 
A key benefit of the Hurisk design is not only to provide an environment for structured 
scoring but also to provide a visualisation suite for reasoning. Strain can be visualised as we 
have seen in list form with attendant scores. There are also a number of graphics: 
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Figure 7: Strain visualisation options 
wHurisk > Strain Analysis Menu 
Jon > Jon's Test Case 
--train. v Time 
All user's strain over time 
User's strain v Time 
A user's strain over time 
User's strain scaring style 
A user's strain score distribution 
O er's strain weighting 
Comparison of users strain weighting 
User's strain score and weighting 
A users strain score and weighting 
AP user's strain score 
Aii users strain scores for a session 
_-train scores comparison 
Table comparing strain scores between two users 
The following examples show how the system helps users to home in on key ideas: 
Idea one: where is the strain in this project going? 
Figure 8: Comparing changes in strain over time (single user) 
ifkiie WHuIr'k. .- 
FA U:, t, 1 `_, . '.: Il. sln V. 
Jon > Jon's Test Case 
user: Jon vi Type Engineering Date: ;1 yreer _; 
Refresh 
82 
81 
80 
79 
78 
j78 
77 
76 
75 
74 
73 
72 
Strain v iime. ion tngmeenng 
29 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 
Dec 2007 
Time r. Short . -a Long 
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Idea two: What do I think the key contributors of strain in this project are and how does that 
compare with my colleagues views of the same? 
Figure 9: Comparing different users views on strain at the category level 
wHurisk > Strain Scores Comparison 
Jon > Jon's Test Case 
Users: Jon Sven Date: Current Refresh 
Type: Engineering Format: Short Prim; kble der--ion 
Category 
Complexity and demands 
Time 
Equipment change 
Non standard processes and technology 
User preferences 
Specification 
Politics and Management 
Staff Roles and Responsibilities 
Idea three: how do I generally score strains when I do? 
Figure 10: Assessing scoring style 
Jan Sven Difl 
(2811112007) (05/0612003) 
49 59 10 
89 25 64 
60 100 -40 
65 57 8 
58 57 1 
94 64 i) 
95 65 .ü 
70 15 55 
wHurisk >A User's Strain Scoring Style 
Jon > Jon's Test Case 
User Jon Type: Engineering v, Date Current Refresh 
6 
5 
e4 
17 
d3 
LL 
2 
1 
Strain Scoring Style Jon Lngineenng 2W1 i/1UU/ 
UI ------- 
ý1 °a b 4a 01C 
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Risk measurement and visualisation 
Risks are simplified for the purposes of Hurisk. Simply put, they are a summarisation of 
negative events which may occur to upset safe operational functioning or the safe execution 
of a project. NATS already uses this concept of discrete risks in its safety cases. At the 
descriptive level, a risk in Hurisk is determined by the user who provides a discrete set of 
events which pertain to the assessment question. An example is shown here. 
Figure 11: A sample from a Hurisk risk list 
wHurisk > Risk Scores 
jon > Jon's Test Case 
User: Jon Date: Current Refresh 
Fable 
vc-rslon 
Risk 
The trainer takes longer to build than is set out in the project plan 
A major re-design is required before the end of the project 
There is not sufficient time left for thorough validation 
The trainer does not overcome the drawbacks of the Hillway Knee 
The Hull simulated is more advanced I sucessful 
The level of registration between physical and virtual components of the design does 
not have a high enough fidelity 
The tissue deformation is not realistic 
VR research does not answer the how real is real gestion 
Inputting risk measures 
Ion 
3f07r2005i 
75 
74 
50 
75 
50 
75 
75 
51 
Hurisk scores are all 1-100. The system returns a final single risk score in this range 
score can be seen in the diagram below alongside the sister score for strains. 
That 
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Figure 12: Summary page of the system 
wHurisk > Main Menu 
ion > Jon's Test Case 
Strain 
Enter strain 
assessment data 
These oauges summarise the current strain and risk Risk 
Enter risk 
Strain Risk 
assessment data GI 
Strain 
analysis 
View 
assessment 
results 
Risk analysis 
View 
assessment 
results 
Current 73 G3 
worries Depth of Analysis (97%) List your priority 
strains and risks -'- wýc' 
Administration 
edit project 4... ._ý. r . 'ý _... _. 
users and 
passwords 
The six part system scoring scheme is shown here 
Figure 13: The main risk scoring interface 
wHurisk > Risk 
jon > Jon's Test Case 
In this interface you ßl1 assess each of your risks on the., attributes. to get help with the 
meaning of e a3f these scores please click on the gauge title. 
R, ck ; ýaesnön ^ `< 
he trainer takes longer to build than is set out in the project plan 
Next > 
LMH 
Kprobabd typ 
SA 
LMH 
Risk level 
Risk summary 
so 61 51' 
L MH LMHLMH 
Kcnirol heffect Confidence 
f5 
LMH 
41 
71 17 LMH 
LMHLMH 
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Hurisk expects the user to supply a risk score as `L, M, or H' as a discrete score including 
direct manipulation of the needles on the gauges. The guidance given by the Hurisk system 
on the meaning of these elements and how to score them is: 
Probability: This score is estimating how probable it is that the exact event listed will occur 
within the life of the project or the life of this assessment. You are to use a scale of 1- 100 
where a score of I is "almost impossible" and a score of 100 is "absolutely certain". 
Control: This score refers to the degree to which the occurrence of the event comes under the 
control of you as a single agent or your group in the organisation (e. g. your ability to control 
whether or not you contract an `immunable' disease would be rated against your access to 
immunisation). You are to use a score of 1 to 100 where 1 indicates "no control over the 
occurrence of the event at all" and 100 is "absolute control". 
Effect: This is a severity judgement which estimates how much "damage" would occur to 
your project or your future operation if the exact event listed were to occur. You are to use a 
score of I to 100 where 1 is "negligible" and 100 is "very severe implications". 
Knowledge of probability: This is a confidence estimate using a score from 1 to 100, to` 
score your confidence ask the following question: "To what degree am I an expert judge in 
making probability assessments about this kind of event? " If you are extremely 
t. 
knowledgeable and frequently make accurate judgements on this kind of event, score 100. If 
you do not normally make probability assessments for this kind of event and you are not sure 
how accurate you are in so doing, score 1. 
Knowledge of 'controlability': This is a confidence estimate using a score from 1 to 100, to 
score your confidence ask the following question: "To what degree am I an expert judge in 
making assessments of control over this kind of event? " If you are extremely knowledgeable 
and frequently make accurate judgements on this kind of event score 100. If you do not 
normally make assessments for this kind of event and you are not sure how accurate you are 
in so doing, score 1. 
Knowledge of effect: This is a confidence estimate using a score from 1 to 100, to score your 
confidence ask the following question: "To what degree am I an expert judge in making 
assessments about the effect of this kind of event? " If you are extremely knowledgeable and 
frequently make accurate judgements on this kind of event score 100. If you do not normally 
make effect assessments for this kind of event and you are not sure how accurate you are in so 
doing, score 1. 
Risk tolerance 
The `Risk level' and the `Confidence' scores are combined to make the risk summary score. 
That combination rule is governed by an algorithm. This user controls its application, again 
by applying a score of 1-100 for a variable elsewhere in the system called "risk tolerance". 
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Figure 14: Risk tolerance gauge and instruction 
wHurisk > Risk Tolerance 
jon > Jon's Test Case 
P. the fcllo ri e_ Bors eu »III be {, rc. 'jirg estimates fcr the lee; c` 
your risks, in advance of that you may also; choose to assess your risk 
tolerance by adjusting the control to the right. This will affect the 
assessment of the scores in favour of the tolerance you choose. A score 
of I is very risk avoiding and a score of 100 is very risk accepting To 
AC re; "t the oefact iisl t lerarce cf neutral s=m-ri. ply click checklist 
Visualising risk 
Figure 15: Visualisation options. for risk 
Risk Tolerance 
if'i 
}L ti 
LMH 
wHui isk > Risk Analysis Menu 
Jon > Jon's Test Case 
Confidence. v Risk 
A user's confidence and risk 
Ccmfidence v. Pisk change 
A user's confidence and risk over time 
Confidence v Risk distance 
Confidence and risk dialance between two users 
Confidence v. Risk difference 
Contitlence and risk difference beMeen My users 
User risk scores 
Table of risk scores for a user 
Risk scores, comparison 
Table comparing risk scores between two users 
Hurisk allows a number of visualisations of the risk data. Two examples will be shown for 
illustration. First, confidence plotted against risk summary. As can be seen here the user 
explores the relative positions of the risks in a two dimensional plot either just for the current 
data, as shown, or by selecting two time periods for comparison. 
, ý_ 
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Figure 16: Risk and confidence 
wHurisk > Confidence . v. Risk 
Jon> Jon's Test Case 
........... .... .. _... 
User. Jon Date Current Refresh 
m v 
C C 
U 
p ýo mence 
- 
un uu raun 
ý } S7t ý 
a 
30 
50 
to 
30 
20 
to 
n 
Risk 
There is not sufficient time left for thorough validation Zoom 'L TR 
The Hull simulated is more advanced / sucessful 
_ __ 
Out BL BR 
One of the functions is to look at the distance between two users' risk scores when they have 
performed a separate analysis of the same set of risks. This visualisation helps you see how 
discrepant the scores are and over what. This is one of the key decision aids focussing 
attention to the right things. 
Figure 17: Risk distance plotting 
wHurisk > Risk Distance 
Jon > Jon's Test Case 
Users Jon Sen ýý; _vj Date Current Kj Refresh 
70 
60 
A 
50 
t 140 
....... : 
30 
Vý 
20 
0 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 
Risk 
The tissue deformation is not realistic 
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The calculation do this a simple two dimensional Euclidian distance calculated on the 
confidence and risk parameters and plotted in two dimensions. This Euclidian distance is also 
used when the same visualisation is utilised for a user to compare risk scores over time. 
The audit bar (decay function) 
As part of the visualisations Hurisk contains a schoolteacher function shown in the red bar 
here. This depth of analysis is subject to the decay function described earlier. 
Figure 18: Highlighting depth of analysis 
wHurisk > Main Menu 
jon > Jon's Test Case 
Strain 
Enter strain 
assessment data 
Risk 
Enter risk 
assessment data 
Strain 
analysis 
View 
assessment 
results 
Risk analysis 
View 
assessment 
results 
Current 
worries 
List your pnonrr 
strains and risks 
Administration 
edit pro/ect. 
users and 
passwords 
T ksc gauqes sun n the current strain and risk 
Strain Risk 
73 
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3.7.4 Lesson learning measurement ideas and visualisation 
Introduction 
Hurisk had a number of lesson learning prototypes within it. This remained, at the end of the 
project, the least developed area and the least easy one to provide any tool concepts for. For 
completeness, three approaches are interesting to consider for the purposes of this thesis. It is 
accepted at the outset that these are too soft to draw very effective conclusions from. In 
consequence of this the measurement and visualisation ideas will be considered in one 
combined section. 
The techniques covered comprise of a fresh version of the triads from Hurisk one, a set of 
matrix-based questionnaires with visualisations and a function called "worry beads". 
Taking the triads out again 
In a development of the triads from Hurisk 1 (Safety, Efficiency, Capacity & People, 
Procedures, Technology) a third triad called "focus" was added (Engineering research focus, 
business focus, operations focus). A glorified spreadsheet was used to collect data on specific 
projects. The safety arm is shown below. A group of decision makers would agree on the 
"parity" of the object to be analysed. This ranged from a single decision to an entire project. 
To provide scores users allocate 1-100 for the influence they feel these factors have. 
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Scoring and presenting the triad diagram 
Figure 19: The triad scoring diagram 
This diagram has three levels, but the data treatment is the same for all levels. Using these 
scores the three dimensional Euclidian distance between decision makers is calculated at each 
level. In the case of a summary score to represent distance at all levels the nine dimensional 
Euclidian distance is used. These distances are then re-scaled. The largest distance is set to 
100 to indicate the largest proportional disagreement and the others are scaled against that. 
Data is presented back to each individual decision maker in a "city plot" format, an example 
is shown below. The decision maker reading the plot is always at the zero point. From this 
plot the decision maker can quickly understand who disagrees with them the most and over 
what. The triad diagram is also available of course for any "deep dive" activity. 
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Figure 20: Decision distance city plot 
Matrix based questionnaires 
Two tools were used experimentally with members of the NATS steering group to further 
develop lesson learning (or decision comparison) methods. The first tool was a highly 
conceptual safety taxonomy. It's core idea was that, particularly in the changing political 
situation of NATS at that time, the identity of the decision makers on projects had a bearing 
on the safety-consciousness of the decision making. A number of criteria were developed 
partly from the Hurisk one risk analysis and partly from the experiences of the steering 
committee. These criteria were scored again in a simple spreadsheet environment which 
looked like this. 
Figure 21: A safety consciousness taxonomy 
Categories 
PW MR JS PW - JS MR - JS 
Concrete 100 50 85 15 -35 
Abstract 1 50 40 -39 10 CORE REALITY Real responsibility for safey 100 2 50 50 -48 
Direct physical measures (of safety) 75 60 98 -23 -38 
Data processinq used 10 1 100 -90 -99 
MEASURES AND Indicator based 10 50 100 -90 -50 
STIPULATIONS Procedurally led 100 100 100 0 0 
Engineering biased 10 10 10 0 0 
Experiential element 50 1 1 49 0 
PERSONAL ENGAGEMENT Subjective qualification 100 50 50 50 0 
Emotional element 1 75 100 -99 -25 
Complex responsibility 90 20 90 0 -70 
COMPREHENSION AND Delegated responsibility 100 1 1 99 0 
INFLUENCE Flexible definition 90 20 , 60 30 -40 
Market led 100 1 50 , 50 -49 
Core reality: 
- The degree to which the objects in this decision are real, tangible and fixed 
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- The degree to which the elements of this decision are intangible, abstract and prone to 
change meaning over time 
- The degree to which this agent has a real responsibility in this domain to ensure safety 
- The degree to which decisions will be based on actual evidence about safety 
Measures and stipulations: 
- The degree to which evidence will be sought to fuel this decision 
- The degree to which there are pre-existent indicators which will be used as evidence to 
fuel this decision 
- The degree to which this decision will be led by what is feasible to do within a 
standard operating procedure 
- The degree to which the measurements which are being utilised to aid this decision are 
sourced in the engineering world 
Personal engagement: 
- The degree to which the decision maker will have real experiences of the aspects of 
this decision both now and once it is made 
- The degree to which the decision maker is likley to rely on their own subjective 
judgements about this decision 
- The degree to which the decision maker is emotionally tied up with the subject matter 
of the decision 
Comprehension and influence: 
- The degree to which the decision maker understands the world of this decision from a 
position of having complex responsibilities in it 
- The degree to which the decision maker, once this decision is made, delegates its 
effects to another agent 
- The degree to which this decision maker has to be flexible in their understanding of 
safety in order to make judgements and compromises about it 
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-bb. 
- The degree to which this decision maker will be influenced by market, profit and 
customer satisfaction issues in making this decision 
The user first scores themselves and then at least one other decision maker. The decision 
maker scores are subtracted from the user scores and the results are plotted in a `tornado style' 
bar chart where the user can see disagreements in terms of magnitude and direction. 
The idea of performing a safety audit of the decision makers was quite ostentatious. The 
results were a series of comparative bar charts where judges could compare views. Examples 
are shown: 
Figure 22: safety taxonomy bar chart 
100 
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Disagreement as distance between two users was also plotted 
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Figure 23: The decision distance plot 
Taking stock of this approach 
This approach is aimed at decision support, to give a clearer and more structured way for 
decision makers to compare themselves on key attributes of the safety decision space. The 
safety consciousness taxonomy is a model of the world which, if users agreed its validity, 
does serve as the platform for some rational comparisons. Again, the users would have to 
accept the comparisons. The end result is a comparative understanding of the decision space. 
It reveals where individuals preferences lie and how they see the `seed stock' for safety 
argumentation. Used constructively it could go on to frame a more idealised and facilitative 
kind of safety discussion than the current round table practices. 
The twenty questions tool 
Although considered worthwhile the safety taxonomy had a number of drawbacks in terms of 
its comprehensibility and its highly subjective nature. The question was posed, why not stop 
being so fancy and just ask the blunt questions which the taxonomy is alluding to? The result 
was the `twenty questions' tool (the number was a pure accident). Naturally, when you take 
this approach, what you end up with is a questionnaire which in itself is not very interesting 
from the point of view of developing decision support. But it was designed and considered. 
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DecWm D4Nrin Plot 
This questionnaire elicits 20 scores from 1-100 for each decision maker which are arranged 
into five category groups of four questions. The analysis allows comparison between decision 
makers at the individual question or category level i. e. there are either twenty differences or 
four. 
As a primer tool this questionnaire could set the landscape for decision making within a more 
demonstrable common ground which is more disciplined and compartmentalised. Users 
found the questionnaire to not only be highly provocative, but highly intuitive at highlighting 
issues of "focus", which key decision makers or key functional groups might have. 
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Figure 24: The twenty questions tool 
This decision maker is being guided by the formal analysis of real data in aspects of the 
decision which need that approach 
This decision maker is monitoring real and appropriate indicators to inform their 
understanding of this decision 
This decision maker has valid experience of the area in which this decision will have its effect 
IIIJ ueLIJlull I VOJ IIUI Ilavc a Nol OIJI al vloa aaýca vll IIIcII vý I yl clcl cl II. c IUI II IC 
his decision should go 
contributina to this decision 
the fog 
own 
This decision maker is emotionally tied up with the content, the lifecycle and the outcome of 
this decision 
This decision maker understands the world of this decision from a position of having complex 
responsibilities in it 
This decision maker, once this decision is made, delegates all of its effects to other people 
I nm ucubIun uta, I will uc iIII1-1-vu uy IIIGIKUL, Njum dIIU uubLuniei sdusiecuun issues in 
making this decision 
This decision maker has a real responsibility in this domain to ensure safety 
The decision will be based on valid and recent evidence about safety without any spin 
The decision will be based around indices of safety which are redominantl physical 
In the clear his decision maker does not have to be flexible in their absolute understanding of safety in 
order to make judgements within a bigger picture 
This decision maker will not be influenced by market, profit and customer satisfaction issues 
in making this decision 
This decision will have a significant impact on this decision maker's, or their area's, budget 
This decision would ideally need, but does not come with, sufficient additional resources 
the 
This decision maker is likely to want to see additional safety justified in terms of a cost ben purse . 1-ic 
or compares favourably to operations elsewhere 
on maker is required to or wants to save money 
Re-visiting the taxonomy 
The final chapter in this part of the work was the decision to re-visit the safety taxonomy and 
attempt to strengthen it as a comparative profiling tool. The scoring was simplified to "yes / 
no" opinion and a matrix of "safety influence houses" were added: 
- Operational practice: Safety was in the delivery of air traffic control 
- Management practice: Safety in the management of the delivery of air traffic control 
- Technology closed: Safety in "black box" technologies e. g. radar 
- Business development: Safety in the face of remaining competitive and developing 
UK air transport 
- The word: Safety enshrined in mandatory fixed written procedures e. g. MATS pt 11 
- Tools: Safety mediated by interacting tools such as Terminal Collision Avoidance 
System 
1 
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- Agents: Safety mediated by people 
Some results from a trial of this approach are shown in the figure below. What one is looking 
for is high consensus areas which can quickly draw attention to the safety profile of a project 
or decision. In the example below the decision is notable because of the high contrast value 
between the `operational'/ `emotional' and `business development' elements. Performing this 
analysis gave the users considerable food for thought in terms of how the safety bearing 
properties of these decisions might be driven. 
Figure 25: an expanded safety considerations taxonomy 
Elements & sub elements 
Categories Operational 
practice 
Management 
practice 
Technology 
closed 
Business 
development 
The Word Tools Agents 
Concrete Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Abstract No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
CORE REALITY Real res onsibilit Yes Yes No No - - 
No No Yea 
irect physical measures of safety) es o --wo- ---- IT O Ye es 
Data processing used Possible Yes Yes Yes No Yes Y... 
MEASURES AND Indicator based No Yes No Yes Yes Yes __ý'ý"ý"___ STIPULATIONS Procedurally led Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Engineering biased No Possible Yes No es es 
Experiential element Yes No No No No Nu Yes PERSONAL Subjective uglification Yes Yes Possible Yes Yes Possibli_ý Yes ENGAGEMENT motional element es o o No No Yep es 
Complex responsibility No Yes No Yes 
_ 
No No Yes 
COMPREHENSION AND Delegated responsibility No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INFLUENCE Flexible definition No Yes No Yes Possible Yes Possible 
Market led No Possible Possiblo Yes No es No 
How this approach could work is as an early warning system for arguing at cross purposes 
giving as it does an early landscape of the whole decision space. The use of such a taxonomy 
could conceivably cause discussions that might otherwise not have taken place (or have the 
permission to be). In this way, like all of the lesson tools, it's commendable to set a frame for 
dialogue but it is hard to see it as "a tool" in the sense which I have come to discuss them. 
Worry beads 
The Hurisk concept demonstrator contained the well developed risk and strain models 
highlighted earlier. As discussed above the lesson learning / decision modules were not 
maturing quickly enough out of concept. There was much background modelling not shown 
here and a great deal of discussion about how tools could be built from these and other 
analytical ideas. What became clear though was that these would not be built. 
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A desire to have some sort of lesson learning built into the tool for decision support remained 
however. Reviewing what the system could already do led us to the idea that collecting the 
priority risks and strains from any given project might serve as a good proxy for lesson 
learning if they could be carried forward to other similar projects. Functionality was added to 
Hurisk to export these. 
Given the length of many NATS projects, it was then decided that the lessons one could learn 
from the high priority risks and strains might actually add intuition within the life of the 
project as well as retrospectively. Reviewing top of table risks and strains was considered a 
valuable activity. The worry beads make this recognised good practice easy to achieve. 
To facilitate this the `worry beads' viewer was introduced. The user set the filtering threshold 
(strains or risks above 75,85,90 %). The figure below illustrates how this looked. 
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Figure 26: Worry beads 
wHurisk > Current Worries 
jon > Jon's Test Case 
This screen lists your current worries, these are a sub set of your 'strain' and risk' data covering 
the top 10 -25 % of your scores. These are thus the things which worry you at present 
Strain threshold: 90 C Refresh Pnntahle 
erMnn 
The technology in this project may throw up issues which will be very time consuming 10ý 
There are complicated politics which have not been resolved DO 
The later the re-specification the more it will be about trying to keep everybody happy 99 
The specification process here is not realistic on a number of fronts 99 
Re-specificatlor, is Inevitable on a number oftmals 99 
Re-spec licabon will mainly be about money not user needs 9a 
- ---rýýý ftko -d-n'r<ge of us if we have late re-specification 98 Risk 
r q0 0 Refresh e time factor in which Is relatively unknown and could be very threshold: 90 
The project becomes technical over training focussed t00 
The final system does not provide proven effective training '. 00 
Performance measurement in the system is not valid 100 
Tutors don't accept the system t 0v 
The system Is not perceived by users as more beneficial than current training arrangements 100 
Functionality which was mooted (but alas not built) was to make these worries into a rolling 
screen-saver to help users stay highly conscious of them. 
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3.7.5 Benchmarking within NATS 
Working with the Human Factors community in NATS, who took a keen interest in Hurisk, 
we decided to perform a benchmarking exercise looking at the closest thing they had yet 
developed to a heuristic system for reasoning support. Theirs was called Tracer and it acted 
as a guided reasoning tool to assist operational accident investigation. Tracer addressed the 
shift in root cause of air traffic incidents from system failures to human error (a generalised 
trend in air traffic) at the time in excess of 90% of incidents were caused by human failures - 
more specifically, human error. 
The well developed processes for analysing failure modes within engineered systems were 
very easy for NATS deterministic systems being compliant with this form of enquiry. 
Recognising that human operators are not deterministic systems, a new way to mitigate 
failures was needed if a human error analysis was to work. 
The basis for TRACEr was a decomposition of errors to assess which cognitive processes 
failed. Mitigation could then either reduce the number of future occurrences of the error, or 
reduce it's consequences the next time it happened. 
Figure 27: TRA CEr Hierarchy 
Performance 
Shaping Factors Task Errors 
Error Modes Information 
r Error Mechanisms The raw data for Tracer are in the form of incident reports produced by the individual who 
made the error, which can be backed up by interviews. The output is purely subjective and in 
narrative form. Tracer did not have a formal scoring system. The reason for this is 
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institutional and complex. The formal scoring of incidents lies elsewhere within the structure 
of NATS and uses and approved format which has not at this time, taken on the work of 
Tracer in identifying error pathways. 
Heuristics 
Tracer and Hurisk can both be designated as heuristic tools. In the Tracer case this is 
because of the way in which the tool is to be used. In the Hurisk case this was a design issue 
from the start. Neither tool provides deterministic or directive data, such as `answers'. Each 
tool provides the capacity to look at pertinent data and, importantly, to track it over time. 
In the Tracer case this data remains raw. The incident investigator uses qualitative data to 
develop a comprehensive view of the complex issues within the incident. 
Tracer can also be considered heuristic because it is designed to comply with a process which 
is essentially one of expert judgement. The four stages of incident investigation outlined by 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidance (HSG65 - Successful Health and Safety 
Management) are: 
- Collect evidence about what has happened 
- Assemble and consider the evidence 
- Compare findings with appropriate legal, industry and company standards 
- Implementation of findings and tracking of progress 
Current practice in this area is a professional judgement Tracer helped the investigator 
consider all relevant data. Tracer fits further into the heuristic mould because it considers a 
cocktail of active failures (e. g. missed actions) and latent failures (e. g. poor or incomplete 
training, bad design). These latter failures are inextricably mixed with the human experiences 
of the operator and the human environment of the operating control room. They are 
necessarily softer factors and do not present themselves easily, even through the use of fault 
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trees, hazard & operability analysis or Failure modes analysis and the like, to meaningful 
quantification. Also, Tracer is aimed at reducing or mitigating effects of errors which occur 
in a human technical system which is dynamic, sometimes indeterminate and contains 
unknowns. 
Comparing and combing Tracer and Hurisk 
Table 12: Comparison of Tracer and Hurisk 
Tracer Hurisk 
Hierarchical Structure Yes Yes 
Based on a spreadsheet Yes Yes 
Recording of Data No Yes 
Allows Subjective Data Yes Yes 
Contains Objective Data Possible Yes 
Produces Statistical Scores No Yes 
Has an Empirical Basis No No 
is Retro-fitted to situations Yes Yes 
The two tools as can be seen do, to an extent, live on a continuum where Hurisk is dealing 
largely with the organisational phenomena which surround and sometimes make up 
performance shaping factors and Tracer is looking at the discrete level of the factors 
themselves and the errors they accompany. In this sense the tools are close relatives and 
could potentially be of use to the same user communities. Although Tracer does not contain 
any formal scoring it is, by its very structure, conducive to adopting a scoring strategy like 
that in Hurisk. If Tracer adopted a more sophisticate scoring structure this would greatly 
enhance its potential to act as a risk management tool. 
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Integrating Hurisk and Tracer data 
Figure 28: An a priori model of the A TC environment of Tracer and Hurisk 
Making World 
Strain 
Tracer 
Better 
Decisions 
Lesson )4 Hurisk 
learning 4r1. r--ý 
Context 
Risk 
'--T-, Reasoning World 
Risk 
Mitigation 
N. itLrnance 
shaprn 
Fa: tors 
Tracer and Hurisk are both ultimately heuristic tools, Tracer because it produces guided 
reasoning and Hurisk because it allows the development, monitoring and visualisation of its 
key objects in a user centric way. The conclusion of this benchmarking study was very 
interesting for two reasons. First, NATS Human Factors, because of operational and 
organisational constraints, had resorted to building a heuristic system based on content rich 
data sources and designed to guide expert judgement. Second, they had stopped short of 
building a scoring platform for it. Hurisk, by comparison, looked ahead of its time. 
Benchmark two: The Safety Monitoring System 
NATS has a complex safety monitoring system in place, this is not a surprise. A key 
benchmarking exercise was to read through the certificated safety statements for the elements 
of that system and reflect on how Hurisk might contribute something to the overall safety case 
of a present and future monitoring system. The conclusion was that a fully integrated version 
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of Hurisk would provide an expansion and enhancement to several safety system components, 
these were: 
SP100 v2, SP200 vl, SP201 v2, SP201 vl, SP300 v3, SP301 v2, SP302 v2, SP400 v2, SP401 
vl, SP402 v2, SP 403 v2, SP404 vl, SP406 v2, SP407 vl. 
SP100: The safety assessment of organisational change 
Currently this is a difficult procedure to articulate. There are many potential safety 
management issues in the frequent changes of managerial responsibility in NATS. There are 
also, as with any complex organisation, certain shortfalls in numbers, distribution or expertise 
at various times. This is a difficult area within which to create guidance. 
Hurisk may be of some help in structuring and directing actions. 
- It is aimed at assessing changes and potential changes to operations and is -able to 
concretely articulate risks associated with this kind of change 
- Hurisk includes communication and management issues 
- The lesson learning format may help manage change and "information survival" 
issues more easily 
SP200 Safety Surveys 
Most safety surveying necessarily concentrates on the hard evidence of traffic, controlling and 
technology issues. Surveys tend to deal with these in engineering, physical and statistical 
ways. The assessment of issues, such as performance shaping factors, which are much more 
personal and organisational than the human machine and human procedural interfaces, is of 
growing importance. 
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Hurisk would be a good tool to use in this case because of its clear focus on such issues and 
because of its design for continuous assessment and review. It may be able to help assessors 
make a more well rounded assessment. It could be integrated with other safety surveys 
throughout the year or act as a stand alone. 
SP201 Safety Management System (SMS) Continuous Assessment 
The use of tools such as incident reporting, event monitoring, and trends analysis are all 
essential to keep the SMS in a healthy state. The importance of lesson dissemination has been 
more widely recognised. Also, the advent of tools such as the technique for retrospective 
analysis of cognitive error (Tracer) has begun to investigate incidents and human error from a 
wider human factors perspective. 
Hurisk is a tool built on very similar principles to Tracer but which is looking at the wider 
organisation which shrouds the safety significant events. As such, Hurisk is not only 
complementary to Tracer but may be a similarly useful addition to the continuous assessment 
of the efficacy of the SMS. Hurisk also contains lesson learning functionality. 
SP202 Safety Reviews 
Safety reviews are an important large scale exercise for continuous improvement both of 
safety data and safety performance. These include the collation of incident investigation 
outcome data. 
Hurisk's main focus is on the higher level features of the safety culture as such it could 
contribute to safety reviews and broaden the evidence base that they can call on. Hurisk is 
also a potential candidate for the need recognised to "fill in the gaps" which the current data 
leaves. Strain data in particular may provide an explanation for some of the changes in the 
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objective data. If such links can be made then the dissemination of lessons learned from 
safety reviews will be more thorough. 
SP402 Development and assessment of safety related systems 
An important goal in ATC is to understand the dynamic and complex relationships between 
procedures, people who execute them and the equipment they use to do this. In a highly 
engineered environment like ATC with a large number of technical specialists. This gives a 
slight bias towards the technical and procedural aspects of this. The people aspect is itself. 
dominated by the more technical elements such as the Human Machine Interface issues. 
These assessments are intended as the basis for requirement setting. 
Hurisk provides a means of linking these elements but with more emphasis on the people and 
organisational issues. Thus it may provide a good bridge to the more technical methods. 
Hurisk also has an "options appraisal" functionality. This could be used to assess differences 
between requirement sets. In these ways Hurisk may support and strengthen the assessment 
of safety related systems. 
SP403 Systems Safety Case 
The systems safety case presents evidence, arguments and assumptions to show that system 
hazards have been identified and controlled; both in engineering and operational areas; and 
that qualitative and quantitative safety requirements have been met. 
Hurisk data is a blend of mainly qualitative judgement data with hard traffic and controller 
data. In an operational setting where traditionally quantitative data has been the most 
functional approach, Hurisk represents a validated opportunity to strengthen and customise 
the qualitative basis of safety case data. 
154 
SP404 Systemic Safety 
To present safety evidence and arguments through a systematic approach to safety 
management, to justify the claim that the operational safety of a unit or en route facility is 
adequate for its role. 
Hurisk is a long term recording system with an audit strand which allows reviewing over 
selected time periods. As it is a reasoning platform it shows how evidence has been balanced 
over time. 
SP407 Safety assurance 
To ensure that NATS has adequate safety assurance for the equipment elements of the ATC 
systems that are procured under contract and used in the provision of air traffic service. 
Hurisk has a set of tools which are designed to look specifically at projects. These have been 
based on a typical procurement and design paradigm to allow the identification of strain and 
risk in the operational setting directly caused by these processes and the resulting technology. 
Hurisk is very well placed to provide a complimentary data set to existing technical quality 
control and risk assurance methods. This is because it is oriented towards capturing the 
human judgement data which is lost in technical representations but contains a very important 
strand of knowledge which can be transferred to prevent technology transfer failure and costly 
late re-design. 
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3.8 Final consideration of results 
Risk Management 
The National Air Traffic Services, as evidenced in its sponsorship of these projects, 
understood very well that the safety of the UK airspace was a complex and dynamic thing. 
This led to the growing understanding, in a burgeoning air travel society, that it was not just 
the decisions made by air traffic controllers which effected the safety of passengers. The 
decisions made by engineering designers and operational air traffic control management could 
conceivably affect and effect that safety. The worry was that these decisions were more 
invisible, given that they were not scrupulously reviewed and reported. Thus, slowly these 
decisions might conspire to undermine engineered safety. This opened up the challenge that 
decision maker attributes should also be modelled because these were, in an of themselves, 
potential arbiters of a new form of risk. 
Having understood that a "human risk" to air traffic was a real potential, NATS wanted to 
measure it. It is a part of their culture that all risks are to be minimised to generate safety for 
passengers and protection for property. The "socio-technical system" of NATS therefore was 
to be the proving ground for a risk model which could compliment NATS' already well 
developed technical risk controls. 
Not `Human Factors' per se 
The human risks in question were not the kind that come naturally from complex technology 
and human operators. NATS employed a team of Human Factors specialists to assess 
technology risks. Those risk assessment processes were governed by the strictest technical 
and legal stipulations encased in The Safety Case. This was something which all NATS 
systems had to have. Technical risks more traditionally associated with this industry, e. g. the 
reliability of air traffic control equipment or the prediction of human cognitive error patterns, 
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were already covered by formal human factors methods e. g. Hierarchical Task Analysis 
(HTA), Failure Modes Effects and Criticalities Analysis (FMECA) and so on. These were not 
to be the remit of the Hurisk study. 
Decision Making 
The decision making covered by Hurisk was not the kind which is carried out by air traffic 
controllers in achieving the "safe and expeditious" movement of aircraft. Rather, it related to 
reasoning about risks of all kinds in engineering project and operational management 
meetings. That reasoning of course underpinned formal air traffic control that in terms of 
resource, infrastructure, organisation and technological spend. The potential value of a risk 
reasoning system specially designed for management decisions would be better and more 
consistent (and transparent) decision making about risk by project managers and operations 
managers. 
The decision making of these managers, it was recognised from the beginning, was taking 
place in a context of increasing pressure for economy and efficiency of operation coupled to a 
heretofore unparalleled expansion of air travel in the UK. Engineering project decisions and 
the decisions which dictate the resources and support for air traffic controllers, as well as 
changes to their roles, technology and working environments, were being realised in a faster, 
more dynamic and more uncertain environment. The air traffic controllers' role, as a slow 
paced and stable structural underpinning of the safety of air traffic management in the U. K., 
was recognised as under threat. NATS wished to understand that threat and restore balance. 
The forum for these sort of risks and strains, and their associated decision making, were 
predominantly discussion and consensus forum, that is management meetings. That fact 
raised several cultural, organisational and psychological challenges. Hurisk was 
commissioned with an open-ended remit to explore the concept of "human centred risk" (as 
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opposed to technology, or human technology interface centred risk) in these forum with a 
view to gaining more sophisticated and more explicit levels of risk control. 
3.8.1 Key attributes of this system 
This discussion will go on to consider in more depth the Hurisk 2 development project. 
Having described key technical outputs in the main body of the chapter space will now be 
give to discussing four areas: 
1. What have I concluded that `strains' are and how do they work in a system like this? 
2. What have I defined `risks' to be and how do they work in a system like this? 
3. Summary conclusions on the concept of lesson learning tools 
4. Conclusions on the whole project 
What are strains? 
It is important to understand for all the positive use of maths displayed here that strain is a 
completely heuristic idea. We don't know it really exists in the form we are attributing to it 
and therefore it remains unclear how to measure it. What we are measuring therefore is a 
proxy. It is still a proxy which needs rules. Hurisk works on the basis that any single 
individual strain has the same potential to upset safety as any other. This . assumption 
underpins the heuristic the system. 
Strains, simply put, are the operational effects left behind by a bad design process or poor 
decision making and compromises. Strains are also the operational effects of the instability 
caused by projects being undertaken, engineering or operational organisation. Strains are not 
a safety loss, the certificated safety of the system is not, according to standard metrics, 
reduced. It follows that, if strains exist, the standard metrics are not sensitive to them. This is 
a key concept. 
ý- , 
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How do strains work? 
Strains are tiny `ghosts in the machine' and they threaten safety in one of two ways. By being 
present in large numbers (a critical mass argument) or by working unnoticed over a period 
time (an attrition argument). The key to strains is that they are a force against safety, they 
make the air traffic controller's job a tiny bit harder or less logical, they make the organisation 
of air traffic a tiny bit more complex, they are present in technology solutions which are a tiny 
bit sub-optimal, they create decision pressures which make people agree with a decision even 
when they are uncomfortable with some small level of compromise. Also, as the history of 
industrial disasters shows, strains, or more generically risks, are sometimes tiny but can be 
expressed forcefully when the engineered system itself is in a unique or anomalous state. 
Differentiating engineering and operational strains 
Although strains are heuristic, measurements were developed for three kinds in the NATS 
organisation because these could be seen to be working differently. Thus there is a specific 
form of strain caused directly by instability around large engineering projects. This was 
called "engineering strain". There is also a form of strain on the organisation's decision 
makers. This is coming from the social and economic forces of operating competitive, but 
safe, air traffic control services. This form of strain can be generic, because the operational 
health can vary. This form can also be specific to a large project or programme (not all 
significant projects in NATS are engineering focussed). These were called operational strains 
and therefore came in generic and specific forms. 
Strain analysis for air traffic projects and management discussions now has a detailed 
methodology to it, a fixed rationale (based in applied research) and a suite of on line 
reasoning visualisations to help track strain at varying degrees of detail within and between 
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users. This approach because its content is embedded in real descriptive concerns, 
compliments the more focussed technical safety case. 
Strains give a heuristic system which nonetheless preserves necessary assumptions e. g. 
equality of strains. It comes with a highly structured measurement system which is' designed 
in two formats offering basic high-level impression or a comprehensive analysis. Importantly 
these fit together interchangeably, as appropriate, in providing the final strain summary. 
Strain measurement now has a highly structured questionnaire basis. The questionnaire 
creates a `journey system' for rationality. The scores are indeed relevant, but the journey to 
the output is actually about the reasoning stimulated by thinking in a calibrated way about the 
questions (a key feedback from user trials). The scores create a proxy for that rationality and 
introduce a second level of economy in future scoring (adjusting from a benchmark) and 
reasoning (being able to review why was this score given, is it still relevant). 
Strain consideration forces users away from very open-ended processes such as discussion. 
The tool does this by causing a pre-analysis activity and offering the capability to see a raft of 
focussed comparisons between and within groups and individuals over time. The 
comparisons all have high cultural value within the organisation (again backed up by user 
trials) because they came from the culture, and are written in its language. The application of 
this tool, particularly in group reasoning tasks seeks to expose the underlying rationality that 
drives preferences. These drive decisions which of course in this context drives some of the 
safety of aircraft and passengers in the sky. 
What I have achieved is proof of concept for a new reasoning device, strain. That device is 
aimed at `the human element' source of risk in air traffic proven in the first study. I have used 
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measurements within a parsimonious system to elicit decision maker comparisons based on an 
agreed underlying model of the world which can be used in real time comparisons to aid 
rationality. This model is in the reference grammar of the decision makers themselves even 
though it is using mathematical modelling to produce decision support inputs. 
What are risks in Hurisk? 
Risks are simplified for the purposes of Hurisk. Simply put, they are a summarisation of 
negative events which may occur to upset safe operational functioning or the safe execution 
of a project. NATS already uses this concept of discrete risks in its safety cases. 
The idea of working with risk is straightforward. 
1. In a safety critical setting it is important to demonstrate that you are cognisant of "the 
risks" of what you are doing. 
2. As a form of communication, phrasing unsatisfactory outcomes as individual risks is a 
good strategy. 
3. If you can define something as a risk then Hurisk allows you to measure it and chart its 
progress over time and in reaction to control features. 
At the descriptive level, a risk in Hurisk is determined by the user. The user provides discrete 
events which pertain to the assessment question. This is at a level where they can describe 
them efficiently. These events are things which they feel can or will threaten safe operation 
or safe project execution. The outworking of these events are likely to be very complex, but 
Hurisk is being used to keep high-level tabs on them and the way they behave over time. A 
summary of the guidelines used for writing risks is seven-fold: 
1. A risk does not equate to a hazard 
2. A risk does not equate to an emergency 
3. A risk happens in time 
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4. A risk is phenomenological (it can actually happen, it is not just a "fear") 
5. A risk stipulates a measurement 
6. A risk should not be too large 
7. A risk should not be too small 
Risk `scenario' generation 
It is conceivable that risk tolerance would vary throughout the life of a project. The risk 
tolerance input described earlier is therefore kept separate from the risk scoring. This allows 
users to experiment at different times with differing levels of risk tolerance whilst holding all 
other values constant. Thus the output of Hurisk, the key risks, can be explored for a given 
risk tolerance scenario. 
With this risk tool I have made some important steps forward for an organisation which 
already has a detailed understanding of technical risk sources and their management. We 
have created (and had accepted) a bounded definition for "the human element" risk as a new 
form of risk. This has been accepted as complimentary to not only technical risk but to 
formal human factors risk. A lot of that success would seem to lie in no small way in the 
rigour with which this sort of risk can be defended as coherent (ultimately challenging the 
existing forms) and which has a support structure (in the form of the seven rules) which 
maintains the force of that definition into use. 
When it comes to measurement things are tightly defined and we have produced a complex, 
but coherent, multi-attribute rating system for this risk. This makes it formidably transparent 
what the reasoning behind any high or low risk is (again existing systems do not actually have 
this transparency). In the particular case of project and operational decisions we have moved 
the organisation a long, long way from consensus based discussions resulting in high, medium 
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or low risk. Of course, in keeping with the desire to reflect existing heuristics, the system 
permits this level of coding. 
As in the case of strain the measurement the tool is not only powerful, but it is flexible too. 
This recognises the highly time pressured nature of these environments and is a key to 
transferring the technology. The target of an hours worth of assessment for a reasonable 
portfolio of risks has been met. In fact, using the very bluntest form of the risk tool, this has 
been reduced to ten minutes. The quick and simplified scoring alternatives are seamless in 
the system with the detailed ones although clearly more fundamentally heuristic (in the sense 
in which we are using that term). 
Also as in the case of strain the risk tool allows for (encourages) a time dynamic assessment 
in a world which was typified by "snap shot" approaches. Like the strain case, the risk tool 
has a range of visualisations which are conceptually quite distinct and allow a detailed form 
of auditing within and between users as well as "impressionistic" comparisons. Risks can be 
reviewed and re-scored at any time by any user. Analyses results show comparison within 
and between individuals and groups over time. More powerfully than that however, it is also 
possible to look at hypothetical shifts in risk tolerance over time and this may prove an aid to 
refining the action plans around risks. 
In view of the range of input modes from simple to complex, and in view of the idea that 
deeper reasoning is considered of higher quality, the tool contains a quality filter for depth 
and shelf life of an individual or team's assessment. This is placed in the primary output. Its 
use is not stipulated as it is an essentially passive recorder, but it is mindful of the very real 
human dynamics of risk judgement (i. e. that people do not have a lot of time to review 
scoring) observed in these settings. 
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The risk tool, importantly for these summary conclusions, produces risk data which is in 1 
same currency as strain data. That synergy is important when one comes to consider, as, 
will later, that they are really two sides of the same coin. 
/ 
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`Lessons learning' 
In the case of developing lesson a learning technology and approach we were, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, at our most challenged. Lessons are so much more intangible than our highly 
structured risk and strain concepts. They are inherently more difficult to define and one is 
faced with the problem of mapping any definition to the appropriate arena. Lessons could be 
about speculation on facts or indeed on persons. Lessons have no natural currency that is at 
all approaching anything one might summarise with a mathematical heuristic. Lessons are 
inherently subjective. Most importantly, lessons are the very essence of professional 
judgement which is, of course, the ultimate intangible in the safety bearing qualities of a 
human - technical (and socio-technical) interface. 
What our early prototypes. reported here do stimulate is some fuller thought as to how this 
area could go forward. We re-visited and improved the triads from Hurisk one, a simple, but 
quite elegant concept. What we found was that one could attach very robust scoring methods 
to this and it created differentiation which could be easily highlighted between decision 
makers. The utility of having that is not certain, but it is feasible to do and it was an 
improvement on the notation output that these had previously given. 
We were able to create a raft of possible decision-maker and decision-content comparisons. 
These could work as a sort of decision priming phase. That might be particularly important to 
keep an eye on upstream safety threats entering the system in a similar manner to that 
hypothesised in the strains and risk work. Lessons could lead to an understanding of how the 
decision space and its safety bearing qualities are being conceptualised by different groups. 
That would clearly be a window on the way people chose to reason and the weight being 
given to particular classes of decision. This is all very soft at the level we took it to, but 
clearly not without merit. 
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We were able to experiment with slightly more sophisticated narrative modelling forms in the 
shape of the questionnaire and the two forms of a detailed taxonomy of influences. There is 
clear room demonstrated here (although an agreed model would be a pre-requisite) to probe a 
good deal more deeply into decision rationale. This sort of analysis can only help shape 
decision making processes, particularly if these are highly time constrained, which we knew 
was the case. An off-line analysis that caused decision makers to reason out their positioning 
beforehand might improve decision making. 
Lastly, we looked at projecting this sort of decision taxonomy approach at a model of the . 
"stereotypes" (some might argue archetypes) of decision influences (and influencers) in the 
NATS environment. This, almost a self-knowledge proposition, threw up some interesting 
findings. It was possible to highlight deep contradictions in the safety emphasis of a decision 
space just by placing it under a different stereotype. Although somewhat hypothetical, at the 
level of evidence we have, this is highly interesting again in understanding the forces which 
shape safety decision definition. 
Benchmarking 
Comparing Hurisk with Tracer produced an interesting caveat to the Hurisk 2 project. It 
could be seen that NATS' Human Factors department were experimenting with heuristic 
reasoning tools for sensitive or unclear areas of risk. Where Hurisk has the upper hand is in 
the fact that it is centred on detailed scoring. Tracer's developers were not able to take that 
step. 
Assessing Hurisk against some of NATS' safety standards proved to be a very interesting 
technology transfer exercise. It is clear that Hurisk can contribute to the levels of safety 
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which these standards require in new ways which in some cases would actually improve on 
them. 
3.8.2 Where has this research taken us? 
The heart of this work has shared a journey of discovery with a large, complex, safety-critical 
organisation in evolution. At the beginning of that journey NATS "knew risk" and "did risk" 
as a normal part of their charter. This was both technical and Human Factors (for air traffic 
controllers) centred. Through sheer diligence to prevent loss of life in air travel NATS 
encouraged self-doubt and always entertained the possibility that there was more to learn 
about risk. At the time of my research a number of other parallel projects were running. My 
area was "human centred risk" particularly that part where upstream decision making 
(increasingly driven by commercial forces) might somehow impact downstream safety at the 
operational level in a way that existing alert functions were not sensitive to. 
As a fundamentally socio-technical system based on risk NATS was hungry for "a systems 
solution" as the countermeasure for any new risk source identified. Once we had 
convincingly identified that there was such a risk source I managed to convince them of the 
idea that a human centred risk system might best function heuristically. In creative terms this 
opened up a huge range of options. This debate was therefore fuelled by one grand 
overarching heuristic: the thermometer and its partner the scale. In sympathy with aviation 
heritage these were stylised as clock-faced gauges. 
NATS wanted to "meter" the risk temperature at the air traffic controller level, at the 
engineering project level and at the managerial decision level. Importantly, which is why 
lesson learning was added, they wanted these three communities to communicate with each 
other and a common tool used by all for different applications seemed an excellent method. 
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As a result of this research NATS had a web-based safety tool called wHurisk. It has the 
capability of providing robust decision support in the areas of upstream human risk entering 
the safety supply chain through management and project decisions. Examples of these human 
risks have been rigorously researched in the widest possible range of case studies. These case 
studies cut across the breadth of the safety bearing properties of NATS' operation covering 
technology, training, organisational behaviour and, above all, decision making. A 
comprehensive measurement system for such risks has been designed. 
wHurisk has the capability of analysing normal operations, operations under project pressure 
and large engineering projects for attrition of safety they cause. This attrition is in the from 
the hypothetical entities called strains. These have been thoroughly researched and described 
and turned into a measurement tool. This tool has gained high levels of acceptance in NATS, 
particularly with the engineering community. A comprehensive measurement system for such 
strains has been designed. 
wHurisk, in the assessment of the priority strains and risks in any NATS proposition, has the 
capability of folding inwards and forwards basic lessons to be learned in future similar 
projects or decisions. The surrounding research has also unearthed some very interesting, if 
prototypical, ideas for comparing decision spaces around safety. 
The working concepts in wHurisk have been validated by a NATS expert steering committee 
and wider expert groups contributing to concept development workshops. They have also 
been validated by a sample of "ordinary" NATS personnel utilising the tools in their daily 
work (not reported here). The thing that is the most interesting about wHurisk is that it is a 
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heuristic reasoning platform for air traffic safety decisions. Technically it does this in three 
essential ways. 
First, it plays upon the essential natural heuristics of an technically defined organisation like 
NATS i. e. the use of graphs, charts, gauges, and meters to provide rate and state information 
about physical systems and "potential conflicts". 
Second, it has detailed measures of its core objects on a 1-100 scale and these are combined 
meaningfully, by some basic mathematics, to give them properties such as summary values. 
Third, the way in which measurement takes place is flexible there are interchangeable 
methods to measure risks and strains. Some are very quick and very dirty, others are very 
detailed. 
Philosophically this is all heuristic reasoning in one overarching way. That is that the things 
these systems measure (in some detail) are not only impossible to measure, but they are 
impossible to observe, in the scientific sense. Risk, strains, lessons are collective spectres 
without physical form or phenomenological rules. What they do is help people to have a 
shared narrative of their fears associated, in this case, with the physical form and 
phenomenology of an air crash. The collective anti-thesis to these fears is the controlling 
grand heuristic of NATS other shared narrative: safety. In modelling and supporting decision 
making wHurisk, in all likelihood, was making a contribution to NATS' confidence in its own 
reasoning on safety. 
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The degree to which these heuristic devices might be improved upon with reference to . the, 
inherently similar but far more formal, systems of subjective Bayes methods will be discussed 
at the end of this thesis. 
The bridge between NATS and Unilever 
The similarity between NATS and Unilever is not immediately apparent, it is true. It lay in 
both being risk users an in one other important factor, Unilever's appetite to better measure 
risk had led them searching for ideas to use. This was to prove an excellent test bed to export 
key successes from Hurisk and assess them in a new, and very different, environment. 
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4. The Unilever Projects 
Introduction to chapter 4 
By its own estimates Unilever products are used one hundred and fifty million times per day 
across the world. It is one of the world's largest Fast Moving Consumer Goods Companies. 
It is operating in eighty five countries and has over two hundred thousand staff. The 
execution of it's business directly impacts on three million lives. 
All large companies face "issues and crises". Most have an issues management system in 
place to cope. Issues management is increasingly becoming a professional discipline 
supported by a worldwide network of academia, associations and consultants. With the scales 
upon which Unilever operates, the timely and effective management of issues is a business 
critical activity. This is not only to preserve continuity of business. In a world of globalised 
media, this is also critical to preserve a contradiction free corporate reputation. 
Issues management as a context 
In early 2005, struggling under a portfolio of nearly one hundred issues, Unilever recognised 
that it needed a more formal system of issues management to replace its historically devolved 
systems. The new system was to be, in their language, "a one Unilever system". "One 
Unilever" was a reference to one of the largest re-organisations the Anglo-Dutch company 
had ever seen. An unparalleled level of rationalisation and re-organisations of Unilever's 
global business took place. This included a project to deliver the one Unilever issues 
management system and all of its associated processes, databases and tools. 
Key to the success of this global project to improve issues management was the need to 
develop a coherent system of issues prioritisation. It was decided that this system would draw 
directly upon some of the main concepts developed in the Hurisk project. They would be 
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modified (initially simplified) and modelled to suit this new applied sphere. The new tool 
was named "Descartes". 
The overall aim of Descartes was to provide effective ways for a cross section of decision 
makers from this industry to come to a shared understanding of Unilever's priorities in order 
to mobilise resources to manage these. The issues prioritisation system integrated into the 
issues management process (itself in a fast evolving state) would thus provide a new form of 
decision support for Unilever's risk management and mitigation. 
This research was highly detailed and under high levels of applied organisational constraint. 
In the interests of the reader the development Descartes is portrayed as three distinct case 
studies. These are: 
1. The development of score-cards for issues prioritisation 
2. The development of visualisation environments for issues prioritisation 
3. A summary review of heuristic concepts in issues prioritisation 
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4.1 Summary of Chapter 4 
Score cards 
Issues prioritisation is defined. The methods of scoring and scoring processes prior to this 
work are described. The main approach to that scoring (the post it pad exercise) is given a 
detailed critique and advantages and drawbacks are considered. Advantages include 
familiarity, simplicity and ease of use. Drawbacks surround sources of bias, inconsistency 
and the lack of any audit or justification for priority. The development of four separate score- 
cards for improved rigour in prioritisation, with different user communities, is reviewed and a 
final set of concepts for practicable improvements to issues scoring proposed. 
1. The practice in the HPCE group of using an off-line scoring method based on a spreadsheet 
is considered and some early improvements are reviewed. The effect of these improvements 
in terms of the behavioural frame of reference, scale design and simple statistical analysis are 
briefly examined as a function of heuristic reasoning they support. Continuing limitations in 
the light of these improvements are also considered. 
2. The practice of the ICFE group of using a more sophisticated combination of plenary post 
it pad and review exercise is examined. Results of a workshop approach to improve the 
validity of prioritisation rationale and tools are considered. Definition strengthening is 
demonstrated to be a key route to better reasoning with this group also. They were able to 
accept more radical improvements to their scoring approach by introducing a multi-attribute 
scale with a detailed behavioural basis. A more detailed scoring process is also considered. 
This case showed that significant changes to prioritisation process and content were 
acceptable and considered effective and that these could be grounded within organisational 
constraints such as time. 
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3. In the UIG case new impact measures focussing on "business drivers" were sought using a 
number of complex scale ideas but the cardinal effect of the need for simplification 
discounted all but a few of these. A final score-card for the global team created further 
improvements in the area of scale definition and the use of bi-polar scales allowed the 
language of "advantages" to be held in tension with that of "threat'. 
4. Additionally, this UIG team developed a strategic score-card to address their specifics 
needs to communicate with senior audiences in the lingua franca of corporate reputation. 
This totally new strategic score-card was based on an analysis of extant strategy documents. 
Visualisations 
Users were already plotting the results of their early prioritisations. These plots were 
reviewed and re-created in a graphical computer programme which linked them directly to the 
score-cards, also stored in the programme. A first result was a visually improved version of 
the plots already in use. 
Problems of data volume in the ICFE case led to an innovation to allow grouping of issues so 
that these could be rolled up into single data points. A new visualisation was developed to 
show the `hidden' scores of individual items in groups. New functionality was added to allow 
direct interaction with groups in a dedicated visualisation which supported better reasoning 
about groups. 
The more demanding case of the two UIG score-cards (including advantages and impacts, 
assessing strategic impact) created visualisation innovations away from the traditional 
quadrant plot. Time was now also visualised as a linear relationship between now and future 
data points. The strategic plot was created as a boundary plot to reflect negative and positive 
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values in both scales simultaneously. When combined with time this was seen as very 
powerful 
Heuristic reasoning 
Heuristics found in issues prioritisation surround priority itself, the measurements used and 
the graphs which represent the data. One case study shows how these could all be modestly 
improved and the improvements were valued which could be described as working within the 
essential natural heuristic on offer. One case study shows how more radical changes to the 
heuristics were also possible and accepted, this could be described as expanding the essential 
natural heuristics. A third case study shows that innovation in the use of heuristics was also 
possible such as complex grouping techniques or condensing large supply chains of scoring 
information. A final issues prioritisation process benefiting from all of these developments 
was successfully rolled out in Unilever. 
4.1.1 Some key points from this chapter 
Score-card development 
" The main technique observed for issues prioritisation was the group post it pad 
exercise, this is a highly limited approach and prone to inconsistent reasoning. 
0 The simple and expedient scales of priority currently in use were not considered to 
carry enough rationality into later decision making but a system with usability and 
flexibility was highly desirable. 
9 It was possible to improve the essential natural heuristics of existing reasoning by 
small improvements focussed on better attribute definition and improved scoring and 
simple statistics 
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0 It was possible to expand the essential natural heuristics of existing reasoning by more 
sophisticated improvements including the introduction of multi-attribute scaling and 
flexible forms of data reduction through grouping. 
0 It was possible to develop measurement heuristics for issues which focussed on 
advantages as well as threats. 
0 It was possible, at the behest of strategic decision makers, to adapt Unilever's 
company strategy into a score-card. , 
Visualisation development 
0 Visualisations improving upon those already in use were easily accepted, with these 
came the ability to show more data in a more sophisticated way. 
0 Problems of data volume led to functionality to group issues into data reducing 
clusters which greatly improved the reasoning power of the approach 
0 Despite an oft stated desire for simplicity the users were able to accept and use 
complex visualisations involving larger and more detailed plots 
0 The introduction of time modelling was a valued breakthrough in the utility of this 
kind of visualisation to assist reasoning 
" Entirely new forms visualisation which broke previous conventions were readily 
accepted. 
The development of heuristic concepts 
0 It has been possible to observe and develop the heuristics which are in use in these 
sorts of settings. 
9 These forms of reasoning can be improved, revised and innovated. In all cases a high 
degree of teclmology transfer was observable. 
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4.2 Case study one: Score-cards for issues prioritisation. 
Introduction 
Issues prioritisation is the discipline of examining multiple threats and opportunities to ones 
business over time. An issues prioritisation scoring method can either be informal e. g. group 
discussion and voting; semi-formal, such as post-it pad exercises; or completely formal such 
as utilising a validated score-card. Issues prioritisation scoring is one aspect of a wider issues 
prioritisation and management process. 
This case study tracks the development of four formal issues score-cards in Unilever under 
the supervision of the Unilever Issues Group (hereafter UIG) was a group. This oversaw the 
global governance of issues management. The development took place with the assistance of 
Unilever's issue managers and their expert teams and that of the Global Issues Manager the 
single expert at the head of the issues management community and who trains, supports and 
organises them. The aim of the development was to support more efficacious methods to 
manage Unilever's issues portfolio. 
Whilst the global issues management process was overseen in the way described above, a 
number of similar, but smaller, structures were replicated in different Unilever Business 
Units. Two of these units were Ice Cream / Frozen Foods (ICFE) and Home and Personal 
Care (HPCE). These units developed score-cards for issues prioritisation ahead of the UIG's 
efforts. These score-cards were early templates. 
4.2.1 Aims 
This study describes the applied development of four issues prioritisation score-cards, that 
work can be summarised under the following aims. 
1. To work with subject matter experts to extract user requirements 
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2. To establish a critique of the current best practice, from a process and technological 
point of view, and ascertain the aspiration for future process and technology. 
3. To design and evaluate a series of prototype score-cards. 
4.2.2 Objectives 
Three projects to deliver four score-cards to different user groups ran in a sequence. The 
projects can be described by the following (sometimes overlapping) objectives: 
1. To assess existing practices in issue prioritisation scoring 
2. To develop the user requirements for new ideas for issues prioritisation. 
3. To derive separate, business unit specific, score-card contents. 
4. To evaluate potential score-card elements with users and commissioners. 
5. Internal testing and validation of score cards. 
6. Iteration of score-card design. 
7. External testing, validation and final improvements to score-cards. 
4.2.3 Methodology 
The following methods were used (to differing degrees) in the development exercises. 
- Observation of existing practices in issue prioritisation scoring through attendance at 
project meetings and discussion with project users. 
- Facilitated group workshops with end users to develop content concepts and scoring. 
- Structured group discussions with commissioners to assess the suitability of business 
unit specific score-card content. 
- Structured and ad-hoc one to one interviews with users to evaluate candidate score-card 
elements and assess these for consistency and comprehensibility. 
- Content analysis of Strategy Into Action plans as a basis for score-cards. 
- Test of score-cards on samples of issues in plenary discussion. 
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- One to one interviews with issues managers. 
- Final field testing of score-cards including comparison of group scoring and off-line 
individual methods. 
4.3 Consideration of Results 
Review of existing practices: The post-it pad exercise 
The original post it note was made by the 3M Group and was 
launched in 1980. These yellow sticky note pads would later 
give their name to a group reasoning exercise: the post-it 
exercise. Variations around that exercise were observed and 
reported at all levels of Unilever's business up to and including 
the executive. 
To better understand the requirements for issues prioritisation score-cards five post it pad 
exercises were observed. The flow of the exercise and the main steps were analysed to assess 
what was being achieved and in particular how data on issue priority was being 
conceptualised and managed. The following description gives a typical example and 
summarises pertinent results of observations. 
A facilitator would, on an Al flip chart, either: 
1. Draw a set of x and y axis, or 
2. Divide the page into four equal quadrants. 
The `x and y axes' of this drawing are labelled. Most commonly, for prioritisation tasks 
observed, the labels were "Probability" and "Impact". 
The subsequent stages of this extremely soft approach, and the order found in the following 
description, should be thought of as typical, not definitive. The titles of the stages are a 
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w at, 
necessary way to describe observable phenomena but they were not used by participants. The 
titles are not meant to convey that this technique has formally been described in any peer- 
reviewed literature or that the titles themselves refer to known reviewed techniques. 
a. Generation In the group form of the exercise each participant is given a set of post it pads 
and a pen. They are charged to write the names of the current issues which they are aware of 
and then stick these to the flip chart thus indicating their relative positions on the two axes. 
b. Consideration Once all of the participants have completed this the group gathers around 
the results to read them and ingest what they are saying. 
c. Disputation The facilitator will begin by having an open discussion on agreement and 
disagreement with the relative positions of all of the post-its and the group will begin to 
debate relevance and position of particular notes. 
d. Clustering As a result of the discussion, or as a formal instruction from the facilitator, the 
participants will begin to cluster similar objects together by sticking the post-it pads on top of 
each other. Note this essentially is over-writing the position data of those notes which are 
moved. When clustering is in full swing it is observable that several small teams, or 
individuals, may take control of the board simultaneously. In more structured exercises only 
the facilitator moves any notes and this only by consensus. 
When clusters are agreed it is common to replace the clustered notes with a single note. 
Sometimes this adopts a name which is common to those it replaces, sometimes it also has a 
bulleted list of the original names under a new title. 
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e. Re-scoring Once the definitive set of notes has been formally or informally defined, the 
relative positions of the notes is often tailored by making pair-wise comparisons between 
notes which highlight any anomalies in their positions. 
f. Consolidation As the exercise is brought to a close the picture consolidates, clusters are 
accepted, further combined or spliced back into smaller units. New items are sometimes 
brought to the chart as a result of omission or ideas generated from seeing the "mature" chart. 
g. Reviewing The rule of thumb tended to be that the upper right hand quadrant of the page 
was the area of the highest priority/interest and the lower left the lowest. The group would at 
some point review a "whole picture" on this basis discussing the relative priorities. Once this 
was pronounced as satisfactory the chart would be frozen. 
Some possible benefits of the post it pad approach 
- It is quick and easy to do and doesn't require any complex equipment 
- It is familiar and expected, people are comfortable to do it for a range of problems 
- Its output is easy to use because of the aforementioned familiarity 
- The results are uncomplicated fit into a small space 
Some problems with the post-pad approach 
- Known psychological biases of group discourse such as the effect of hierarchy and 
assertiveness, lead to some opinions carrying more weight and agreement 
- Anchoring effects are potentially introduced very early on where later variables are scored 
relative to existing variables 
- Position of a post it relative to an Al sheet is a poor proxy for a real measurement scale 
(and heavily mediated by which size Post-it note is used) 
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- The rationale (and variability) for the prioritisation decision is not formally captured 
- The clustering approach is neither formal nor criteria led 
- The analysis is bound to the time at which it is done, essentially being a snap shot of the 
current state of affairs 
Challenges for improvement 
For issues prioritisation in the use of the post it pad exercise, or other similar data reduction 
techniques which provide quick and malleable processes to discuss complex problems, the 
key weakness is the rationale for priority. The necessary justification of the priority decisions 
was not observed to be carried forward in any systematic way. 
When one prioritises a global issue in a modern industrial setting the money and resource 
allocation to that issue is significant. Interview data suggested that the acceptability of simple 
rank order prioritisations, or priority decisions without any justification or supporting data, 
was being challenged. The task of producing the results of a post it pad exercise was seen to 
introduce post rationalisations or outright bias. The use of the outputs of these kinds of 
exercises was being perceived as highly politicised and tantamount to a complex form of 
lobbying, not measurement. 
Discussion of post it pad with users 
The sorts of measurements of priority currently in use ('1,2., 3' or high, medium, low values) 
were not considered sufficient to support decision making. Prioritising in this rough and 
ready manner also created at least three other associated problems. First, checking the 
rationality of why one object is prioritised over another requires you to re-visit the discussion 
with the expert. This was so highly inefficient as to never happen. Second, because of the 
vague criteria for discrimination priority, the Post-it pad exercise was essentially another form 
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of "lobbying tool", in essence little more than a physical capture of a discussion. 
Undoubtedly the processes like the post it exercise did facilitate discussion, but whether it 
really came to any conclusions that a round table discussion could not was called into 
question. Third, whilst it appeared to be more systematic, the approach of the post it pad 
exercise was not reducing the known biases of discussion processes. 
The retort to such challenges of course was that there was no better system with the same 
usability and flexibility available for busy people to use. 
183 
4.3.1 A first score-card (HPCE category) 
The HPCE group had attempted improvements to the measurements in their version of the 
post it pad exercise. HPCE had a geographically very dispersed team so this exercise was a 
mix of opportunistic group activity (e. g. at meetings) and off-line scoring via a spreadsheet. 
Team members in the off-line exercise made a `high, medium, low' type judgements on two 
attributes: probability and impact, (these an obvious legacy from early risk plots). A 
qualitative variable, called `hot or not", was also measured. This data was collected by e- 
mail. The team results were then aggregated by the process owner and a quadrants plot was 
produced as a communication of the results. 
Two measurement improvements on the basic Post-it exercise are available here: 
I. There was an attempt to create a scale of measurement, albeit a very simple one. 
2. There was a second order of data comparison added in a qualitative data point. 
Two things are important to note in terms of the use of the approach: 
1. The group were scoring independently and using software to do so (Excel). 
2. The quadrant plot was only produced once the results from the scoring had been 
mathematically aggregated. (This is not strictly true as firm evidence of biasing in interpretation 
could be observed, e. g. the person responsible for the final output would discount outliers based on 
"character judgement ", but in principle this was what the users thought was happening). 
Testing improvements 
Working with the Issues Manager for HPCE some changes were proposed and tested in the 
next available exercise, these were: 
- Rejecting the "probability" measure and replacing it with a measure of "perception" 
- Defining the axes more systematically 
- Using a sliding scale (rather than a high, medium, low estimate) with some clear 
"behavioural anchors" at the poles 
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- Improving the qualitative variable 
- Aggregating the scores by first using simple descriptive statistics 
- Labelling the quadrants of the plot 
Defining the axes 
The text below is an excerpt from the instructions on a revised spreadsheet: 
"What is Business Impact: Business impact is the degree to which an issue, if uncontrolled, 
would damage Unilever's business. 
You will be asked to rate business impact using a relative scale: 
Low = Low impact which is localised 
High = High impact, ball-park of 200 Million Euros 
What is Perception? Perception is the trickier of the two attributes, it relates primarily to 
how, and by whom, the Business impact of the issue will be perceived. This is combined 
with existing perceptions of products, ingredients and processes. 
You will be asked to rate perception using a relative scale: 
Low = Issue is important to a few external publics 
High = Issue is important to many external publics" 
Using a sliding scale with behavioural anchors 
The scales were presented as follows for each of the issues in the portfolio, note that a 
nominal figure in Euros was added to the business impact scale. 
Figure 29: Spreadsheet scoring tool 
AlIergeA & Fragrance Business Impact High Impact 
1 Ingredients - specific allergen 
Low impact (ball park of 
which is 200 million 
labelling with the 7th Amendment. localised euros) 
Public concerns that some of 
Unilever HPCE's products can 
cause allergies. Perception Issue Is Issue Is 
Important to a Important to 
Hot or not? Please F Live -moving 
few external many external 
rate current activity publics publics 
on this issue 7 Litte I no activity 
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Improvipg qualitative data 
A `hot or not" variable was added, a robust idea to help the category decided whether there 
were any crises brewing in particular countries. We decided that this too could be sharper by 
making it a behavioural judgement. Hot or not was retained as the title but the question 
became a choice between whether there was "current activity" on this issue "live and moving" 
or "little or no activity". A second qualitative variable was also added to the visualisation 
entitled "resource allocation". This helped improve understanding of priority in another way. 
Aggregating the scores 
In the place of using a simple democratic average (i. e. how many of the participants had 
scored either high, medium or low), mean and standard deviation measures were introduced 
into the analysis. The mean was used to create the aggregate position. The standard deviation 
was converted to a `disagreement index' around the business impact variable and this was 
translated into a qualitative high, medium or low. 
Labelling the quadrants of the plot 
The quadrants of the plot, like the other areas of the approach, were locked more firmly into 
behavioural terms as each quadrant was given a reference label. 
Results of these improvements 
The HPCE category of Unilever were engaged in an important measurement exercise. From 
it they wanted to be able to prioritise the issues in their portfolio in an agreed manner. Whilst 
they had adapted the Post-it pad exercise for this, they still retained its essential flavour. 
Therefore they retained its essential failings also. Following observation of the effect of these 
improvements (which were accepted as improvements). Some applied principles can be 
derived: 
ý-_\ 
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Improved definition: The frame of reference for measurement (i. e. the meaning of the axes), 
the measurement unit itself (i. e. the scales) and the qualitative characterisation (i. e. the 
interpreted meaning of the data points) have all been improved in this case. These have 
caused the team to work with behaviourally based judgements over ephemeral ones. 
Importantly, the behaviours in question are still in the natural language of their business. 
Improved Scaling: There will be more discussion on the use of scales in this kind of 
application. What is important to note here is not so much that users went from a categorical 
(high, medium, low) assessment of their issues to a continuous scale (in fact 1- 1000), but 
that they did so happily. The deliberate choice not to display any numbers on the sliding 
scales, but simply make them positioned on a line, did not upset these users in the slightest 
(even though this was predicted). Note here we see a slight break with the Bayes paradigm 
which would use a nominal scale as opposed to an ordinal. 
Improved Descriptive Statistics: Rigour, in these settings, is not a mathematical concept per 
se, but a psychological one. However, the improvements which came about by confronting 
the individuals to improve the meaning of their measures and to use numerical scales, led to 
an instant improvement in the applicability of very simple summary statistics to these 
problems. 
Improved Heuristics: It is important to note that this case study demonstrates is that you can 
work within the `essential natural heuristics' of a decision making group and improve them. 
The scoring approach, the analysis and the communication of the results were all in essence 
only improved, they were not radically altered from what the users were trying to achieve. 
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Some remaining problems at this level 
These improvements increased the overall rigour and had been accepted by users. However, 
they were only modest improvements and still left behind deficiencies in the scaling an in the 
problem reduction.. This reduced therefore in the validity of the meaning of the results. 
Scaling: A complex business proposition was still being assessed on a two uni-attribute 
scales. The scales themselves related to business impact and perception of an issue. Such 
complex concepts should really be reasoned about in more detail. 
Problem reduction: It is arguable that even with better scaling and a basic statistical 
treatment, the problem of prioritisation is still being reduced to a core proposition which 
examines a quadrant plot and asks: "which of these four categories does the issue belong to? " 
Judgements on variables of this kind will always be essentially heuristic but improving the 
actual meaning of the results was still a concern. Issues themselves, by their very nature, are 
highly dynamic things but this assessment produced a relatively static representation of them. 
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4.3.2 A second score-card (embedding a multi-attribute measure) 
Unilever's Ice-Cream and Frozen Foods category (ICFE), like their colleagues in HPCE, 
managed a portfolio of issues. Their approach had been to use a group Post-it pad exercise 
and then refine this data in discussion. Their own report on the results of this exercise was a 
combined chart showing all the data on a probability impact plot. This had a lot in common 
with the HPCE approach (using probability - impact, using low - high scaling). The 
drawbacks already noted were also in evidence therefore. 
Workshop to improve priority score-card 
A workshop with key personnel from the category was convened to examine the area fully. 
Understanding what their priority measurements actually meant was a key concern to this 
group as there was a stronger link between priority measurement outcomes and business 
interventions in this case. The result was that the objectives of the prioritisation exercise were 
more fully articulated and the definition of its components was systematically revised. 
Defining "an issue" and its prioritisation 
ICFE arrived at the following definitions: 
Issue: "A threat, specific to Quality Assurance or Safety, Health and the Environment, which 
has the potential to impact (positively or negatively) on ICFE's business. " 
Issues prioritisation: "is a process which should enable ICFE to: identify; prioritise; 
communicate; act upon and assess the status of its issues regularly. The approach must be 
sustainable and reproducible in the future. " 
Adopting a multi-attribute approach 
Probability and impact, were replaced by `perception and business impact' as in the HPCE 
case. Unlike the HPCE case however, a deeper set of discriminating variables were worked 
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up to support their definition. From the available list of variables discussed at the workshop 
perception would focus on a shortlist of attributes which were meaningful to the business 
environment and business impact would adopt a heuristic based on Unilever's supply chain 
these are defined below and were: 
Perception Business Impact 
- Intrinsic value - What we make 
- Visibility - How it's made 
- Business damage - How it's sold 
- Ownership - How much of it 
- What brands are involved 
Each of these ideas was translated into a simple question giving nine attributes as follows: 
- Perceived Intrinsic Value: Is the product or ingredient highly valued by society/ 
individuals and will this therefore negate the issues with it? 
- Perceived Visibility: How visible is this issue and to whom? 
- Perceived Business Damage: How much do people, who are not close to Unilever, 
automatically think the issue will damage us? 
- Perceived Proportion of Ownership: How much is Unilever seen as the main owner 
of this issue? 
- What we make: Does it damage/ attack the viability of something that we make 
- How we make it: Does it damage/ attack/ alter the way we make something 
- How we sell: Does it impact on the way we currently sell products/ where sold 
- Pervasiveness: Does it impact a high tonnage ingredient/ a high use ingredient 
- Branding: Does it impact on one of Unilever's key brands 
For each of these attributes a bi-polar set of behavioural anchors was worked up. The 
resultant score-card as it looked in one of the software prototypes is shown: 
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Figure 33: early score-cards 
,e Name IlscueName 
Business Impact 
Doe n't damage the viability of what we make Seriously damages the viabihty of more than one key brand 
What we make 
.................................................................................................. 
Doesn't alter'>ource-make-deliver" of products Alters "source-make-deliver" of a more than one key brand 
How we make 
........................................ ..................................................... 
Doe>ri t impact or, how we sell product Alters how we sell more than one key brand 
How we sell 
.............................................. ................................................... 
Doesn't damage the reputation of a key brand Enduring negative impact on the reputation of a key brand easily remembered 
Branding 
.......................... .................................................... 
Impacts only on low tonnage/low use ingredient Severe impact on a high tonnagelhigh use ingredient 
Pervasiveness 
.................................................................................................. 
Perception I 
OK Cancel 
Issues Prioritisation scoring 
Issue Name ll ueNarre 
Perception 
Minor u ues will alter custoumer behaviour Even serious issues will not alter customer behaviour 
Perceived 
intrinsic value 
-ýýý ý'7 ýN . _V s~N~ 
........................ ....... ......,.......,................... ......,....,,,.,.......,,,,...... 
Issue rs important to a fe,, v external publics Issue is important to many external publics 
Perceived 
visibility 
"Lay betief " that no business damage to Unilever will occur "Lay belief" that serious business damage wiA occur soon 
Perceived 
business 
damage .............................................................. «..,................., . 
Unilever is not teen as the main issue owner Unilever is seen as the only responsible owner of the issue 
Perceived ----- 
ownership ,. ............................... ............. ,.,,. 
A process 
In the HPCE case a better scoring method had been added to the same scoring process. In this 
case a new process for prioritisation was also designed. Plenary Post-it Pad exercises were 
replaced by: 
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- Off-line scoring prior to Quality Assurance meetings by all team members 
-A report on scoring results highlighting agreement and disagreement in advance of 
meeting 
- Disputed issues will be "flagged" 
- Business impact and perceptions will -be equally weighted 
- At Quality Assurance meetings a master issues profile would be updated in discussion 
of off-line scores and disagreement resolved 
- Annually a review of all the issues data would be the key agenda item 
Testing the new ideas with end users 
The new score-card and visualisation were tested by an initial pilot group. Its use mirrored 
much of the Post it exercise in that issues were placed onto the grid by a group. However, 
this time the group used the score-card to reason about the issues. The first trial was very 
successful and a portfolio of issues was able to be derived within the time. 
Improvements brought about by this case 
This case is a more sophisticated argument than the HPCE case. The rationale, the core 
technique, the software and the reasoning model all underwent improvement. The result was: 
- Improved definition 
- Increase rigour of approach 
- Increased measurement sophistication 
Improved definition: The previous unstructured approach was replaced by an improved set 
of definitions. The ephemeral notion of `issue' and the loose process of prioritising have 
tightened. This has led to increased understanding of the group's intentions within, this 
process. 
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Increased rigour of process: The rigour of issues prioritisation process created 
measurement exercise which was more demanding. "Technology transfer failure" became a 
concern. A perfectly workable tool might fail to embed in the organisation because it would 
not be workable within the time available to the process. How long this analysis took had to 
be "owned" by the users and not imposed by a system. An optimisation approach made this 
time constraint explicit. The analysis had to take no more than one hour. 
Increased measurement sophistication: The existing measurement and reasoning of a 
professional group (and its heuristics) could and should serve as the platform for better 
measurement and reasoning. A particular advance made in this early example with ICFE was 
to create enthusiasm around more sophisticated measurement. In a business environment 
very much hooked on "traffic lights" and measurements no more sophisticated than "high, 
medium, low" this example was a major victory. The team addressed the fundamental scaling 
problems of Unilever's prioritisation approach i. e. the use of only two uni-attribute scales to 
convey issue complexity meaningfully. The idea of using a multi-attribute score was 
successfully developed and deployed in a live case. 
Conclusions 
This group of prioritisation users were successfully taken from a fairly institutionalised Post it 
pad exercise, one which they struggled to remember the meaning of, to a data driven audit 
trail of reasoning. All areas of their prioritisation exercise underwent significant 
improvements in detail and rigour of application. Their reasoning became more systematic 
and transparent in their own eyes. Importantly it could be applied later to justify the 
prioritisation of one set of issues over another. This case shows is that a much more 
sophisticated score-card can be tailored around existing poor quality heuristics and still fit in 
with the organisational constraints, such as a time limit, which mediated them. 
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4.3.3 A global issues prioritisation score-card 
Developing a score-card for the issues which Unilever as a company were managing on a 
global scale was a larger challenge. The subject matter was more complex and the scrutiny of 
and constraints over the end result was greater. 
The existing global model for prioritisation largely conformed to the kinds of starting point 
which had been observed in the two previous cases: 
- Application of a "probability & impact" style measurement 
- Use of only `high - medium - low' as a measure 
-A quadrant plot as the visualisation 
- The use of post it pads and flip charts as the "primary technology" 
HPCE and ICFE had been articulating predominantly technical issues in their score-cards. 
The global company scale required a more detailed user requirements capture process to 
create a 'scorecard' Which could applied to both technical and non-technical issues. There was, 
as evidence of an ongoing cultural shift in the company, a desire to link priority to "key 
business drivers" and not just threats. Content analysis of the existing material in this area 
suggested four fertile areas for further examination: 
- Impact on Unilever's corporate reputation 
- Actual business impact 
- Control 
- Perception 
a. Impact on Unilever's corporate reputation 
Three groups of variables were viewed as crucial: Unilever itself, Non Governmental 
Organisations and the media. The desired score-card should reflect these in some way. 
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Table 13: Corporate reputation early ideas 
Variable Measure or comment 
Subject of current NGO Highlight likelihood and credibility with NGO/severity issues 
campaign 
Conflict with corporate social Highlight actual or perceived and severity 
responsibility 
Conflict with code of business Highlight actual or perceived and detailed severity 
principles 
Front page coverage in the Contextual statement about likelihood and nature of story 
next 4 months 
b. Actual Business Impact 
A simple measure of business impact avoiding a complex costs benefits assessment was 
highly desirable. Trade off between the tangible i. e. costs and the intangible i. e. brand 
reputation loss needed to be understood if possible. Note the very rich, if inconclusive, nature 
of the possibilities for encapsulating impacts. 
Table 14: Competitive advantages ideas 
Variable Measure or comment 
Actual Business Mainly financial Assessing in a quantitative Financial or financial 
Impact context or qualitative way what the equivalence 
impact to Unilever will be if 
the issue continues 
unmanaged 
Cost of issue current Financial estimate several multiple choices about estimate of cost 
impacts 
Cost to put right Financial estimate green book approach, economist to help, 
prototypes/benchmarks approach 
Or use variation on Slider bars against handles on subjective reasoning benchmark from 
impact of what we severity of impact unilever examples 
make, how we make it, against a "blood 
how we sell it, where chilling" cost extreme 
we make it 
Impact on key brands Mainly descriptive Understanding the nature Described threat to 
data of the behaviour of the named brand with 
issue as it relates to the associated financial 
understanding of brands by estimate 
producers, consumers and 
shareholders 
does it touch the foods how many of these when do we go alone and when do we go with 
9 or hpce 6 does it impact and competitors 
how hard 
Reputation Qualitative scale for severity and recoverability 
Efficacy package Narrative detail of which actual aspects of brand efficacy will be threatened 
and in what way 
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c. Control 
Assessment of the controllability of risks again took the form of a sort of costs benefits 
assessment, this time about likely controls. 
Table 15: Influence and control ideas 
Variable Measure or comment 
Control Behaviourally Anchored Quantifying Actions and costs balance 
Rating Scale and Q&A Unilever's strength in 
the debate and 
decision making 
arena 
Ability to Estimate of how much the "is it worth it index" 
Influence issue is being or can be 
defined by us 
Debate control Estimation of how much What are the risks associated with it 
of the discussion on the 
issue is controlled by us 
Complexity to An overall picture of the "issue size" in terms of the cost to control if one wished to 
control do so in relation to numbers of discrete players, profile and perception of expertise 
authority and trust 
d. Perception 
Table 16: Perception ideas 
ble 
Could use 
existing 
perception 
attributes: 
Intrinsic value, 
visibility, 
ownership and 
business impal 
Measure or comment 
analysis or 
current IP 
metrics in tool 
Ascertaining in some useful 
way how the issue is being 
perceived and what the 
intentions are of other key 
Characterisation and 
classification 
correlation with subjects of ngo stuff, linked to impact on 
corporate reputation 
Categorical 
slider bars 
The final score-card 
Many iterations were required to produce a score-card which could satisfy only some of these 
aspirations. When this was finally agreed the threat and impact language of previous score- 
cards had been partially replaced by more positive "reputation and competitive advantages". 
Further improvements in the detail of behaviourally anchored rating scales were also seen. 
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Figure 39: The first UIG score-card 
Iý-sue ('Jýme- Nano MH 
Reputation Advantages 
Internal stakeholders' confidence 
Shareholder and employee Shareholder and employee 
increases 
External stakeholders confidence 
Unilever 's external reputation heavily Unilever's external reputation greatly d e damage improved 
Secrecy / Transparency 
Company criticised as secretive not Company praised for tranaparency 
transparent and honesty D 
NGO media behaviour 
Detailed campaign of protest by 
consortia of key NGOs targeting 
Major Unilever - NGO partnership in 
j public arena 
Qs 
Unilever a 
Long term social standing 
Criticised on social, environmental, 
communit rounds or combi ati 
High profile praise for best practice ' yg n ons 1 
< Reck Next CarxL, 
Issue Plame: Nano PAH 
Competitive Advantages 
Reactivity 
Crisis management for the forseeible We lead this issue and have good 
future control of the errternal agenda "º 
Competition / Profit impact 
Reduction of market share in key Increase market share in several key 
markets ,,,, markets 
Impact control 
Low level of control over key High level of control over all business .ýf business impacts impacts 
Resource cost of impact control 
Resource cost is too high to justify Resource cost will create a return on 
fJ 
the investment 
Readiness to deal with the issue 
Unilever will take along time to get 
ready compared to the issues pace 
Unilever is ready to deal with this 
issue full now , y, 
< Sack cancel r 
Review of this score-card 
The attributes are beginning to look more like elements of a formal scale here which is 
tapping into an overall construct. The anchors are highly meaningful. Each scale has its 
extremes defined in a realistic behaviour which is essentially measurable. Reading vertically 
down the anchors of the right hand side of these scales encapsulates a "grand heuristic" to 
assess how well issues are managed. It is a short step from there to give those issues some 
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kind of data-driven priority estimate. What is also very interesting is that the "grand 
heuristic" for a well or poorly managed issue in Unilever's eyes is visible as a narrative in the 
score profiles. 
Improvements brought about by this case 
This case demonstrated that global issues prioritisation on a common scorecard was not only 
possible but that it could create the driver for new reasoning heuristics to come along which 
the group would accept and act upon. The benefits created in the earlier cases were still seen 
to be transferred here: systematic combination of multiple scorers views; use of multi- 
attribute scales; emphasis on behavioural anchoring; encapsulating key metaphors (like 
"competitive advantage" and "reputation damage"). Overall this supported a rational audit 
the priority decisions. Stronger forms of measurement were in evidence, where more 
attention was given to creating anchors for the scales which said very specific things like: 
"Unilever will take a long time to get ready compared to the issue's pace". 
The most radical shift in definition is the move away from "impact" models favoured by the 
other two communities in the study. The UIG focus was to be "advantages" (reputation and 
competitive). This put the prioritisation question firmly into corporate reputation language. 
The resultant scales would therefore also measure a proxy for `upside risk' as well as threat. 
This was considered a much more appealing form of reasoning for the corporate setting. 
Business impact was however, retained as this was for a crucial technology transfer argument 
as it was obvious from the previous cases that it would remain important to talk about impact. 
Communities who `traded' in impact assessments were sceptical of the up-beat language of 
business advantages seeing it as "corporate spin". A benefit of behaviourally anchored rating 
scales is the ability to hold the two views in tension in the same measurement. 
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Increased process rigour: The prioritisation process was designed with three elements: 
1. The global issues team would (independently or in plenary) perform an analysis of their 
issue using the new score-card. 
2. The global issue leader would be responsible for ratifying the team's scores to one view. 
3. The UIG would be presented with the results in order to decide on the priorities. 
Improved heuristics: In all three cases the `essential natural heuristics' which people were 
operating with to create prioritisation (defining, scoring, analysing and communicating) had 
all been demonstrably improved by their score-card developments. These improvements came 
about not by introducing a model which supplanted existing preferences, but by introducing a 
model that mirrored and improved them. This opened an less threatening door to change 
existing heuristics to ones which were more formal and analytical but still. recognisable. 
4.3.4 A strategic impact score-card 
The UIG score-card had, out of the three on offer, the strongest link to "corporate business 
drivers". This was achieved through the emphasis of advantages over impacts. This led to a 
further research challenge. This was the communicate the prioritisation results. to senior 
stakeholders fully in the language of their own business drivers. The answer to that question 
created a powerful step change in reasoning about priority. 
A step-change in reasoning 
In the first round of global issues prioritisation nearly 80 issues were taken through the 
scoring process. Under review the prioritisation tool and process were well received, the 
results from the global issue teams and leaders using the current score-card were considered 
to be a definitive "technical" assessment of the issues portfolio. 
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However, the absence of stronger rhetoric of "business value drivers" for senior 
communication was still considered a weakness. It had been expected that these strategic 
ramifications of the priority assessment would be a more conventional discussion process 
using use the expertise of the UIG themselves and that this process would lead to their 
translation into this sort of language. The benefits of a score-card approach were considered 
to be so strong that it was decided to extrapolate the research into an additional, strategic 
version of the entire prioritisation process. This meant the development of a new score-card 
to assess the strategic relevance of priority technical issues. 
Strategic prioritisation 
The source of the strategic criteria would be "SIA". This stood for Strategy Into Action plan. 
Preserving the need to put the results of this further analysis in plot form, the UIG chose 
impact on SIA (positive and negative) and "influence" as the variables. A workshop was held 
to develop the influence criteria as these were a matter of professional judgement. 
For the alignment with SIA a more formal method was chosen. SIAs, by their nature, are 
very high level, hierarchical tools. That is to say Unilever's board sets the company SIA and 
then there is a cascade of further SIAs in response. Three SIA plans (the foods category, the 
HPC category and the SIA of Unilever board) were examined in detail. 
Deconstructing Strategy Into Action 
An SIA takes up a single page of a Powerpoint slide. The core structure is fixed: 
0 Must win battles 
0 Strategic goals 
0 Key Performance Indicators and Targets 
0 Strategic Actions 
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Stage one: Actual statements 
Each of the SIA plans was broken down into the number of "statements of intent" it contained 
excluding explanatory text, such as the titles above. 
UEx = 69 
HPC=64 
Foods = 51 
Removing duplicates left 116 unique statements across the three SIAs. These statements 
could be placed into the 39 categories shown here: 
Figure 45: SIA content analysis 
Global mindset Optimisation 
External orientation Effectiveness 
Alignment Responsiveness 
Competitive 
Portfolio choices 
Regional / global mixes and category Key Markets 
strategy 
D&E Markets Financial flexibility 
Mature markets Confidence in leadership 
Stop decay Real accountability 
Accelerate growth in china and Complexity reduction 
russig 
Deliver top ten Marketing 
Link customer insight Customer development 
Link consumer insight Information mangement 
Communication 
Health 
Consumer insight 
Customer insight 
Channel strategies 
Rennovation 
Vie, Soy, Lipton, HH emphasis 
Distinctiveness development 
Functional through relevant science 
Sharper positioning 
Effective brand communication 
Inspiring activation platforms 
Vitality partnerships 
Vitality incorporation in brankey 
Stage two: Clustering 
The 39 categories clustered into 7 key areas shown below 
Figure 46: SIA clusters 
External orientation 
Alignment 
Competitive 
Regional / global mixes and 
rganisation category strategy 
Portfolio choices 
Financial flexibility 
Confidence in leadership 
Real accountability 
Complexity reduction 
inovation Deliver top ten 
Link customer insight 
Link consumer insight 
upply chain Optimisation 
Effectiveness 
Responsiveness 
apability development Marketing 
Customer development 
Information mangement 
Communication 
Key Markets 
D&E Markets 
Mature markets 
Stop decay 
Accelerate growth in china and russia 
Brands Health 
Consumer insight 
Customer insight 
Channel strategies 
Rennovation 
Vie, Soy, Lipton, HH emphasis 
Distinctiveness development 
Functional through relevant science 
Sharper positioning 
Effective brand communication 
Inspiring activation platforms 
Vitality partnerships 
Vitality incorporation in brankey 
Stage three: Identification of common measurement 
Each of these 7 areas had two or three main "impact variables" identifiable within it: 
Figure 47: SIA main areas 
The final scorecard 
Armed with the above analysis and the variables for "influence" the final score-card was 
worked up through drafting and testing. As with the previous score-cards in this study the 
aim is to develop a robust set of questions which could be rolled up into a single metric. 
The final strategic score-card took the following form 
Table 17: The SIA score-card 
SIA "Fit" scorecard 
Supply chain: What overall impact will this issue have on either the optimisation, the effectiveness or the 
responsiveness of Unilever's supply chain 
Very negative impact on Supply No real positive or negative impact Very positive impact on Supply 
chain on Supply chain chain 
Vitality: To what degree does the management of this issue bring significant delivery on nutrition, health / 
hygiene and vitality 
Left un-checked it damages Some contribution with links to 
Contributes heavily to thought 
delivery thought-leadership 
leadership (with key external 
audiences) 
Innovation: To what degree can the management of this issue help with the delivery of the "top ten" global 
innovation projects, in either cate o, on time and in full 
Left unchecked likely to hinder top Some generic contribution but 
A direct and defined link enabling 
category innovations uncertain to quantify 
delivery on one or more top 
category innovations 
Distinctive brands: To what degree can the management of this issue bring significant contribution to unique, 
insightful, functional, competitive, scientifically proven brand benefits 
There is a no argument that it will There is a reasonable basis to There is a compelling argument for 
help and may damage key brands assume a reasonable contribution a powerful contribution 
Growth: To what degree can the management of this issue bring significant delivery on "the creation of great 
brands preferred by retailers and repeatedly purchased by consumers" 
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Left unchecked likely to lead to A compelling case for a direct downturn in sales / not achieving Some contribution to growth, but contribution to brand/market 
growth targets hard to quantify growth performance 
Key market strategic actions: Does the management of this issue contribute to Unilever's "strategic portfolio 
choices" as expressed in the SIA "win key markets" 
Damages delivery on either key This is linked to Unilever's 
There is a direct and defined link to 
rands and strategic market key b Brands or strategic market targets strategic portfolio choices rgets 
Winning with customers: To what degree can the management of this issue bring significant contribution to how 
we meet our "win with customers" aims (as specified in the SIA) 
Negatively impacts on our win with Some improvement will be possible 
Positive impact creating 
competitive advantages for Unilever 
customers SIA aims but it is difficult to quantify and customers 
Table 18: The influence and control score-card 
Influence and control scorecard 
Unilever ability to influence : To what degree can Unilever have significant influence over the way this issue is 
discussed and the way it plays out : 
Very low level of influence 
Have influence but not able to Very high level of influence can act 
control as a leader 
Unilever's need to have an influence : To what degree should Unilever have a significant influence over the 
way this issue is discussed and the wa it plays out : 
This is not an area for Unilever 
Unilever needs to be a significant It is crucial and expected that 
"ownership" this is a sector issue 
force in the debate and this is Unilever will lead and drive this 
expected issue 
How does Unilever need to drive or lead on this issue: 
Low external visibility, dealt with 
Some external visibility but in High external leadership visibility 
in the context of a `sectoral' debate 
coalition with other companies and because the issue is crucial to 
relevant stakeholders Unilever's competitive priorities 
Impact shift: If the impacts of this issue came to our door to what degree can we control the outcomes to our 
competitive advantage 
Very low level of control with Very high level of control, allowing 
likely disproportionate damage to Some control to share the impacts competitive advantages by 
Unilever (compared with across Unilever and competitors significantly shifting negative 
competitors) impacts (to com etitors) 
Important to note about this score-card is that the propositions have become more detailed. 
Also, because these propositions are quite a bit more concrete and complex than those used 
before, a central behaviour anchor was introduced to stabilise the meaning of the rating scale. 
Improvements brought about by this case 
There were some interesting improvements in this case in three areas: 
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" in the meaning of what the heuristics are trying to do 
9 in the process by which this approach and tool are deployed 
0 in the way the results are visualised 
Improved scales: The meaning of the scales being used in the global issues teams' version of 
prioritisation was already based on a solid set of questions with behaviourally verifiable 
anchor points. The opportunity afforded by access to the strategic documents which set 
Unilever's business priorities however, opened up a new opportunity. The deconstruction of 
the strategy into action plans gave the most grounded score-card yet. This is evidenced by the 
more proposition like nature of the questions and their increased specificity. Three scale 
anchor points defined the behavioural grounding of the answers more firmly. 
Improved process: The process by which prioritisation takes place had reached a fully 
mature stage spanning the gap between technical project areas and strategic priority setting. 
There were now two scorecards. One was to rationalise a kind of solid and sensible 
operational priority, facing broad drivers like competition and reputation. The second was 
used by a more elite group was to rationalise the "meaning to Unilever's strategy". The result 
was five stage prioritisation process. Each stage maintained the same rationality and was 
bounded by similar data. 
Improved argument: Lastly, in terms of improvements, although the function to compare 
users at the score-card level had been available the whole time, the strategic assessment was 
the first place where it was formally used by the (highly divergent) group of decision makers 
to resolve key disagreements. 
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4.4 Unilever case study two: The development of visualisation environments 
for issues prioritisation 
Introduction 
Three projects to deliver four score-cards to user groups within the Unilever issues 
management community have been described in the previous section. These projects ran 
essentially in a sequence. Each of these score-cards, as well as being a visualisation itself, 
produced results which the users desired to view in a range of Cartesian plots. In a parallel 
exercise with score-card development, these plots were also evaluated and improved. This 
case study considers how this was done and the implications for the contribution to support 
for heuristic reasoning which the plots delivered. 
4.4.1 Aims 
This case study describes the applied development of three issues prioritisation visualisations, 
that work can be summarised under the following aims 
To work with subject matter experts to extract user requirements 
2. To design and evaluate a series of prototype visualisations. 
3. To evaluate final versions in user trials 
4.4.2 Objectives 
The part of the projects to design these plots can be described by the following (sometimes 
overlapping) objectives: 
1. To assess existing practices in issue scores plotting 
2. To develop the user requirements for improvements in the light of new score-cards. 
3. To derive separate, business unit specific plotting devices. 
4. Internal testing and validation of plots. 
5. Iteration of plots design. 
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6. External testing, validation and final improvements to plots. 
4.4.3 Methodology 
The following methods were used (to differing degrees) in development of the visualisations 
- Observation of existing practices in issue prioritisation visualisation through attendance 
at project meetings and discussion with project users. 
- Structured group discussions with commissioners to assess the suitability of business 
unit specific visualisation content. 
- Structured and ad-hoc one to one interviews with users to evaluate visualisation 
elements and assess these for consistency and comprehensibility. 
- Plenary discussion sessions with user groups to test visualisations on prioritisation 
exercise results. 
- Final field testing of visualisation methods. 
4.5 Consideration of results 
4.5.1 A basic case in Unilever's HPCE category 
The final results of the HPCE group's prioritisation were published in the form of Cartesian 
plot split into equal quadrants with data points shown as small shapes. Improvements on the 
score-card side and in the scales of measurement made it possible to improve the existing plot 
design (which was `drawn' in Powerpoint). Numerical scales could now be added the 
quadrants could be more accurately (still in the heuristic sense) be labelled in behavioural 
terms. 
A software prototype was used to create a graphical user interaction based plot in a stand 
alone application. The first improvements to the HPCE approach are shown: 
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Figure 30: The HPCE issues prioritisation after changes 
Resource Allocation Not Set ` Business Impact Consensus Not Set 
OWatch brief QActive low L Active high "High disagree ? Mediurn disagree qjLl-owdisagree 
1 Animal Testing 
Antiperspirants - aluminium, 
reast cancer, parabens 
Boron Compounds 
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5 Consumer Confidence 
Enzyme Safety iincl GM) 
Fragrances - allergens & 
ragrance ingredient labelling 
Fragrances - artificial musk 
ngredients (incl cashmeran) 
Genetically Modified Derived 
ngredients 
1 Global Harmonisation 
11 Hydrogen Peroxide 6% 
1 Hygiene and Biocides 
13 indoor Air Quality 
14 
Irritancy Classification & 
abelling 
15 Nanotechnology 
16 1 Packaging Policy 
17 Phosphate 
1 
Phthalates - in formulation and 
packaging 
1 REACH (incl SCALE) 
2 Silicone D5 
21 Sodium Hypochlorite 
22 Triclosan 
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This visualisation is in fact a very sophisticated version of the flip chart drawing one might 
use in a post it pad exercise. It was considered important by users to retain the overall flavour 
of this familiar heuristic device. With the improvement in measurement scale came the 
ability to use numbers on the axes in a representative manner (note these were still not really a 
mathematical scale). The qualitative characterisation (i. e. the interpreted meaning of the data 
points) has been improved by the power of the software to draw and revise shapes and colours 
based on underlying scoring which can of course be changed at any time. 
This early case of HPCE's improved visualisation was a good example of the use of a 
software solution and on the acceptability of modest improvements via an interactive 
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graphical tool to replace post it pads leading and the resultant "cleaner" representation of the 
problem space. Importantly, these improvements had also been accepted by users. 
This visualisation is an example of working within the `essential natural heuristics' of the 
group. This is the case because the communication of the results at this stage have only been 
improved, they have not radically altered from what the users were already trying to achieve. 
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4.5.2 Case two ICFE visualisation needs 
Unilever's Ice-Cream and Frozen Foods category (ICFE), like their colleagues in HPCE, 
wanted to visualise a portfolio of issues. The results of their approach had likewise been 
drawn in Powerpoint. This is shown below. 
Figure 32: The ICFE `Bubble Chart' 
unEk ser low Likelihood high 
Notice that an attempt had been made through the visualisation to add another layer of data. 
This can be seen by the use of colour and of size of data point. The drawbacks already noted 
for the HPCE approach were also in evidence in this independent endeavour. In addition 
there were two further important considerations. 
- The use of size confuses further the arbitrary low high scale as well as creating a 
visual which is hard to read. 
- At the time of this study, none of the users could remember what the size and colour 
was (from an annual exercise) was meant to represent (and that remains a mystery). 
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The first trial of the new score-card for ICFE issues prioritisation was accompanied by an 
adaptation of the HPCE visualisation. This is shown below. Notice this retains the essential 
flavour of HPCE's version but the quadrant labelling is far more detailed. 
Figure 34: ICFE early prioritisation results 
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Developing the ideas: issue groups 
Problems for the ICFE visualisation arose however when their issues prioritisation process 
provided nearly ninety issues. Ninety issues was too many to display on one chart 
meaningfully. Although the area could accommodate ninety fairly easily, it couldn't 
accommodate large numbers of similarly scored issues. 
This number of issues created serious problems by way of the burden of analysis in the 
Ik scoring rounds. Reviewing nine questions on ninety issues, even without the discussion that 
was supposed to go hand in hand with the scoring, was clearly a formidable task. This led to 
two innovations in the design which were both supported by variations on the visualisation. 
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Both of these were forms of issue grouping within the tool. One was called `issues groups' 
and the other was an issues `car park'. 
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Issues groups 
Initially working issues into groups had to be done in a rather clumsy manual fashion. In the 
diagram below items prefixed with a `G' refer a cluster of similar issues. The creation of 
these eleven groups made a portfolio of ninety manageable at twenty issues. The meaning of 
the groups was being mediated through the visualisation. 
Figure 35: Groups functionality 
Resource Allocation Not Set Business Impact Consensus Not Set 
O'watch Brief QActive Low LActive High iHigh disagree ed disagree Low disagree 
Acrylamide (Chemical Big p. oblem not exposed yet Big problem wide exposure 
ontaminants 10 
Aller ens 
Bovine Spongiform 
ncephalopathy (BSE) q 33 
(Biological Safety) 
4*Foreign bodies 
'Furans (Chemical 
ontaminants 
61G Additives 
7'G Animal Concerns 
G Biological Safety 7 
G Chemical Contaminants 
WG C heroical Residues 
11 `G Claims CQ0 
Ga 1" G Intentional Contamination 4 
1G Leal ° 
14'G Risk Management 
1G Sustainability 
1G "Healthy" foods 
17'GMO 
1 
`Mycotoxins (Chemical 4 
. esidues 
1 esticides (Chemical 
esidues 
Semicarbazide (SEM) 11 20 Chemical Contaminant) 
0 
1 IL. 
1 
No teal problem 13 A percepýon issue 
Acrylamide (Chemical 
ontaminants 
Aller ens 
Bovine Spongiform 
ncephalopathy (BSE) 
(Biological Safety) 
_ 4 *Foreign bodies 
' L Furans (Chemical 
ontaminanis 
G Additives 
7 'G Animal Concerns 
Eg *G Biological Safety 
G Chemical Contaminants 
1 GC hemical Residues 
11 `G Claims 
1" G Intentional Contamination 
1 G Leal 
14 'G Risk Manage eni 
1 `G Sustainability 
1 G "Healthy" foods 
17 C; MO 
1 
_ 
`Mycotoxins (Chemical 
Residues) 
1 
Pesticides (Chemical 
esidues 
Semicarbazide (SEM) 
Chemical Contaminant) 
Issues car park 
A reluctance to lose the data on issues which had been scored into groups created a second 
visualisation. This was named, after a popular group facilitation technique, the car park. A 
car park is a place, normally a flip chart in group process, which is reserved for placing items 
which the group will not be discussing. The car park from the first ICFE prioritisation round 
is shown below. 
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Figure 36: The issues `car park' 
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An improvement to groups functionality 
A formal groups functionality was added to the software to allow users to interact with these 
groups rather than just refer to them. Groups were now either "virtual" i. e. the denoted a 
group of data not present, or real i. e. they were made up from real data that was present. In 
the real case the visualisation cutaway below could be seen. "Cross hairs" were added to the 
data point to indicate the range of scores in the group. 
Figure 37: Groups with `cross hairs' 
1 -., 
Further functionality also allowed one or more groups to be `exploded' to reveal the 
underlying data as is shown in this cutaway. 
Group example [D=2 to 8 F=3 to 7] 
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Figure 38: Groups at next level of detail 
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Improvements 
The sophistication of the way in which the visualisation is now supporting reasoning as well 
as displaying results has become very interesting here. This is an example where the need to 
visualise the data in a way which also manages it has led to a successful adaptation and 
expansion of the natural heuristics of the group. 
The value of this visualisation is shown in the fact that when the software visualisation was 
swamped with the data, the user group, convinced by the improved process, decided to adapt 
their approach to this limitation. In truth it was an underlying limitation of their own process 
also. So both the process and the software had to adapt. The fact that they did not return to a 
more simplified visualisation proposition is a testimony to the benefits of the new visuals. 
The introduction of grouping of issues to reduce data volume added a second tier of data 
representation (the group plot) . The complexity of the visualisation environment was thus 
increased, as was the sophistication. Now very large numbers of issues could still be 
accommodated and, only when needed, was their data reviewed. 
The HPCE case had demonstrated that you can work within the `essential natural heuristics' 
of a decision making group and generally improve them. What the ICFE case study does 
however is demonstrate that you can also expand the essential natural heuristics of a user 
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group. You can do this in a reasonably sophisticated manner as was seen in the innovation of 
grouping issues. This was a step change for the way this community managed such reasoning 
tasks. This change was primarily driven by the need for a clear and concise form of 
visualisation without an associated loss in data sophistication. 
This group of prioritisation users were successfully taken from a fairly institutionalised Post it 
pad exercise, the visualisation of which they struggled to remember the meaning of, to a 
visually very adroit and data driven audit trail of reasoning. The group accepted the approach 
and the technology into their reasoning behaviours and reported benefits to that reasoning and 
its resultant communication. 
r Hs 
k 
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4.5.3 Case three: UIG visualisation needs 
The development of the two UIG score-cards and the change of focus to include advantages 
and a comparison with strategic fit created a need for two new visualisations. Each of these 
was a step change on the quadrant plot approach to a more stretching set of visual concepts. 
The UIG innovation to include time as a variable would also meant that a way to visualise 
time was introduced into the analysis. 
Developing visualisations 
A cultural tension in Unilever could be detected between people who operated at the UIG 
(highly strategically oriented) level and people who were in operations (highly operationally 
focussed). One group wished to speak in a rhetoric of aspiration all around advantages and 
the other favoured the rhetoric of threats and impacts. In the score-card development this 
tension had been avoided by using bi-polar scales for scoring. In the visualisation however, 
three further innovations were needed and these would increase the visual complexity of the 
heuristics being used. 
Contradictory needs to focus on impact and advantages were resolved by effectively gluing 
together two plots (one threats and one advantages) in a single visualisation. The result was a 
more continuous plot whose aspect ratio stretched one of the scales. The plot areas were 
carefully labelled to reflect the duality of the users' worlds. 
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Figure 40: The octant plot 
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This increase in visual complexity did cause some concern it is important to note that these 
tools were being developed in a world very fixated on simplification. Injecting new ideas and 
the visual complexity one sees here is very difficult. 
A second innovation however would see the plot widely accepted. This innovation would 
also result in a sea change in the way the company thought about issues. In Hurisk it had 
always seemed sensible to add another dimension to risk by thinking about it now and in the 
future. That idea was even more effective in Unilever. 
Time and change 
"Please rate your issue as it will stand if managed really well in the future". Although there 
would be caveats about "realism and grounded thinking", this little statement significantly 
changed users' ability to talk about issues. The proposition was simple, the same score-card 
could score an issue in two time frames. 
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Competitive Advantages 
The visualisation software was modified to read two sets of data and create a new 
visualisation. Notice that the perceived benefit in this analysis was so great that no-one 
questioned the need to effectively double the number of questions answered. The impact on 
the power of the system to improve reasoning was noted to be very great. The impact on the 
use of the visualisations was similarly remarkable. 
Figure 41: Adding delta values 
Knowledge & Information Not Set Management plan readiness Not Set 
QPoor DCornnaiable ýCprn,: etih, a "Low -hted. um Hqn 
10 
Damage Reputation , ctua! dein, 
Limitation ". __. Marntäined 
Fep 1, n and Provuwe cemrfaI 
Po>sible 
1 ý.. 
_ 
'.. 
Competitive Advanwjie. 
Innovating visualisation, a boundary plot 
The UIG supervised the technical assessment of its issues portfolio which would be displayed 
on this octant plot. Due to their desire to also prioritise issues strategically, a plot to visualise 
this very different score-card was needed. The opportunity afforded by the need for a further 
visualisation lead to the creation of a specialist form of chart intended to: 
" Move away from "quadrants" and their associated problems 
" Make the most intuitive use of the more detailed scales 
" Be easily interpreted by people who had not provided any scoring 
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The result of this was the boundary plot shown below. The best way to explain how it is read 
is to use the notes provided along with the first report of strategic prioritisation presented to 
the UIG: 
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Reading the strategic graph 
The strategic graph has two key differences to other similar graphics used in Unilever 
a. The scales used in the scorecard are "behaviourally anchored ratings scales" using a 
mid point method and designed to produce interval level data. This means that the 
numerical position on the graph relates to a specific behavioural outcome rather than 
"agreement" on a more blunt bi-polar rating such as "high- med - low". 
b. The graph is not read, in the first instance, in four categorical quarters. The use of 
an anchored scale with a mid point allows for the graph to stipulate meaningful 
"boundaries", resulting in three, as opposed to four, categories. This has the further 
advantage that points on the graph can approach a meaning threshold in any 
direction. 
The figure below demonstrates the meaning of the boundaries and how to read an issues 
boundary plot. 
Issues here could be referred to as 
"business as usual". Although they 
10 are important, their "middling" values 
on the strategic scale suggest no 
q urgency either to extract benefit 
from 
K.;, them or to control impacts 
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Keeping time and clustering 
This boundary plot was accepted by the UIG. The techniques which had worked well 
in the technical prioritisation were also used here, hence analysing the issue now and 
in the future was retained as was the use of clusters to understand the results. 
From the original technical prioritisation forty six issues were highlighted as possible 
priorities. Twenty eventually made it through to a final priority portfolio and their 
strategic prioritisation can be seen here. 
Figure 48: The UIG priority portfolio 
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The two stage prioritisation had taken over eighty issues and reduced them to twenty 
priorities. Even with this small number clusters remained a valuable aid to 
understanding. The cluster shown was titled "business / reputation damage with good 
Unilever control". 
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Figure 49: Cluster example 
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Three other clusters were specified, these were: 
9 Business damage limitation 
" Business / reputation damage with poor Unilever influence 
" Business / reputation advantages with good Unilever influence 
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Alignment with SIA 
4.6 Unilever case study three: A review of heuristic concepts 
developed for issues prioritisation. 
Introduction 
Unilever is one of the world's largest Fast Moving Consumer Goods Companies. In 
the execution of its business Unilever faces "issues and crises" all the time. At the 
time of this research the company was building an issues management system to 
ensure that a timely and effective management of issues became a business critical 
activity. This would preserve continuity of business and a contradiction free 
corporate reputation. 
The application of Descartes has been a success and its use has been extended. This 
system is now in operational use around the world in local and global issue 
prioritisation applications in Unilever. The results of two rounds of global issues 
prioritisation have been communicated to Unilever's board using the Descartes 
system. Together these would seem to suggest a high degree of successful design and 
transfer of the concepts and the technology. 
To achieve prioritisation, effective ways for a cross section of decision makers to 
manage a shared understanding of Unilever's priorities was needed. As these 
priorities would inform significant resource decisions any tool to support this would 
provide a new form of decision support for risk management and mitigation. 
The proposed system drew directly upon some of the concepts developed in the 
Hurisk project to create and test a new reasoning tool named "Descartes". Descartes 
was centred on heuristic reasoning techniques in a computer-based decision support 
prototype to: 
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0 Support the prioritisation reasoning of Unilever's global issues leaders 
community 
" Use a common, multi-criteria, score-card to measure relative priority of issues 
(even if categorically different issues are being compared, the `apples and 
oranges' paradox) 
0 Allow users to reason with their data through a visualisation system similar 
visualisations in common use (but with superior utility) 
0 Provide evidence of an audit trail of priority issues and justify top priorities 
The score-cards and the visualisations of Descartes have already been described in 
sections 4.1 to 4.3. This discussion paper will now review some of the wider heuristic 
concepts in the approach and tool. 
4.6.1 Aims 
The aim of this discussion paper is to highlight and comment on the main heuristic 
concepts developed for the Descartes tool. 
4.6.2 Objectives 
This paper will: 
0 Explain three forms of heuristic available in the case studies 
" Plot ways in which improvements, modest and significant were made possible 
" Demonstrate that improved heuristics gave rise to significant innovations 
" Show how successful issues prioritisation process was built on these principles 
4.6.3 Methods 
The methods used to arrive at the data for this discussion clearly include all of those 
listed in the other case studies. Key methods informing the thoughts in this paper are: 
" Semi-structured depth interviews with all users 
" Group discussions at project meetings 
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End-user testing: This scorecard and the visualisations were tested on groups 
of end users not involved in their initial design to assess effectiveness and 
transferability. 
Deployment rounds: Two Unilever issues prioritisation exercises were 
conducted using the tool and process. Each was closely facilitated to assess 
Descartes "as designed". 
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4.7 Discussion of results (heuristic concept development) 
This discussion will surround the notion of a heuristic as described in chapter one. A 
heuristic is the idea of being able to reason in the absence of a complete algorithm. 
Three forms of heuristics will be identified and their development in the Descartes 
project discussed. The concept of priority 
" The measurements used to create a priority estimate 
" The graphs used to display the results 
It will be argued that each of these objects functions in a heuristic way and that 
improvements to them brought about by this research also do so. 
Heuristic one: Priority 
Before Descartes arrived prioritisation in Unilever was primarily done using post it 
pad exercises. These were a very robust processes and it follows that decisions in 
these area were very basic also. The `priority' they produced came from an analysis 
process which was not consistent issue to issue. Different issues were prioritised for 
different and sometimes incommensurable reasons. Priority itself therefore is the first 
heuristic. 
Heuristic two: Measures 
Closely related to priority decisions were assessments made of "probability" and of 
"business impact". These were clearly shown to be an impressionistic uses of these 
scientific terms, as the measurement scales were little more than a judgement of rank. 
Where aggregation was being used to reduce group scores on these measures to a 
single value it is clear that no calibration efforts were made. At each turn then, the 
measurement activity was very heuristic. 
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Heuristic three: Graphs 
The visualisation of the results of the prioritisation was a heuristic interpretation of a 
scientific artefact. The results were displayed in a Cartesian graph. This graph was 
behaving extremely flexibly whilst maintaining an appearance of something rather 
more strict. The final result that was placed onto a mathematical graph was not 
showing the results of any mathematical calculation. Inside some versions of this 
graph was also placed a reference value for each quadrant which was qualitative and 
categorical, mixing the metaphors yet further. 
Improving the measurement heuristics 
Early improvements to the definition of the measurement objects, the scales used, and 
simple statistical treatment of data and plotting of the results were all referred to in the 
previous section as part of the HPCE case study. In some cases these replaced one 
heuristic with another. For example the categorical (high, medium, low) assessment 
of issues changed to a continuous scale (1 - 1000), but this was evaluated on sliding 
scales in the absence of any numbers. 
These existing heuristics (scoring approach, the analysis and the communication of 
the results) were all in essence only improved, they were not radically altered from 
what the users were trying to achieve. These examples demonstrate that it is possible 
to work within the `essential natural heuristics' of a decision making community and 
make modest improvements to them. 
The more detailed work described earlier shows how the scales being used in the 
ICFE prioritisation case became multi-attribute. The variables the attributes were 
rolled into (business impact, and perception) clearly act as a more powerful heuristic 
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reduction of a proposition made up of nine parts. That reduction is of course still a 
heuristic number. 
Improving graphical heuristics 
The retention of a simplified quadrant plot arguably still reduced the problem of 
prioritisation to a core proposition which merely says: "which of these four categories 
does the issue belong to? " Data points in quadrants which come close to the 
boundary of the quadrant, or worse still the centre of the plot, lose their meaning in 
such a scheme as a few points in the right direction could completely re-interpret the 
data. 
Issue No. 12 in the chart below (hygiene and biocides from the HPCE analysis) serves 
as an example of this. It is at the mid point of both scales and classed as "no real 
problem". However a half point in any direction would re-classify it. Clearly users 
might moderate their opinions near the mid point. However, in a system where 
multiple scorers are aggregated using an arithmetic mean this will pull scores into this 
area. That reduces the overall usefulness of the categorical variables and of the chart 
itself. This is exacerbated by the fact that follow on communication of priority to 
senior decision makers was observed to fall back onto categorising which issues are in 
which quadrant. 
Figure 31 example priority data 
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Two key developments in the UIG case study would go some way to addressing this 
problem. The supply chain of data from multiple scorers and the use of time greatly 
enhanced the usability and usefulness of the graph heuristic. The supply chain of data 
is shown below: 
Figure 42: The issues prioritisation process 
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A worked example can show how this supply chain used the graphical environment to 
preserve reasoning. 
Phthalates are a family chemicals used in plastics and in some cosmetics. Chemically 
very diverse, there are "bad" Phthalates, e. g. proven carcinogenicity, and "good" 
Phthalates e. g. "plasticers". Put simply, in the global debate, all Phthalates tend to be 
lumped together leading to calls from Non Governmental Organisations for all of 
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Perception 
them to be banned. Very tiny amounts of safe Phthalates are found in Unilever 
products but the company is heavily criticised. This global issue went through 
prioritisation. 
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Phase one: The global issue leader canvasses his team 
Figure 42: Phthalates 
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Here, each line on the chart represents the same issue but a different person's view of 
it. Notice that No. 3 (SY) seriously disagrees with the others in the team. This sort of 
information helps the issue leader reason more fully about the issue in advance of 
ratifying the issue, i. e. sending the UIG an issue prioritisation report which contains 
only one set of data. 
Phase two: The global issue leader ratifies the team's view 
Figure 43: Phthalates ratified 
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Note here, the issue leader has ratified the data to reflect his own view. This is an 
entirely legitimate behaviour, but obviously raises an eyebrow. A "history function" 
of the software allows the previous chart to be viewed from this data. This is the case 
even where this data is transposed into the strategic score-card. This is a reasoning 
audit trail which preserves the justification of the priority. 
Innovating heuristics 
The development of the groups functionality in the ICFE case is very interesting 
example of innovation brought on by more formal use of these measurement 
approaches. Here a single data point could now represent many items each made up 
in turn of multiple attributes. These `rolled up' variables have three forms of meaning 
representation, these are 
1. When this data point is managed as one aggregate issue on the main plot with 
`cross hairs' to connote, but not denote, the variation in both axes. 
2. When an independently scored `proxy' issue on the main plot is related to the 
content but not any form of aggregation from the underlying scores. 
3. When the single issue `exploded' back into its (measured) constituent 
variables. 
This is a highly flexible form of data reduction operating on a needs basis and only 
sometimes surrounding a fixed value. That is a heuristic form of reasoning because 
the underlying reasoning algorithm can vary in detail and form for the same task. 
This heuristic is also an important improvement in the prioritisation approach 
allowing as it does the admission of a great deal more data into the same summary. 
This, along with the related functionality offered by the `car park' function, helped the 
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users adapt to a limitation of their plotting approach when it was swamped with data 
that they still wanted to use. 
I 
4.7.1 Working within, expanding and innovating heuristics 
Working within: The early HPCE case had demonstrated that you can work within 
the `essential natural heuristics' with which people were creating prioritisation 
judgements (defining, scoring, analysing and communicating) and improve them. 
These simple improvements were all accepted and the technology which supported 
them was "transferred". 
These improvements came about not by introducing a model which supplanted what 
was already there but by introducing a model that mirrored and improved it. The 
approach retained its heuristic character but these heuristics were now more formal 
and analytical. 
Expansion: What this ICFE case study does however is demonstrate that you can also 
expand the essential natural heuristics of a user group. You can do this in a 
reasonably sophisticated manner. Moving the ICFE (and UIG) group of users to a 
very tightly defined multi-attribute scoring system improved the meaning of their data 
by far more than the improvements HPCE case. The increased meaning also enriched 
the quality of the reasoning process which the group was willing to use to apply 
priority. 
Thus the mirroring process in this case helped users to see some systematic 
drawbacks in the way that they were reasoning. What was clear was that the heuristic 
could expand to cope. The ICFE community's heuristics for priority, and for handling 
issues data increased significantly in complexity. However, the final approach was 
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still proven to be transferable. The community accepted the approach and the 
technology into their reasoning behaviours. They also reported benefits to that 
reasoning and its resultant communication. 
The result of expanding the heuristics was therefore highly favourable. A group of 
prioritisation users were successfully taken from a fairly institutionalised Post it pad 
exercise, one which they struggled to remember the meaning of, to a sophisticated, 
data driven audit trail of reasoning. Their reasoning became more rigorous and 
transparent and it could be used to justify the prioritisation of one set of issues over 
another. 
Innovation: In the global issues case the drive for new forms of reasoning (e. g. 
measuring advantage, looking at strategic impact) meant that new essential natural 
heuristics could be created out of those presented in the earlier cases. Two of these 
have already been discussed in the previous section. A third innovation is `clustering' 
for decision making. 
Clustering of data which was shown in the multi-user case but that was many scorers 
to one issue. The Unilever Issues Manager would also be able to use the same 
technique to cluster many issues to one profile. This would not be, as in the ICFE 
case, to hide them but to highlight the similarity of their profile. This creates a data- 
led review process. These clusters, and any outlying specific issues, are described and 
presented to the UIG for discussion. Whereas before this group would have discussed 
individual issues one by one, they now had a useful heuristic classification process 
which was data led to deal with them in larger groups and communicate about them in 
that way. 
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4.7.2 The final global issues prioritisation process in summary 
With this work completed, Unilever had, for the very first time in its history, a data 
driven and detailed prioritisation process. This process delivered a set of priority 
issues, and the rationale for why they were priorities, based on data. In the final 
design this was all about "multis" a multi-attribute, multi-scorer, multi-level system. 
The system as has been shown in this discussion was built upon an evolution of 
interdependent heuristics. This evolution was based around either essential natural 
heuristics already in place or innovations of them. 
The following graphic was widely used around this time to communicate, in a very 
simple manner, what had been achieved. In fact, a version of it was presented to 
Unilever's board. 
Figure 50: Global Issues Prioritisation summarised 
ýS 
Global Issues Prioritisation Exercise 
Over 70 Global 
Issues 
" Biofuels 
" Anti-counterfeiting 
" Health Claims 
" Suppliers Code 
" Tea Sustainability 
This case illustrates how all of the essential natural heuristics we found could be 
improved to generate clearer and more justified reasoning. The scales were improved 
46 First round 20 High I6 UEx priority priority issues Priority 
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- Global Issue Teams - Unilever Issues Group 
- Innovation & Policy 
Groups 
to use behaviourally verifiable anchor points. Access to the strategic documents 
which set Unilever's business priorities created a measurement opportunity about 
communicating in the language of business. The ability to transpose technical data 
into the strategic score-card meant this very different strategic rationality was 
nonetheless linked to the operational world. 
Improved process: the final global system 
The prioritisation process now had five stages, each stage maintaining the same 
rationality and bounded by similar data. If, at the beginning of the exercise the UIG 
had been informed of the complexity of the systems they would end up with, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that they would not have accepted something so complex. 
This is evidence that the journey itself, changed their view of decision support. 
At the beginning of these developments there were two pragmatic worlds of managing 
issues. The first was from a foods manufacturing quality assurance point of view. 
The second from the point of view of reputation management specific to the 
chemicals arena. These were essentially operational case studies. They were testing 
grounds for the concepts which would be brought to full development over two years. 
The final process for global issues prioritisation would generate not one, but two 
global forms of prioritisation for Unilever. The technical and strategic forms of 
prioritisation created an unprecedented supply chain of issue data in Unilever, at one 
time spanning the opinions and scores of over 100 people in one analysis. That 
supply chain of data was still focussed onto one core concept, discrimination. 
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A raft of heuristic conceptualisations representing a range from business criticality to 
time itself were developed to support this discrimination. These were used 
successfully to provide decision support to reduce a fiercely complex comparison 
problem to a single, agreed and accepted proposition. A proposition for use in the 
issues management teams and in the boardroom. A summary of the final global 
process is shown: 
.... 
future state of the single issues. 
1. Technical score-card used by 
global issue leaders with their 
teams to produce and 
assessment of the current and 
2. Global issue is ratified to single set of current 
and future scores by Global Issue Leader. This is 
either done mathematically, via the leader's expert 
judgement or in discussion over key differences of 
opinion. That discussion may be supported by data from the score-card. 
3. The Unilever Issues Manager collates the single 
issues into a portfolio and within that creates named 
clusters of issues with similar profiles for 
consideration by the UIG. The cluster names contain 
recommendations for action. 
...... ....... .......... 
f ...... .... 
......... ...... .... 
4. The UIG takes a priority list of issues 
following these recommendations and 
using the strategic score-card these are 
now re-assessed for current and future 
strategic priority. Issues which create disagreement are resolved using specific plots 
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of those issues and, where necessary, a detailed comparison of their scoring profiles 
among non aligned scorers. 
0... . 
_.. _. _ ;ý 
5. This re-assessment results in the strategic portfolio. The 
Unilever issues manager again assesses the portfolio for 
clusters of issues with similar profiles. These are ratified by 
the UIG and recommendations are made to Unilever's board 
on the highest priority issues and the rationale for priority. The rationale for priority 
is used as the basis for an action plan to manage the issue. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1 General introduction to this discussion 
This thesis has reviewed an applied range of the literature pertaining to human 
reasoning and decision analysis theories and to the prevalent theories of risk. It has 
then embarked on a descriptive journey of two heuristic decision support systems for 
risk reasoning. In that journey I have commented on their influences, their 
development histories and their application stories. The conclusion of this thesis lies 
in proposing a marriage between these two manifestly different worlds, that of 
theoretical risk and decision science on the one hand and that of the "versions" of 
these one can use in real life on the other. 
That marriage faces a number of problems the chief of which is to do with the 
practical relevance of academic theory to the real worlds of the air traffic control 
service and the FMCG. The individual case study discussions of these two systems so 
far has concentrated on their common heritage in a revised, psychologically focussed, 
idea of heuristic reasoning. That discussion did not contain any consideration of 
theoretical alignment. This will not be considered in some detail. 
The Science of decision 
What I believe I have shown is that the `science of decision' is divided in history and 
in positioning. It has a lineage which ranges from philosophy through application and 
back out to philosophy again. The obvious tensions between a closed inventive 
system of the rarefied mathematics of reason, and the alluring, but "boundary-less" 
world, of applied reason is plain. There seems to a discernible concern in the 
literature that one cannot operate in both. The serious tensions between so called 
normative and descriptive science make this clear. There is also the philosophical 
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tension over whether heuristics are statistically demonstrable empirical failures or 
humanist expressions of complex uncharted reasoning forms. 
The science of risk 
What I have shown is that the science of risk is divided in a plurality of thought 
forms. These thoughts are trying scientifically, organisationally, institutionally, 
culturally and socially to say something definitive and helpful about humans and the 
mysteries of chance, harm and the opportune moment. This discipline has over the 
last few decades has created a rich, diversified nomenclature and yet has given only a 
limited a number of validated measurement forms. "What do you mean by risk" is 
still a chief question and this is after much scientific effort. 
I have alluded to the fact that in large, contentious, globally-significant, multi- 
stakeholder decisions there are highly effective decision models available. These 
models range from the scientific utility maximising to the social criteria satisficing. 
We know too that each, from their own particular perspective, is mindful of the value 
of the other. Maximum expected utilities often contain "acceptability" variables. 
Social mapping exercises, in the end, contain measured preferences, even if these are 
unresolved. When there is an awful lot riding on the outcome, governments and 
institutions call on empirical and social scientists to create equitable, defensible and 
usable "alternatives" support and, ultimately resolution. These approaches are, of 
course, very costly. That aside, this is one of the well proven interfaces between 
science and societal governance. 
239 
The science of reason 
What I have shown in smaller settings where the decisions are still highly significant 
(such as NATS and Unilever) is that reasoning is highly valued as the key to safety. 
Good reasoning preserves an ethical self image story for complex public service 
institutions like these. This reasoning happens under a complex array of pressures at 
all times. These are the pressures of modernity. A very large part of that reasoning is 
technical i. e. is based in the known critical failure rates for complex computer 
technologies, or in the microbiological science of pathogen death curves in food 
preparation, or the skin penetration capability of a substance based on molecular size 
and so on. That part of the reasoning, although. not devoid of social and cultural 
framing, is "a question of science". 
When it comes to a risk judgement which is prefixed by "acceptable" or suffixed by 
"perception" or "communication", and when the reasoning in question centres on 
values and judgements, the story is very different. In part this is because of an arena 
shift away from the laboratory, the radar technology and the factory floor. However, 
there are two main further shifts to do with position of the reasoning in the supply 
chain of risk: 
1. Reasoning is no longer certainly about a fixed objective risk entity, rather it is 
about larger less definable organisational entities. 
2. This concerns, in my language, "upstream" risk, a position predicated on its clarity 
and on its positioning in the risk decision chain i. e. not clear and very early. 
Much of this reasoning, in my observation, is sub-optimally formed. There are two 
causes for this. The first is that these decisions take place in human group processes, 
very often around a table with papers on it. The papers often contain a complex 
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cocktail of present facts and future intentionality. The order of business is often to 
make a decision or ratify an understanding, but it is also very often to generate, 
through a consensus process, a model `of the world of' hat decision or understanding. 
This is a key reasoning form. 
The second cause for sub-optimal reasoning is in the facilitated exercises and 
measurement structures which these organisations have inherited from questionable 
management science. The flip-chart, the post it pad, the brown paper exercise 
coupled to the demand characteristics of a decision forum without clear data, all spell 
uncertainty. The key research question which I feel I have tried to address in this 
work is: How do you build a decision support system which takes away this sort of 
uncertainty? 
5.1.1 Structuring this discussion 
This discussion will be split over three sections, these will be: 
1. General discussion of the Hurisk and Descartes systems and their efficacy when 
benchmarked against the findings of the general literature review. 
2. A specific discussion of the possible relationship between the approaches in these 
systems and subjective Bayes decision analysis. 
3. A more detailed look at the systems' main "heuristic devices" 
Two key questions have to stay in focus during this discussion : 
1. How can busy, and often frustrated, people start to give judgements which behave 
much more like a deterministic scientific process i. e. they are logical, consistent, 
transparent and "reasonable"? 
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2. How can this more logical approach have enough of the characteristics of the 
existing valued processes that people are already using, to transfer into, and ultimately 
supplant, these? 
The first is a question of logic, it is "really for a statistician helped by a psychologist. 
The second is a question of belief, it is for a psychologist helped by a statistician. 
Statistics and psychology are the two obvious disciplines to develop a hybrid for 
decision support in this setting. This will not come about, in my view, by statisticians 
learning psychology or by psychologists learning statistics. It will come about in a 
concordat which looks not for commonality but differentiation of efficacy. In a very 
small way the two projects discussed here are really examples of that sort of thinking. 
242 
5.2 Discussion one: of Hurisk and Descartes 
5.2.1 Summary of this section 
The development of real time measurement and visualisation systems for safety 
critical and business critical reasoning support is not only challenging, but 
theoretically is in a very wide world. This research focussed on formalising reasoning 
processes in two large applied case studies. 
These studies had four pillars in common 
1. They were detailed attempts to improve the reasoning of groups of decision 
makers who were depending heavily on traditional methods. 
2. They drew on the same core concepts for measurement and visualisation of 
risk. 
3. Purpose built, and deliberately diversified, risk nomenclature was used to 
guide reasoning 
4. Preventing technology transfer failure was the key success factor. 
Both studies were founded about two core principles these were 
1. Reasoning and rationality should be phrased within the natural reference 
grammar of an organisation's experts. 
2. A reasoning platform for risk, not decisions or expected utilities associated 
with alternatives was the core object of interest. 
The research approach was to look for a kind of supported reasoning where the 
lessons, factors, insights and breakthroughs for decisions were demonstrated in a 
more transparent and self-evident system. These features describe decision support 
system which is: 
A reasoning platform approach: Hurisk and Descartes are both reasoning 
platforms. Hurisk is specifically for risk and strain, Descartes for a risk derivative 
called issues. 
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A practical measurement environment: The way in which measurement can be 
carried out in these systems benefits from the inherent flexibility and usability of 
these systems where the scoring could be alone, in groups, virtual presence and off- 
line scoring. The review process could be tailored to specific tasks at different times. 
Based on validated core concepts: Concepts derived from the literature to assess the 
validity of decision support and risk measurement were used to benchmark the 
systems. 
Decision support concepts were : application / workload (the degree to which the 
reasoning is applied and lower workload); Human centred (the degree to which the 
reasoning was `real world'); Rationality (the degree to which the approach and 
algorithms would satisfy questions of scientific rigour) and Values / credibility (the 
degree to which the systems were valued by users as credible). 
The evidence in the study suggests that the systems offer good decision support 
because users can be seen be using and valuing them and acting rationally on the basis 
of their output. 
Risk concepts were: application (the degree to which risk is about measurement 
communication, decision making etc. ) and perception (the degree to which can 
convey multiple perceptions and cultural importance of risk factors etc. ) 
Hurisk is shown to be a comprehensive decision support methodology with a 
coherent design which requires thorough execution. The system functions as a 
decision transparency aid supporting risk based decision making. The value of Hurisk 
to NATS was plain in identifying and scoring non technical risk as an urgent priority 
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was demonstrated. The definitions of risk allowed for an affect component which is 
enshrined in the organisation's commitment to safety. Further research is needed to 
look at the long term effects of the use of the tool. 
The conclusions of this section are that the design of these two systems is 
fundamentally sympathetic to the organisational behaviours of their hosts. This has 
created a powerful level of technology transfer into these environments. Where these 
systems are inherently strong is in their ease of use and the familiarity of their 
heuristic architecture with that of the users. Where they are potentially weak is in 
how transportable their heuristic credentials are in terms of measurement consistency 
and efficacy, on the questions of bias reduction and/or introduction. Finally whether 
more statistically oriented elements might strengthen them whilst having them remain 
a transferred and valued suite of tools is a key research question. 
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5.2.2 Some key points raised in this discussion 
The key points raised in this discussion fall into one of five categories, these are: 
General assumptions from the theory base 
2. General observations about the benefit of heuristic methods in these designs 
3. Benchmarking heuristic systems against standards that can be derived from the 
literature 
4. Similarities and differences between a heuristic approach and a subjective 
Bayes one 
5. Technology transfer issues 
General assumptions from the theory base 
0 An applied form of decision support for the communities studied in this thesis 
lies at the intersect between decision support and risk. 
0 The science of decision support is complex and unresolved resulting in a 
number of overlapping candidate designs for support tools 
0 The science of risk is predicted to remain lacking in validated measurements 
due to its disputed nature. 
0 The use of the term heuristic may be philosophically confused due to an over 
reliance on one group of decision theorists' use of the term. 
General observations about the benefit of heuristic methods in these designs 
The nature of the heuristics in these models is explicable by looking at the 
metaphors which they evoke and understanding how the heuristics fail to 
satisfy the necessary objective qualities of the target object. 
It is possible to model decision support inputs further upstream than is 
conventionally done and reflect nature of the uncertainties as more granular. 
246 
It is an important task to try and remove the uncertainty associated with the 
sub optimal decision processes observed to be operating these settings. 
Benchmarking heuristic systems against standards that can be derived from the 
literature 
In heuristic reasoning about risk users can be shown to place a high value on 
the narrative constructs this uses. This concurs with recent theory on 
heuristics and biases which suggests that narrative (or semantic) approaches 
reduce bias. 
An assessment of a good decision support system based on a summary of the 
extant research produces eighteen attributes which can be divided into four 
key categories. 
Comparing the systems in this project with this list shows that the systems are 
conceptually very well underpinned. 
The same exercise for risk theory delivers a less articulate idea comprising of 
nine attributes across two criteria. 
Assessing the systems against these demonstrates that they are performing 
modestly, in part this is to do with the vague way in which risk can be 
appropriated like this. 
Similarities and differences with subjective Bayes 
In large, highly significant, multi-stakeholder decisions the use of very 
complex models, such as those produced by a full subjective Bayes approach, 
will be considered as cost effective in terms of time and intellectual overhead. 
In small scale, high volume decision problems concerning risk something less 
analytically and computationally intense will always be required. 
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Heuristic reasoning systems arguably provide a more direct form of access to 
the reasoning objects in use, this is much like a (simplified) version of a Bayes 
model output without the overhead to produce it. 
The algorithms in these systems seem to form around an idea which is like a 
simplification of subjective Bayesian decision modelling designed from a 
primarily psychological standpoint. 
A hybrid systems between heuristic reasoning and subjective Bays is 
suggested to deal with rejection, by non mathematical users, of Bayes on the 
grounds of complexity. 
The key similarity between subjective Bayes and heuristic reasoning 
approaches is a move away from providing an accurate answer in favour of an 
accurate description of what is important and why 
A key difference is that in a heuristic reasoning system it is considered enough 
to have laid bare the rationality with higher level upstream measures which 
remain available for later attention. 
Heuristic reasoning systems arguably identify important but generic aspects of 
the problem spaces. These do not have to form a part of a unique model as 
they would in a Bayes style approach. 
Technology transfer issues 
Conclusions drawn from this research demonstrate that heuristic reasoning 
concepts have high validity with users, are inherently transferable between 
decision problems, and are generic, quick and effective in a way that other 
decision models cannot be. 
The result of these strengths is that these systems have penetrated the 
organisations to a significant level where more complex modelling forms have 
not shown a track record of being able to do so. 
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5.2.3 Discussion 
As is evident this thesis lies at the interface of applied occupational psychology, risk 
analysis, decision support and human reasoning. The development of real time 
measurement and visualisation systems for safety critical and business critical 
reasoning support is not only challenging, but theoretically is in a very wide world. In 
applied terms I have narrowed this considerably. This is both to take into account 
what was feasible to achieve for real world sponsors, and to avoid a post-modern 
vortex. 
This work is about formalising reasoning processes. These detailed, often very soft, 
but definitely very applied, case studies looked at two different organisations, aviation 
safety and consumer goods. The case studies also looked at two very different (on the 
face of it) reasoning objects, risk-and-strain and issues. What these studies had in 
common can be described in four pillars. 
Pillar 1: Both were detailed attempts to improve the reasoning of distributed groups 
of decision makers who were depending heavily on traditional, consensus-based, 
boardroom methods. 
Pillar 2: The Unilever case study was a natural extension, and then evolution, of the 
proven reasoning forms from the NATS work. 
Pillar 3: Groups in both organisations, once they were using the methods we 
designed, were reasoning about risk under a newer and deliberately diversified 
nomenclature. (An issue, a strain, a decision influence, a lesson, in all cases these 
would have, in a more rudimentary approach, just been called risks). 
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In these frequently very tough-minded organisations the challenge of providing better 
decision support had to be proven through organisationally effective measures. This 
is why both case studies tell a story of the indigenous process to develop decision 
support from within the ideas the organisations were already'having on risk 
monitoring and tracking. Even if this resulted in the rejection of some of these ideas, 
this is the first foundation of this research approach: 
Reasoning and rationality should be phrased within the natural reference grammar of 
an organisation's experts. 
Risk in these studies is an "upstream" concept. Risk in Hurisk may be well defined in 
a multi-attribute scaling space. I may be well presented in a complex array of 
utilitarian comparisons. However, it is still being intercepted at "pre-decision" point. 
This gives a second foundation of this research approach: 
What is needed is a reasoning platform for risk, not decisions or expected utilities 
associated with alternatives for risk. 
The audit trail for decisions is a crucial example of this approach. Both systems 
described here have detailed history features where experts' reasoning can be laid 
bare in some detail. It is in this supported reasoning itself where the valuable lessons, 
correction factors, insights and breakthroughs for decisions were demonstrated. This 
is decision support, not decision analysis. 
Heuristics and their application is the third foundation in this research. In the first 
instance these had to be recovered from a very simplistic, or single minded (but 
relevant) application. Heuristic reasoning in the lingua franca of decision theory had 
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become synonymous with systematic errors and irrationality. This thesis has 
contributed to a reclamation of the term as a working concept. This work has proven 
convincingly that deliberately applied heuristic reasoning methods have a great deal 
to contribute to business and safety critical industrial problem solving. 
Pillar 4: The fourth and final foundation of this work is the prevention of "technology 
transfer failure". This is a technical term from Human Factors often applied to device 
penetration into an organisation. Technology transfer relates to the factors which 
prevent inherently successful devices from being taken up. I've broadened that idea 
by using "technology" to refer to decision processes and tools and describe how these 
have influenced the behaviour and the culture of the host organisations. 
Because of the upstream nature of the risks and processes in this research, technology 
transfer success was approached through building a system which was `for experts', 
not by experts. A system which was not, in and of itself 'expert. `For experts systems' 
rather than `expert systems' might seem a subtle distinction, but it is key to 
understanding why this research took the direction it did and it remains my main 
conclusion that this approach is highly effective. 
Developing `for experts' systems 
My starting assumption was that a close affiliation with practitioners and their 
working environments would be able to understand what sorts of risk and decision 
support models would be needed. That is why there is a heavy emphasis on social 
research techniques in my methodology. I wanted to reflect back to these 
organisations decision support. systems which were in what I have called "their own 
reference grammars" for risk and decisions. The resultant systems faced in a 
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theoretical direction where I believed mainstream decision support was not being used 
effectively. The application of decision analysis and support to organisations, as I had 
observed it, was too focussed on the idea of external experts building complex and 
expert systems. 
A reasoning platform approach: Hurisk and Descartes are both reasoning 
platforms. Hurisk is specifically about risk and strain. Risk is assessed through the 
development of risk events and the association of three scores to these. A probability 
that the event will come to pass. An impact on a project or an intention, should the 
event come to pass. An estimation of how controllable either the probability of 
occurrence or the mitigation of impact would be. 
Strain is assessed by use of one of two possible questionnaires (a longer and a shorter 
version). The questions relate to real states of affairs. Users agree on the degree to 
which, whether in the particular project or status of an operation at a given time, these 
states of affairs accrue. Collections of these states of affairs are in strain categories. 
These categories are have their relative importance estimated using a weighting 
structure. Visualisations support the review of this data over time, and between users. 
Descartes is about a reasoning platform for issues. It has taken the essence of Hurisk, 
the tiered scoring and visualisation of risks, and simplified it in one sense and made it 
more involved in another. The simplification comes about in the level of reasoning. 
Issues are larger collective ideas than risk events. Ideas which can have no 
meaningful probabilities associated with them which is why Descartes does not use 
this measure. 
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Complexity in a Descartes style reasoning task comes about in three ways. First, 
issues are assessed for their status both now and in the future. The discrepancy is 
visualised as a delta value which is an input to the reasoning task. Second, issues are 
assessed across a large group of users, 111 was the largest. The reconciliation of the 
different stories these assessments are telling is part of the reasoning task. Third, 
issues are scored across two core propositions, a technical de facto importance and a 
strategic relevance. The quantitative data from the former is a selection criteria for 
the latter. 
In NATS and in Unilever two reasoning tasks are being approached by this system. 
Groups of users apply these two systems to decision making tasks e. g. what are the 
key project risks, what sort of strain is the organisation capable of absorbing before 
safety is eroded, what should be done about high priority issues and what does that 
priority mean in terms of business opportunity or threat now or in the future. 
A practical measurement environment: The way that the systems are applied 
follows a standard research metaphor. A sample of key people are identified, a set of 
independent (or group) scores is generated. The sample scores are compiled and 
comparisons are made to generate insights. The analysis is repeated a number of 
times and results contrasted over time and between groups / individuals to generate 
further insight. 
Hurisk and Descartes were purposely designed to be heuristic systems. Two key 
ways in which this was achieved will serve to illustrate this at this point. The two 
examples are definition of the core entities and the behaviour of the measurement 
systems. 
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User-centred definition: The definition of a risk in Hurisk was controlled by a set of 
seven rules which users had the choice to satisfy or not. Strains were pre-defined 
through research but were very fluid at the interpretation stage. Issues definitions in 
Descartes were user selected (and very wide ranging). The items entered into these 
reasoning platforms were more typified by dissimilarity. This dissimilarity was 
irrelevant, what was required was a currency to compare them and common 
visualisations to consider the comparisons dynamically. 
Encoded measurement: The measurements used in Hurisk were fixed to more 
definable entities. However, the algorithms which governed the final scores were 
psychological in character. The `knowledge score' associated with probability, 
control and effect was an uncertainty co-efficient. It formed a psychological narrative 
about personal belief calibration but this was not an actual calibration. Likewise the 
risk tolerance algorithm mediated the extent of uncertainty but this was controlled by 
a variable user setting over time. That setting was a psychological narrative to do 
with feelings about accepting risks or not. 
In both Hurisk and Descartes all measurements could be performed at multiple levels 
i. e. ranging from physically changing a position one data point to providing views on 
over a hundred questions. Whatever level of scoring the user chose to use, the system 
made sense of their view by trying to compensate to maintain any detailed profiles 
which previously existed. 
An idealised rationality: The benefits from the inherent flexibility and usability of 
these systems was to reasoning. Users were able to ask these questions over the full 
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gamut of reasoning environments they would normally use anyway (alone, in groups, 
virtual presence, off-line scoring and review). The benefit of both systems was 
clearly not about making a calculation, this was secondary. The benefit was released 
because each system had been designed to embody in a flexible shell, the idealised 
rationality of the decision makers. 
This idealised rationality was released to a greater or lesser degree depending on 
scoring diligence, time and other operational factors. Importantly all of these factors 
were outside of the systems parameters. The system focussed on asking questions and 
making comparisons (over time and change). The ease with which the scoring 
activity was sublimated to being representational, not deterministic, helped the users 
to use their measurement results to tell stories. This led, in the users' views, to better 
more informed decisions and better risk management. 
Summary characteristics 
In summary both systems were soft reasoning platforms with hidden hard algorithms. 
They could reason about risks or issues. These risks and issues were measured 
heuristically as a reflection of belief and judgement allowing for bounds to be 
stipulated and possible changes over time to be reflected. The scoring systems ranged 
from the crude to the highly sophisticated within a single housing and were applied at 
the users discretion with underlying cues as to which method had been used. These 
cues, algorithmically, created a system preference to profiling more complex data 
forms even in the face of crude over-writes. The scoring process was distributed 
across people, locations and times. The measurement criteria were forced whether the 
objects were commensurable or, as was more often the case, were not. Uncertainty 
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was coded either as bounds, over time or between judges and at all times held in 
tension. 
Three things stand out in these systems: core logic; transparency; and representation. 
The core logic was that the objects were interrogated by organisationally meaningful 
questions leading to enhanced understanding and dialogue. The system provided 
transparency at every level of scoring (and resolution) to create audit and justification 
of reasoning. At all times the systems provided a single reduction of the data into a 
visualisation of its status, thus coupling a heuristic realisation to the idealised 
reasoning. 
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5.3 Do these heuristic systems offer good decision support? 
The argument from the evidence so far is that my systems offer good decision support 
because users can be seen not only to be using and valuing them but acting on the 
basis of their output, often without further introspection. That has a high level of face 
validity but it doesn't necessarily address any idea in the theory. 
As I maintained earlier the problem here is really one of definition and, given the 
range of often conflicting definitions for decision support and analysis and their 
theoretical emphases, the world of decision analysis itself might not easily answer 
that. However, having reviewed the various schools and methodologies we were able 
to discern an idealised qualitative requirement set for decision support, it looked like 
this: 
Core concept Eighteen features of an ideal decision support system 
Can address small scale few stakeholder problems Application / 
kl d Does not have too many variables oa wor Is not highly demanding of time and resources 
Phrases propositions in favour of long term memory use 
human centred Rests on semantic and narrative descriptions of problems 
Takes cognitive limitations into account 
Mirrors accurately what people really do but in rationality terms 
Is sufficiently comprehensive 
Uses weighted subjective criteria and objective 
Rationality Includes the best available mathematics suited to the problem space 
Involves some formal logical rules for decision closure (choice, acceptance) 
Bases decisions on a bridge between induction and deduction 
Is able to identify and counter biases in reasoning, or at least inconsistencies 
Has credibility with users 
Allows decision making to take place under conventional circumstances 
Values / Remains transparent to and explicable by decision makers at all times 
credibility Allows individuals to compare reasoning on a common platform with each 
other 
Reflects explicitly the values that are being brought to bear 
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In the following section, using one example per item-taken from both systems I will 
argue that these systems show many attributes of being sensitively designed to offer 
high quality decision support. 
5.3.1 Application and workload 
Can address small scale few stakeholder problems: Hurisk"and Descartes can 
work with one person, one set of data and in cases where this has happened the users 
have reported benefits. They can of course also work with user bases in triple figures 
but the design is essentially for the small group resolution process both in terms of 
risk and issues profiling but also in management decision making. 
Does not have too many variables: Descartes has two variables, so does Hurisk. 
The fact that these are backed up by multi-variate spaces and multi-attribute scaling 
does not weaken this ideal. This is a lean measurement style, in both cases to perform 
a robust assessment requires only two numbers. 
Is not highly demanding of time and resources: The maximum times for analyses 
of fixed numbers of issues was almost written into the computer code of these 
systems. They were measured in minutes. However, the systems were designed with 
a siren like quality to lure the user into performing more detailed analyses which take 
very much longer. Being highly demanding of time and resources is of course a cost 
benefit argument. In comparison with complex decision analysis systems Hurisk and 
Descartes would still come out well. 
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5.3.2 Human Centred 
Phrases propositions in favour of long term memory use: This is a very 
interesting criteria and one where Hurisk and Descartes show different and possibly 
complimentary strengths. In the Hurisk strain questionnaires there is a case for 
suggesting that these are a best practice when it comes to "corporate memory". The 
invocation of strains from the past are classified and grouped in a way which is 
indicative of long term memory and evokes a long term memory response in the 
analysis. Likewise risk in Hurisk is a live form of recalling from the past what can 
and did go wrong and applying it to a future proposition, this too is reasoning in that 
part of the cortex which draws on remembered experiences and reactions to those of 
others. In Descartes the objects of reasoning are quite simply long term in their 
nature. They can only be understood in terms of stories from the past and projections 
into the future. People in both these systems are working on long term artefacts. 
Rests on semantic and narrative descriptions of problems: Risks in Hurisk as 
phrased as events, strains are phrased as potentialities and possibilities. Each is 
authored either by people from the NATS culture or in the language of that culture at 
the time of the original research. These entities are language forms they are not 
technical or mathematic propositions. The problem of risk and strain however, is not 
formally described. It is clearly present as a loose narrative but it could be improved. 
In Descartes there is again a core narrative, if one `reads down' the side of a score- 
card one can see a worst case scenario for a problem keenly exemplified. This too 
however is not quite what the statistical theorists are saying here. Partly neither 
system is doing this because they are aimed at upstream risk and the downstream 
decision is still left in the hands of subject matter experts. 
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Takes cognitive limitations into account: None of the heuristics and biases ideas or 
the wider cognitive psychology in this case has been formalised into these systems. 
This is a key place to criticise them. It is important to comment on data from users 
about how helpful these systems are to their thinking, but there is not yet any formal 
evidence to compare this with alternative methods or look at things such as 
measurement consistency etc. As users these people are in applied communities and 
it seems unlikely that this sort of approach will concern them. 
5.3.3 Rationality 
Mirrors what people really do in rationality terms: In both systems the use of the 
four quadrant plot as a simplified visualisation is an exact copy of what was 
happening in their boardrooms. My considerable improvements to its functionality 
(expanded aspect ratio to reflect positive and negative zones side by side, the use of a 
boundary argument for strategic issues, the introduction of between user distance 
plotting for risks) all sought to take advantage of the benefits which people were 
getting, or perceiving, from this approach. The addition of real questionnaires, formal 
in depth scoring and multiple comparison options greatly improved the power of users' 
to interrogate the kind of data which they displayed in this way in a live setting. 
Is sufficiently comprehensive: Hurisk's comprehensiveness is obvious from two 
examples. First, benchmarking in NATS showed it to be unique as a thorough multi- 
attribute treatment of risk with as thorough a measurement scale attached. Second, 
the strain questionnaire was the result of exhaustive research and testing with key 
users and was a landmark piece of work just on the number of items in the checklist 
alone (in some settings this would not be good but in aviation safety the checklist is 
very highly vaulued). The fact that it reflected a balance of well known technical risk 
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sources but, for the first time in that culture, actually introduced psychological and 
emotive reference points makes it clearly a comprehensive piece of work. 
From the Unilever perspective Descartes was comprehensive because for the first 
time ever in the company the entire issues portfolio (over 100 issues) was analysed by 
the entire issues community on one platform and one commonly agreed score-card. 
The tool itself could then be used to communicate throughout the organisation the 
results. There were very few examples of this kind of tool available even to one of 
the worlds largest companies. 
Uses weighted subjective criteria and objective: In both cases the obvious focus of 
attention lay with weighted subjective criteria, this was the heart of these systems 
being heuristic. However, that does not underplay the presence of objective data in 
the reasoning frame. 
Unilever was keenly interested in cost and cost of control and, where appropriate, 
actual costs were part of the analysis. The position statements which were used to 
frame the issues definitions which were used within Descartes were, in the technical 
cases, the results of the best available science. In the more subjective cases they were 
still strictly argued positions of fact. For NATS the purpose of this particular system 
was not to be objective but to be complimentary to existing objective systems. 
Includes best available mathematics suited to the problem space: Both of these 
systems sit upon a very basic combination algorithm which propagates a multi- 
attribute score forward to a single score and vice versa. Attached to these are the 
algorithms described above. It is uncertain if one can comment on these algorithms 
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being the best available. They were designed from the psychology upwards. As one 
of the conclusions of this thesis is that they could and should be more powerful, we 
have to conclude that the maths in question, although proven to be suited to the 
problem space, is a work in progress. 
Involves some formal logical rules for decision closure (choice, acceptance): This 
is not the case for these two systems. The rules for decision closure remain the same 
as they were before these systems were invented. Their aim is to support. 
Bases decisions on a bridge between induction and deduction: Here again we 
have an uncertainty. What is really going on when Hurisk and Descartes users make 
their judgements. One could argue it is a kind of glorified coding of hunches. Or is it 
a fine tuned, stylised measurement system tuned into to highly intangible variable 
sets. The thrust of being a fully heuristic system is that they exemplified in the fact 
that the data quality is entirely in the hands of the users, not determined by the system. 
Only the users can hope to judge their value therefore. Their accuracy is also a moot 
question as the logic of the reasoning that people are using is not consistent and 
therefore hard to define standards for. Insight is of course a product of both 
induction and deduction, but I have not identified when either is occurring. 
Is able to identify and counter biases in reasoning, or at least inconsistencies: 
Hurisk and Descartes, as has already been discussed under other sections above, were 
designed to do this as a primary output and each has a complex array of ways to track 
and highlight reasoning and reasoning agents' profiles over time. 
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5.3.4 Values / credibility 
Has credibility with users: These two systems both achieved credibility for 
opposing reasons. In the NATS case a detailed user testing process noted that the in 
the reasoning objectives of the system the thing that was highly valued was "it really 
makes you think". In the engineering case studies the system replaced a standardised 
risk assessment which again suggests that it proved its credibility. 
In the Unilever case, this kind of ad hoc reasoning culture the system had most 
credibility because it was quick, easy to use and a discussion stopper. The thing that 
was rated very highly was the ability to "get to the point". This might not satisfy a 
measure of adequate reasoning but in in terms of adequate risk reasoning I might 
question that as a credibility measure, but it was certainly highly prominent. I think 
however the obvious credibility that Descartes achieved was that it was used and is 
still used by the executive and the board of Unilever to guide their priority setting. In 
this sort of tough minded world with often very low tolerance for ambiguity this is a 
real achievement. 
Allows decision making to take place under conventional circumstances: In both 
Hurisk and Descartes the decision making still took place in exactly the location it had 
been in before with exactly the same groups of people in control of the decisions. The 
difference before and after was that in one case they were discussing and using 
consensus based techniques and in the after case they were visualising, debating, 
profiling and in some cases rationalising real data in a live system. The outcomes, 
very much the focus of both systems were still left outside of any system output. 
Both Hurisk and Descartes have extremely tightly bounded definitions as reasoning 
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support. They can only be used to help decision making, they do not provide 
decisions. 
Remains transparent to and explicable by decision makers at all times: As has 
already been described the power of both of these systems is in their use of multiple 
highly flexible environments to create the space for disputation and focussed thinking. 
This is the key platform for their positioning as group reasoning tools. In Hurisk, you 
can track your risks and strains from the moment you started recording them, you can 
analyse your own and others scoring styles and preferences, you can compare trends 
in your own and others data. In Descartes the history of the issue's scoring (a key 
factor in the decision transparency argument for such complex objects) is available 
throughout the analysis even when score-cards are interchanged. It is not only 
possible to see why an issue passed the first stage of priority it is also possible to see 
all the individual scorers from the first generation of scoring. Hurisk and Descartes 
are by design transparency enhancing systems because lack of transparency in the 
Unilever case was felt to lead to bad judgement and in the NATS case it was 
considered dangerous. 
Allows individuals to compare reasoning on a common platform with each other: 
The argument above also addresses this point 
Reflects explicitly the values that are being brought to bear: This is not so easy to 
lay claim to. Certainly the use of measurement metaphors (clock faced dials for 
NATS, sliding colour bars for Unilever) reflected what kinds of measurement had 
value to the audiences. The inclusion in the Unilever work of issues scored as both 
risk and opportunity reflected the value tension of the two cultures who wanted to use 
264 
the system in different ways. The idea of priority represents some kind of value 
metric. 
However, these would not seem to compare well with, for example, Keeney's idea of 
"value". Within the Unilever work however, if you look more deeply at the scale 
items in the reputation and influence scales these are clearly statements which expose 
the company's self perceptions as a good ethical corporate citizen. In that way values 
are expressed. The chief value being expressed in NATS however is at the meta level 
of safety being important enough to develop and use Hurisk in the first place. 
5.3.5 How did the systems compare? 
Hurisk and Descartes, if the list of eighteen attributes were actually a scale, would 
score in the region of 12 out of 18. Many of these eighteen variables (and decision 
analysis approaches they purport to) seem to be suggesting it is important to control 
key aspects of the decision reasoning space which Descartes and Hurisk do quite well 
even though they are only heuristic systems. The fact that heuristic systems help, with 
decision framing, reasoning and so on, rather than decide puts them at an advantage. 
For experts systems match up rather formidably with a Gestalt of good decision 
support. That, of course does not take away from the fact that formal decision 
analysis systems have to come up with an answer and decision support systems do 
not. 
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5.4 Do these heuristic risk measurement systems offer meaningful 
risk? 
In a similar way one could ask the same question about our qualitative attributes for 
risk. 
Core concept Nine features of an ideal risk system 
Risk is about measurement and management 
Risk is about communication 
Application Risk should be able to inform actions and influences 
Risk is about decision making 
Risk has to be about control features 
Risk has to convey multiple perceptions 
i Risk ownership and risk framing are key essentials on Percept Risk should focus on culturally important things 
Risk should contain a value idea and have an affect component 
In the interests of economy I will confine my comments to the sphere of Hurisk, 
which is the system formally aimed at risk (including the idea of strain). There is an 
argument for issues is Descartes being a larger cousin of risk. The answers in terms 
of the quality of the risks used within the system generated is conjectural. What we 
will do is compare an ideal proposition, (the seven risk rules, and a fixed risk 
measurement scale) with the attributes above. 
5.4.1 Application of risk 
Risk is about measurement and management: Here Hurisk clearly scores high 
being a dedicated risk identification and measurement system. In Hurisk, the 
definition of risk is very clear and the conceptualisation of risk is multi-attribute. The 
use of Hurisk leans heavily in the direction of `guided thought' for risk remediation 
i. e. understanding why a risk is a problem, be it control or impact, be it the levels of 
knowledge available etc. Strains too are measured and in a more detailed manner, 
given a pre-existent and highly valid cultural model for sources of strain under- 
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pinning the measurement. Any problem or disagreement can be readily and quickly 
highlighted. Taken across the attributes already described Hurisk is a very effective 
measurement and management tool. 
Risk is about communication: The purpose of Hurisk is transparent reasoning about 
risk across users and over time. It's outputs are all designed to build better risk 
narratives graphically and in the changing differentials of people's beliefs about risks 
and strains. These are all designed to be taken back into the group processes and 
shared as a controlling story for future actions. 
Risk should be able to inform actions and influences: Again here, because the data 
quality is in the hands of the user, it is hard to say. The efficacy being introduced is 
again in operational responses to the presence of the tool and to the data it gives. In 
terms of detailed risk and strain profiles Hurisk certainly provides a handsome 
narrative, but it does not control how that is used in related decisions. 
Risk is about decision making: Hurisk is a decision support methodology it has a 
comprehensive design and requires thorough execution. However, it remains a 
support nonetheless. It is assumed that Hurisk's influence on reasoning day on day is 
good. It does produce a deliberate transparency to create risk sensitised disputation 
mechanisms. The risk and strain lists it creates are all going to aid good decision 
making. Having these assumptions even with endorsement from the users is not the 
same as proving them though. 
Risk has to be about control features: Hurisk prioritises risks over time and 
between and within users as well as running an overall risk burden measure. It allows 
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users to stipulate their perceived levels of risk tolerance, a vital pre-cursor to any 
nuanced control strategy. Moreover, Hurisk, of course, requires users to make an 
assessment on a risk by risk basis of their control. 
5.4.2. Perception of risk 
Risk has to convey multiple perceptions: Many of the comments above hold sway 
here when crossed with the idea that Hurisk is a multi-user tool. All users in a project 
have access to all data and there are deliberate and sophisticated comparisons over 
time available. This even extends to the levels of measurements that individuals are 
using and with what frequency and in what scoring style. 
Risk ownership and framing are key essentials: Here Hurisk has no obvious 
strength, the risk elicitation process, although guided by the seven rules, is not under 
the control of the system. The social processes involved in the framing of the risks 
themselves, again helped in accuracy perhaps by the rules and the possibility to 
"splice and join" risks and their scores once they have been defined, is not explicitly 
controlled. 
Risk should focus on culturally important things: Care needs to be taken here to 
differentiate between internal and external cultures. Internally Hurisk is highly 
validated. First and foremost because strain items in NATS come directly from the 
culture, second because the entire system was designed inside the culture and thirdly 
because the metaphors and the reference grammar are highly culturally specific. 
Having said that, one source of this attribute for risk was in reality speaking about 
different national cultures against which Hurisk has not been benchmarked. 
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Risk should contain a value idea and have an affect component: The value of 
Hurisk to NATS was plain from its originating research, there were other sources of 
risk in the world than technical ones and a system to resolve these was an urgent 
matter. The affect component is found in the commitment to safety. Hurisk 
demonstrates this in its explicit requirements for a risk tolerance measure to be added. 
This is however a rather weak argument compared to what this literature was saying 
about switching between modalities and their relevance to guide decisions. 
5.4.3 Does heuristic risk meet the standard? 
Again using the notion of scoring on these nine attributes, Hurisk scores five. This is 
just over 50% and that is not as good as it could be. The answer lies in further 
research to look at the long term effects of the use of the tool and the benefit of that 
data will not be available until there is further research. The answer also lies in the 
positioning of Hurisk as a heuristic system. To entertain the lassitude this system 
creates to be used in uniquely creative ways which leave the user determining their 
own course in the decision means they will do just that. A more formal system would 
be able to highlight where this is positive and where it is negative and provide further 
inputs to support. Hurisk and Descartes cannot do that. 
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5.5 Conclusion to general discussion of Hurisk and Descartes 
What these two systems show, when you compare them as best you can with the 
stretching, and hard to articulate, demands of extant theory on decision science and 
risk, is that they are strong where they are strong. Their design, fundamentally 
sympathetic to the organisational behaviours of their hosts, has created a powerful 
level of technology transfer into these environments. In the case of Hurisk, Unilever 
has even started to tentatively use it now for project risk management and that is an 
interesting cross-over (because they previously rejected it as too complex). In the 
case of Descartes, due to an insightful design decision early on to make it a generic, it 
has, at the time of writing, five distinct applications in Unilever. It is currently being 
rolled out across the globe as best practice. 
Where these systems are weak is of course now the interesting focus. Are their 
heuristic credentials in terms of measurement consistency and efficacy a compromise 
in terms of understanding their impact on real decision analytic activities. The 
systems need to be criticised now from an empirical standpoint. For example, do they 
perpetuate the decision biases they are supposed to defeat. Do people use all of the 
data they generate in their eventual decisions, or only part or none of it. These 
questions remain and are the remit of a more statistically oriented enquiry. The basis 
of that, in my estimation, could lie in a hybrid project looking at blending subjective 
Bayes decision analysis with these techniques. 
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5.6 Discussion two: Towards a proto-Bayes 
5.6.1 Summary of this section 
This research stands as a kind of acceptance of the subjective Bayes paradigm. The 
Hurisk and Descartes systems are described as `near Bayes' systems because the 
approaches can be shown to be inherently similar. A hybrid of subjective Bayes, 
showing the benefits package of these two systems, it is suggested would be very 
interesting and potentially very powerful development of this work. 
This research stands also as some kind of rejection of formal subjective Bayes 
modelling. This is on the grounds of complexity, acceptability, time and usefulness 
and other compounding factors. The tension between academic and applied decision 
modelling is shown here not simply to exist in the tensions of rendering the subjective 
into objective terms. 
The many tensions thrown up by more involved subjective Bayes modelling 
techniques are discussed, they include: complexity (industrial modelling spaces 
become fiercely complex); supervisory issues (an expert modeller is required and 
heavily involved); investment (building of a decision support model, even a subjective 
one, is a very lengthy process); estrangement (decision conferences and the like are 
very `unreal' settings) and potential over-confidence (a tendency for people who have 
invested so much in them, to run models as if they were true reflections of reality). 
The core maths of a Bayesian approach is demonstrably hard for non-mathematicians 
to use in framing and communicating the uncertainty in their decision spaces. 
Overcoming these challenges is the focus of subjective Bayes notion of `requisite 
modelling". The benefits of this very high standard for modelling are discussed, as 
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are the costs. The conclusion is for Bayes to work in applied settings like those under 
discussion seems to require large, powerful and interesting processes to gain insight 
and a more coherent and consistent model of the decision world. They do so at a cost 
of complexity and time which users in my case studies intimate they are unwilling to 
pay. 
The relatively inexpensive (in complexity and time) `reasoning semantics' on offer in 
heuristic systems are shown to be highly valued. These are able to produce more 
transparency than the mathematically based semantics of a Bayesian approach. This 
is because they are working in a robust way and with far less complicated maths but 
fewer and larger assumptions. This is also a rout to relieve many of the tensions 
thrown up by the more involved subjective Bayes techniques. 
My suggestion is that one could start from a desire for these benefits but move in a 
direction of `for experts' systems. The decision maker working with for experts 
concepts will be required to build a narrative about their worldview and measure the 
elements carefully but at far less cost. This is the central technology transfer argument 
of my research. To get results like those shown here one needs a much more open 
ended approach. Also, I will argue that the resultant systems had to have the hallmark 
of the parent organisation, in metaphor choice, in measurement design, and in 
technical expedience vis a vis outputs, communications etc. 
In conclusion Bayesian subjective methods do create a transition process for the 
decision maker to better reason about "self and world' which goes beyond optimising 
strategies based on expected utility. As such these approaches have a really strong 
resonance with the ideas behind `for experts' systems. 
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Subjevtive Bayes methodology aims to mirror what real users actually think and do 
and then not to stray too far from that grammar. 
My approach could be described therefore as a "proto-Bayesian" modelling form 
addressing many of the same stages and same benefits but rejecting (at this stage) any 
overly formal mathematical basis as the de-facto language for these processes. 
To support this argument a direct comparison with subjective Bayes is made from the 
high level perspective and then at a deeper level of methodological intent. This 
exercise also gives insight into areas where future research could improve the 
coherence: 
5.6.2 Discussion 
I have argued that my work lies aligned with Bayesian decision modelling. This is 
not simply because of limited measurement or applied definitions of risk which are 
intangibly subjective, although those play a part. This is because I believe that the 
approaches are inherently similar and that a hybrid would be very interesting and 
potentially very powerful. 
The research direction I chose however stands in one way as some kind of rejection of 
formal subjective Bayes modelling. This is on the grounds of complexity, 
acceptability, time and usefulness, and so on. In the next section I want to outline the 
precise nature of this difference in defence of my own approach. After I have done 
that however, I want to re-visit the idea that the systems are not so far apart as to be 
irreconcilable and indeed that a combination of the strengths of the two is a clear 
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recommendation for a future and potentially highly fruitful partnership in further 
research. 
Positioning within a wider statistical tradition 
Before discussing heuristic techniques for risk reasoning and decision support. It is 
important to outline an overall narrative to help position them. This is my 
understanding.. . 
Academically it is surprising to learn that probability and uncertainty are very young 
techniques. The proofs and the theorem which support this kind of work are only 
around 50 years old. People have only been trying to apply them for 30 years, helped 
a great deal by the availability of inexpensive and powerful computers. This has done 
a great deal to boost the applicability of statistical reasoning to real world problem 
spaces. 
. In the 1930s probabalists created group theory based on the more historical 
probability observations of De Fenetti, Fischer and their contemporaries. Probability 
took on an axiomatic character, although still very firmly within an academic context. 
The early pioneers were not arguably very interested in whether probability was real 
or not even in the gaming room. It was treated like maths and therefore interesting 
proofs and theorem were developed. These were rendered it into the same reference 
grammar as addition subtraction and so on. Once that was achieved proving new 
theorem was regular mathematics. 
Bayesians seemed to say to each other, that to be about reasoning, these axiomatic 
rules looked fit for purpose and so, in a distributed sense, "decided" to work within 
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them. They thus became the reference grammar of Bayesian modelling also. This 
new maths seemed to be agreed to be the simplest semantic which one could use to 
express uncertainty. Since the theorems had been proved, they became a formal 
template for deduction and so axiomatic probability rules became a set of cultural 
truths for objective Bayesians. 
Schaffer and Dempster developed their complex `belief theory' arguably to widen the 
applicability of this formal Bayes reasoning. At the trivial level this meant that rather 
than stick to single probabilities one could now put upper and lower bounds on things 
and get an interval. This is still using a controlling story of betting and betting 
equivalents. The semantics had improved a little because, unlike formal Bayes 
approaches up to that time, you were able to say "I don't know", or I am "more or less 
uncertain'. This was something a single elicited probability couldn't do. 
Larkey and Kadane and others opened up the game theory yet further and the 
applicability of Bayes models within it. This remained within the traditions of the 
dispute over whether game theory could actually add anything to real life decision 
making where it proved predictably unreliable. Belief theory and game theory opened 
the way to more extreme forms of similar sorts of fusions of objective and subjective 
logic. Fuzzy logic came along, and eventually there were theorists who were just 
returning to expressing things as dependencies or conditional independencies. 
This highly incomplete, potted evolution for these approaches is enough to show how 
the discipline has wrestled with two key questions. 
1. Was academic versus applied, in short should the interest be about mathematics and 
statistics or about actual live decision making and real decision makers? That debate 
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was not always about objective versus subjective reasoning, often it was about the 
tensions of rendering the subjective into objective terms. 
2. The second challenge is about the different sets of `reasoning semantics' on offer. 
How is it possible to get to a set which is easy to comprehend, communicate and 
apply? In all cases these semantics had to be qualified by core maths. The core maths 
itself was arguably hard for non-mathematicians to understand. The qualified maths 
in reaching for an applied adaptation was arguably even harder. These techniques 
were stuck, to a greater or lesser degree, in this dilemma. Whilst the theoretical maths 
and statistics was fine, communicating a level of uncertainty between non- 
mathematical users in an applied domain was a struggle. 
The belief theories and the game theories of this world still, I am informed, don't see 
a lot of applied use because, although mathematically coherent, they don't get used in 
real world decision settings. This failure is at what I would call the technology 
transfer stage. 
Taking the debate forward 
In these sorts of historical cases, what we have, crudely put, is a set of formal rules 
and then some mechanism to communicate uncertainty. So in the case of my heuristic 
reasoning systems, I too have tried to set up formal rules and I allow people to 
communicate uncertainty. In some ways I am operating a bounds of certainty 
argument. However, I am doing it in a robust way and with far less complicated 
maths and fewer, but larger, assumptions. What my approach has to commend it is 
that it has transferred into real world settings and if there is to be a marriage between 
these two thought systems, there the marriage should begin. 
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Aligning (or not) with subjective Bayes 
Normative decision analysis seems to undergo an indigenisation process when used 
on real-world decisions. This seems to be the case with the transition from objective 
Bayes to subjective Bayes. The move out of the model-world of hypothetical 
mathematics and into real decision spaces causes the rise of a Bayesian apologetics. 
Importantly this not just a mathematical or philosophical shift, it's methodological 
too. Numerous profoundly psychological (counselling even), techniques are thus 
attached onto the normative structure. Their justification would seem to be to create 
and retain a sort of ethnographic form of mathematical accuracy. This can only be 
done if one improves the interface with humans in their non-maths reasoning. 
Issues with subjective Bayes techniques 
Subjective Bayes techniques would throw up a number of issues if they were to be 
applied to the kinds of decision spaces in this research. These issues could be 
summarised as complexity, supervisory issues, investment, estrangement and 
potential over-confidence. 
Complexity: It's perhaps easier for a non mathematician (or a non financial modeller) 
to see that the modelling spaces in subjective Bayes decision analysis are fiercely 
complex for the mathematically uninitiated. The use of probability alone is obviously 
a concern, this is evidenced in the column space given in Bayes text books to 
developing methods to stop lay people becoming confused and illogical. What is 
evident is that this is because it is nearly universally observed that they do. This is not 
just in terms of key biases, a testimony themselves that probability is an expert 
domain, but in terms of the documented difficulty lay people have in manipulating 
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mathematical probability to correctly convey things which are easily understood as a 
narrative (e. g. dependence). 
The complexity comes as de facto attribute of modelling the human physical world 
using truly representative numbers, formulae, distributions etc. These numbers, 
however sophisticated, can be likened to giving the non mathematician a phrase book 
to speak maths. The subjective Bayes user still has to learn to communicate in 
expected utilities and so on. This is a potential trap because these phrases are so hard 
to learn. To communicate beyond them, not to mention with them, could become 
exponentially more difficult with increases in computational complexity. This-would 
be, in my terms, a key driver of technology transfer failure. 
From an art form which was designed originally to be far more tentative, attribute 
elicitation has attracted the trappings of a more fully deterministic system. The 
fundamental basis of decision modelling, the elicitation of attributes, has become 
increasingly high powered with the advent of more and more powerful computers and 
the associated decision analysis software (again itself constraining and occluding in 
some measure what goes on in the process). 
The advantage I see in building more transparent (admittedly more simple therefore) 
systems is that the complexity is sublimated to a few small calculations which 
themselves are real time updating. When the user is focussed on the "headline 
heuristic" through direct manipulation of a metaphor e. g. do I concur with this 
comparison, or does that distance equate to something I think, there is nothing 
confusing happening and the communication of the results is direct, immediate and 
natural. 
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Supervisory issues: To perform a subjective Bayes decision analysis the users 
require statistical expert support. That support is both in terms of involved analysis 
guidance and supervising computational activities. Short of users becoming expert 
themselves the modelling cannot easily happen in the absence of a trained scientist. 
Scanning the lists of challenges in Bayes best practice, even without the literature on 
biases and heuristics, demonstrates this on its own. This modelling design is the 
domain of a multi-skilled expert in decision modelling. 
There is an argument about being bound to the utility of these models. The 
supervision overhead is justified when they are aimed at a singular application in a 
complex space e. g. plans in the event of nuclear power disaster. Suggesting that once 
the model is constructed the user is free to "run it" as part of decision making would 
again overcome reservations about the supervisory support needed to get it. Note 
however, this is a very restricted set of decisions indeed. Note also that "black box" 
approaches like this are is supposed to be counter to the subjective Bayesian's aims. 
The advantage to building softer, more heuristic, models is their modular adaptability 
to new situations in the organisation e. g. by replacing or refining a score-card one can 
have' a new proposition with no damage to the rest of the model. This cannot easily 
be claimed for a Bayes model (although Bayes Nets are perhaps built on this kind of 
premise) 
Investment: The building of a decision support model, even a subjective one, is 
involved. The larger the decision space the greater this investment will be. Even 
small decision spaces incur a attribute and utility elicitation overhead which is 
279 
considerable if it is to be accurate and representative. This is new time and learning 
investment because (outside of insurance and finance) the core skills of the users are 
an unlikely match with Bayesian updating. The outputs, however satisficing these are 
of statistical standards, will be opaque to a certain degree. This will require 
investment in new expertise for interpretation and communication. The user needs to 
be able to understand and work with these outputs (a core proposition for quality 
control) and they will need to be a convincing communicator (or translator) to their 
line responsibilities. This itself may be quite challenging. 
The argument for the cost benefit of such an investment in large scale energy or waste 
management problems is clear. In day to day safety and issue judgements, 
particularly those which are identified at the "contributory" level of those in the 
NATS project, it is not so clear. Even those very large issues in the Unilever project 
are very small compared to market share, profitability etc., all of which allow for 
highly complex modelling because of their importance. A fitness for purpose 
argument begins to shape itself. 
Estrangement: Building decision analyses, I would argue, takes people into very 
rarefied places outside of their comfort zones. Although this is considered a helpful 
method of improving rationality, reducing bias, and focussing attention on key 
decision drivers and so on, the decision conference is likely to be a fundamentally 
"unreal" setting for many users. Sometimes up to two whole days of attribute 
elicitation and scoring in an atmosphere of learning and assimilating the technique at 
the same time, is a lot to ask. It is straightforward psychology to suggest that people 
come to value things which cost them a lot. If adequate learning and internalisation 
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does not take place (that is of course controllable but requires more of the investment 
above) the resultant models run the risk of functioning as black box approaches. 
Models to reason with in Hurisk and Descartes have a direct utility to the input 
processes. The user inputs directly manipulate the core object of interest, riskiness of 
a future event, the likelihood that an issue will do harm and so on. The model of 
measurement is already in place (although investment in measurement is clearly 
controlled by the user at all times). This makes using the systems "direct" in the same 
way that subjective Bayes systems are ultimately about, but cannot provide at the 
outset. Hurisk and Descartes make generic and more simple kinds of decision 
support leaving very much more in the hands of the user. 
Potential over confidence: This is not something that I am unique in pointing out, it 
is clear from texts on Bayesian analysis that the limitations and assumptions in a 
model carry forward. However, psychologically speaking, when users have a 
complex, expert backed, expensively invested and perhaps not fully understood 
system available. It would seem hard not to focus on the things it can do with some 
confidence. 
The advantages of a decision support system like Hurisk and Descartes as described 
above is that they are being viewed as a useful tool, but not as something that gives 
the answers. A successful subjective Bayes decision analysis one must remember is 
aiming a lot higher than that and people would have due course to feel more confident 
in its output. 
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Some further challenges: High standards of modelling 
Phillips notion of `requisite modelling" described earlier is a key driver for a clear 
Bayes model. This states that there should be a cyclic process of gathering insight at 
the heart of building the attribute and utility models. French suggests to build a 
prescriptive system which is requisite one has to understand the reasoning level 
(consultants, consensus group or bench-markers) because the maths will differ 
between combination and summarisation: 
"it is important to distinguish to which class of problem an particular circumstance 
belongs, because the means to its solution almost certainly depends on its class" 
Requisite modelling adds detailed criteria for methodology choice (explicit axiomatic 
basis, lack of unsettling counterexamples, feasibility {of modelling and maths level), 
transparency {of inputs, calculations and results}, robustness {sensitivity analyses 
etc}, philosophical compatibility {within the users worldview}). On top of these 
criteria checks of uncertainty also have to be made for input and output uncertainty 
(although these have a decision analytic use as well). All of this is required to help 
organise information into a coherent picture then utilise it to calculate the best course 
of action, communicate why it is optimal and provide a framework for the criticism of 
ideas. With all this preparation driving at clarity and validity there comes a 
confession, again from French: 
"one form of uncertainty which neither sensitivity analysis nor uncertainty modelling 
can address is lack of clarity on the part of the decision maker. Often they approach 
an analyst lacking any clear vision of what they want or mean. Problem formulation 
tools can be used in this instance" 
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And his suggestion in this case is that soft OR methods can be applied to iron this out. 
In short, if your highly complex modelling does not seem to be working out, reach for 
another complex modelling tool to sort out your participants. 
Subjective probabilities? 
The assumption that subjective probabilities can be fitted to a classical model (to 
benefit from its axioms) is one of the cornerstones of Bayesian decision analysis. 
Subjective probabilities are not used without controversy. Evidence has already been 
cited for phenomena, such as conservatism where, in the face of clear logic 
individuals (using, probabilities under guidance rather than as experts) still produce 
exclusive probability spaces which do not sum to one. To maintain consistency there 
are a number of fixes the decision analyst can introduce to stiffen up subjective 
probabilities (Using serendipitous betting schemes, breaking events into components, 
avoid very large or very small probabilities, differentiate joint probabilities). This 
again raises questions about how much and how long lived the decision support 
clients really need to make successful use of decision analysis. As Smith points out: 
In practice the probabilities you elicit will invariably not satisfy the probability 
axioms if you happen to ask enough questions, though the client is usually prepared to 
adjust them when you point this out and treat the inconsistencies as measurement 
errors 
It is a given in this statement that you (the probability expert) will be there to adjust 
them. This decision analysis is perilously close to being not only an art-form but 
necessarily the work of a master. On top of everything that organisations have to do 
to elicit a cöherent mathematical model, they have to put systems in place to achieve 
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all of these other criteria as well. One would be forgiven for thinking that unless you 
employ a Bayesian full time, the resultant systems are going to be hugely difficult to 
design, use and maintain. Naturally, if you want to offset a nuclear disaster, you 
would be willing to have this. 
In mainstream industrial decision making about small risks and medium sized issues 
you are this sort of investment is unlikely to be warranted. This is where a system for 
reasoning which bridges the formal and the sub-formal decision support systems is so 
necessary. Taking all of the above discussion into account and considering the ranges 
and kinds of decision makers that I have been working with in this thesis the key 
criticism of subjective Bayesian Decision Analysis has, sadly, to be clear: 
It is much too involved and much too complicated. 
Coming back to first principles 
The heart of subjective Bayesian decision analysis is to help organise a decision 
makers' information into a coherent picture then utilise it to calculate the best course 
of action, communicate why it is optimal and provide a framework for the criticism of 
ideas. For me, given the distance which such an approach has moved away from 
normative techniques a question emerges: How much is subjective Bayesian decision 
analysis actually about decisions now? 
It is true that at the end of the analysis decisions have to be scored. However, when 
one considers the modelling effort it is possible to observe which is required to make 
sure that these are scored, compared, and then chosen wisely, the decision itself seems 
almost trivial. The necessary improvements to `objective' Bayes to make it work in 
applied settings seem to me to create a much larger and more interesting process 
whose primary aim almost might as well not be the analysis of decisions. Its purpose 
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could easily be the generation of insight, understanding and a more coherent and 
consistent model of the world within which the decision takes place. My suggestion 
is that one could start from these benefits thus moving in the direction of `for experts' 
systems. 
The reason I think subjective Bayes is like a `for experts' system is really by its own 
admission. When one looks at the great many supplementary (and non mathematical) 
activities (however founded it is in improving or steering the maths) needed it seems 
to head in that direction. Admittedly the motivation for these inputs is to make the 
maths apply to a final decision in a credible way, but that does not cancel out these 
benefits. I don't think it is a controversial statement to suggest that if a subjective 
Bayes modeller were to quit the organisation before the utility results were in, almost 
everything that had been contributed thus far would remain useful. Useful in the 
sense that the organisation would still have had great support for planning their 
strategy and understanding it within their world-view. 
The decision analysis user working with a subjective Bayes system, as a modelling 
requisite, has to build a narrative about their worldview. That relates to how this 
decision, and critically this decision support model, do or do not fit well with the 
present and future state of that. This model is ideally applied across the largest group 
of decision makers possible. People who share people a common set of strategies and 
goals and who, it is hoped, can share a common probability distribution at the end of 
the game. Subjective Bayes decision analysis when phrased like this looks, to me, 
like an organisational optimisation approach in fact it is clear that one is not able to 
choose a truly optimal decision unless it creates an atmosphere of better reasoning 
across the decision space. 
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The decision analysis user working with my systems will have a very similar 
experience. They are also required to build a narrative about their worldview. In my 
case it is a narrative about how this priority portfolio, and the heuristics which model 
it, represent the tension between the current and the future states of that world. In the 
risk and strain case this is a raft of future possibilities rolled into a collective but they 
are still individually available for inspection and introspection (moreso than in 
Bayes). In my approach the optimisation of the organisation through its portfolio 
choices is done by having better upstream group reasoning as the primary goal and 
more rational (defensible) priority narratives at the end of it. Importantly the core 
data is still visible and interpretable in its raw form. 
5.6.3 Combining heuristic reasoning and subjective Bayes? 
If I say my work is highly aligned with subjective Bayes then why did I not seek to 
use a Bayesian starting point? The first answer is easy. The user engagement at the 
concept phase was the key to my central technology transfer argument and that 
required a much more open ended approach. The second answer is like it, the 
resultant systems had to have the hallmark of the parent organisation, in metaphor 
choice, in measurement design, and in technical expedience vis a vis outputs, 
communications and so on. That wasn't going to happen if the paradigm was simply 
decision analysis with utility maximisation. Importantly, I didn't know at the 
beginning of these projects to what degree the decision support idea would get to the 
actual end of line decisions. These decisions were (and remain) in any case not 
sufficiently static and well defined to use a Bayes approach. 
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There were other drawbacks too. The obvious way of introducing a Bayes like 
paradigm is of course to attempt the issues and risk prioritisations directly from a 
Bayes model, or at least to do so comparatively. However, I wanted to reject of the 
notion of highest expected utility for a focus as (a) I was unsure it would ever 
sufficiently meaningful to non statisticians and (b) it was too restrictive a 
philosophical and methodological starting point. Taken together these are liberating 
arguments. Otherwise there was no need to conduct my research at all since existing 
mature Bayes approaches could have been applied. And in my view, would simply 
have failed by being too complex, too costly and too alien for reasons already 
discussed. 
So where does the alignment come from? 
Subjective Bayes modelling sits firmly between normative and descriptive decision 
science and, as has been argued by French, Smith and others, is itself a form of 
"prescriptive" decision science. What's attractive about Bayesian subjective methods 
to my work is that they create a transition process for the decision maker to better 
reason about "self and world". This clearly goes beyond optimising strategies based 
on expected utility. Two ideas are key first, the "best available algorithm" approach 
of the subjective Bayes modeller, second, the cyclical modelling of a parsimonious 
and acceptable (to the user) solution. I would argue that these approaches have a 
really strong resonance with the ideas behind `for experts' systems. 
This resonance could be brought to bear on a wider array of industrial decision 
making setting if only we could improve the technology transfer. As I have 
discussed, I do find subjective Bayes methodology inherently sympathetic to the 
psychology of the user first and to their mathematical requirements second. 
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Subjevtive Bayes methodology aims to mirror what real users actually think and do 
and then not to stray too far from that grammar. I have also suggested that a full 
power version of subjective Bayes decision modelling however, does still stray too 
far. 
I am not the first person to propose that `near Bayes' approaches retain some merit. 
The satisficing argument of Dodd et al discussed earlier goes some way to bridge 
naturalistic decision making theory high ground and an ex post facto Bayesian 
formulation. My main point from this would be that Bayes has itself tried to build 
these bridges. My work offers another example, from another perspective, for more 
heuristic forms of "good enough" Bayes modelling to be attempted. 
My approach could be described therefore as a "proto-Bayesian" modelling form. I 
address an indigenisation of many of the stages and benefits of that approach but I 
reject (at this stage) any overly formal mathematical basis as the de-facto language for 
these processes. I prefer, in common with some modern decision theorists discussed, 
a narrative approach. That narrative approach does not mean that it is alien to the 
fundamentals processes of such as eliciting attributes, utilities, combination and 
comparison rules and so on. 
My heuristic approach, is mediated by technology transfer i. e. acceptability. That 
approach is satisfied by being `quite formal' where subjective Bayesian methods will 
always strive for formal. I contend that in the sectors where I am working quite 
formal may have the upper hand, remaining as it does more grounded within the 
reasoning worldview of the decision makers and their own rationality. Importantly 
this grounding leaves an open door to future fruitful work. If systems like mine can 
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achieve high levels of transfer, then an improvement on them which makes them more 
powerfully Bayesian is a next step. 
I say this because when one looks closely at subjective Bayes it has the same output 
as me. Subjective Bayes requires not just a course of action (this would be 
`objective') but the ability to coherently communicate the rationale for why the course 
of action is believed to be best. My tools are purposely designed for disputation 
among decision makers about their priorities and views of risk, scoring and issues 
over time at the upstream stage. 
I have shown my participants accept that argument. They also concur that the way 
variables are used and the range of formats in which they can be compared is a more 
focussed and more rational platform for argument than the previous cultures of 
unstructured lobbying. These accepted reasoning platforms, such as the comparisons 
of decision maker emphases, strain weighting profiles or `now and future' predictions 
for issue importance, are inherently less biased than board-room style debates they 
supplant. The focus produced is perceived as refreshing, efficient and effective by 
users as evidenced in its acceptance and deployment. 
5.6.4 Direct comparison with subjective Bayes approach 
The tables below show how the systems compare with their subjective Bayes from the 
high level perspective and then at a deeper level of methodological intent. This also 
gives insight into areas where future research could improve the coherence: 
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Table 19: High level comparison with subjective Bayes 
Hurisk and Descartes Subjective Ba es 
At the high level comparison 
Allow users to reason with their data on a Developing and understanding of the needs for, 
number of levels within and between issues and form of, expected utility 
Elicit an idea of the priority of issues and risks 
now and in the future 
Elicitation of probabilities 
Provide solid first wave evidence to reduce the 
number of priority issues and risks to a Attribute elicitation 
manageable amount and communicate those 
Collect data from all relevant experts on base set 
of risks and issues 
Attribute elicitation 
Provide evidence to brief the board project teams 
on top priority issues Performing expected utility calculation 
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Table 20: Methodological comparison with subjective Bayes 
Hurisk and Descartes Subjective Bayes 
At the detailed methodological level comparison I 
Chief to the design of both systems was to 
deliberately blend the `hard requirements' of good 
measurement and strong definition for an issues and 
risks prioritisation (and process) with the `soft needs' 
of key stakeholders (be this look and feel issues, 
measurement scale choice or output). 
The development process of both tools included the 
measurement of attributes, the comparative 
techniques and the reporting elements of a suitable 
tool always being tested in the fires of acceptability 
for use in the live setting. This was done with key 
user groups. The resultant iteration (often 
simplification) of their design was key. 
The deployment of Hurisk and Descartes at the 
portfolio prioritisation level, rather than the 
individual decision point, was a key part of the 
design. This creates an overview on multiple levels 
and allows "comparison of apples and oranges" on a 
common score-card. This was an essential user 
requirement. The resultant risk and global issues 
prioritisation were portfolio led which meant that 
they could communicate across the company. 
Prioritisation exercise results sharing through formal 
reports and logical presentations, often followed the 
narrative of the analysis itself e. g. tracing the identity 
of a strategic priority from its group scores at the 
technical level. This meant that even at the 
"recommendations to the board' phase of 
simplification, the reasoning audit trail for the entire 
portfolio analysis is available. 
The process for issues prioritisation had to be 
formalised within the very dynamic developments of 
the "NATS" re-structuring and the "one Unilever 
Issues Management process". This responded in both 
cases to radical new operating frameworks. In 
I-lurisk and Descartes this was a generic background 
force (often represented at the micro level in risks, 
strain questionnaire items etc. ) 
Scoring within Hurisk and Descartes is in a formal 
hierarchy. This is to allow users to select what level 
they wish to score at in terms of time and simplicity, 
however the net effect of scoring at the detailed level 
is a roll up of multiple scores into two high level 
attributes which are of course then plotted. 
This approach is analogous to the elicitation of 
attributes phase in a subjective Bayes model. A great 
deal of effort is invested in understanding the user's 
attribute models from within their world-view. This is 
in the understanding that without this the results of the 
utility maximisation (which is only an incomplete 
mathematical rendering of key aspects of that world) 
would be meaningless. 
Once a model has been built there is a great deal of 
further effort in configuring, adjusting and refining 
both the `requirements' and appropriate measures that 
might reflect them. The use of formal sensitivity, 
calibration and reliability measures back on the 
mathematical profile is a formal step. 
Subjective Bayes, at a lower level is a portfolio 
technique. The overall utility score is essentially for 
different portfolios of options. In terms of comparing 
incomparable things it is quite common practice to 
simply ignore uncertainty at this level and just give 
-different portfolios a numerical score and find the 
example with the biggest score. This ignores 
uncertainty associated with the scoring methodology. 
Explanation and audit trail are central to subjective 
Bayes on two fronts. First, for the legitimacy (to the 
modeller) of the expected utility maximisaiton led 
choices. Second, mindful of the limits of users to 
blindly accept a mathematical priority, coupled to their 
obvious communication needs in selling on the results 
in their businesses, explicit reasoning, questioning and 
over-riding are central to subjective Bayes model 
resolution. 
The use of decision conferencing as a conduit 
methodology for subjective Bayes techniques 
recognises at the outset that formalising the influence 
of strategy limitations and available choices is a 
determining factor for a successful system. This is a 
formal (resource intensive) technique and a success 
criteria for this kind of modelling. 
A key technique in utility maximising models is the 
use of the influence diagram where multiple weighted 
attributes lie at the bottom of an attribute tree and are 
rolled up through an algorithm to create one 
overarching utility score which is contributed to by the 
scores underneath it in the attribute structure 
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5.7 Discussion on possible advantages of a heuristic approach 
5.7.1 Summary of this section 
Research into, and application of, the Hurisk and Descartes systems has expanded and 
applied the idea of heuristic reasoning to create user-centred decision support tools. 
Both tools are real-time reasoning systems which can equally support live and off line 
group reasoning. The notion that these tools represent a "heuristic reasoning 
platform" is investigated and this is described as: "a device which imparts the power 
to discover through rules of thumb using incomplete algorithms computationally, 
visually and in terms of process. " 
In the consideration of the tool design, phenomena which are classed as "essential 
natural heuristics" are explored and discussed. These heuristics enable people to 
reason about, and creating summary classifications for, complex realities in a 
simplified thought matrix. Some problems of reasoning associated with them are 
discussed. 
The advantages of including improved versions of these reasoning modes in any 
decision support system are explained from the point of view of technology 
acceptance. The way in which these tools can be used to carry a package of 
improvements to reasoning is therefore considered a highly effective use of them. 
This can be done by working within the constraints which they bring and also by 
expanding the heuristics themselves to suit accepted organisational decision support 
needs. 
The use of these simple tools is seen to address the large overheads associated with 
more formal methods and this trade off is suggested to come out in favour of heuristic 
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approaches and their real and perceived benefits. Three methods of using existing 
natural heuristics of decision maker groups and developing reasoning tools from them 
are explored. These cover visualisation techniques, score-card development and the 
overall intellectual housing for these approaches in constructed concepts like 
"priority" and "risk". How each of these elements conforms to a definition of being 
heuristic is explored in detail and aspects of the resultant functionality of the two 
systems are described. 
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5.7.2 Introduction 
The focus of this thesis does inexorably surround the applications of a primarily 
philosophical notion. That notion is how something is a heuristic reasoning tool 
rather than a deterministic reasoning tool. In the following section I have expanded 
on my understanding of how this applies to the Hurisk and Descartes tools. 
In developing tools to support expert judgement in air traffic control risk and FMCG 
issues prioritisation I have shown how to expand and apply the idea of heuristic 
reasoning. This has been done to create a user-centred decision support. In this 
section I'd like to take a more detailed look at the two systems. The reason for this in 
a stand alone section is that the systems are not trivial pieces of work, it will help to 
read about them in a concentrated way. 
Both Hurisk and Descartes are real-time reasoning systems. They can be used across 
internet meetings, they can support group reasoning and they can be used for off-line 
individual reasoning with or without a view to some future collaboration. Users agree 
that these improve their abilities to consider complex propositions and come to 
decisions about them. A lot of the elements are like heuristic versions of what would 
be needed for formal Bayes systems. 
Why Heuristics? 
I propose that decision support comes in improvements to users own heuristic 
reasoning around complex and uncertain entities like risks and issues. This is 
predicated upon a particular usage of the term "heuristic" itself. Much scholarly work 
has resulted, as we have already discussed, in a sub-field of decision science called 
"heuristics". However, that specific scientific application cannot be allowed to 
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commandeer the whole arena. There is much to be gained in taking the term back to 
its roots. 
Heuristic comes from the Greek "to discover" an it is at hear a philosophical 
construct with many applications and definitions. There are two that interest me 
most. First, from the Psychology of thinking, a heuristic is a "rule of thumb". That is 
a thinking process known to be limited but useful in real time because of its speed and 
economy. Second, from computer sciences, heuristic is seen as "reasoning in the 
absence of a complete algorithm". A fusion of these two ideas suits best what I have 
tried to achieve in this work. That is what I connote by heuristic and this use of the is 
implicated in the two heuristic reasoning platforms I have designed. This idea might 
therefore be described thus: 
"Heuristic reasoning platform". A device (not restricted to software) which imparts 
the power to discover through rules of thumb using incomplete algorithms 
computationally, visually and in terms of process. 
I further suggest that certain phenomena could be classed as "essential natural 
heuristics". These are observable in decision maker groups and I have recorded some 
of these. Simple examples are "high, medium, low" approaches to more complex 
objects; vague (and flexible) rank order scaling tasks, such as post-it pad exercises; 
loose categorisation of "co-ordinate" like objects into "boxes" e. g. "key players", "Cat 
3 risk"; and so on. All of this I would classify as heuristic in form. People are 
reasoning about, and creating summary classifications for, complex realities in a 
simplified thought matrix. 
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This reasoning is doubly heuristic because it is subjectively referenced (high to you 
might be medium to me and so on) and no checks are put in place to calibrate, 
mathematically or otherwise, what is going on between and within users and uses 
separated in time. I have observed in field study that there is usually no time for such 
activity. Even if there was I have not observed an appetite for it. 
So the heuristics which interest me exist "in the wild" so to speak. Groups of decision 
makers under time pressure are using these as labour saving devices. These 
individual are looking at abstract externalities and expressing them in numbers, 
colours, positions etc. These expressions themselves are of course borrowed images, 
from maths, list writing, even from road signs. That classes the whole area to me as 
"fundamentally heuristic". 
Problems arise in the organic use of these techniques of course: inaccuracy and lack 
of repeatability; social hierarchy effects (e. g. no-one wants to contradict the boss), 
averaging effects (taking a vote), loss of rationale (someone wipes the white-board) 
and a host of other drawbacks. However, these heuristics are, I would argue, 
"natural". What I mean by that is a lot like the sense in which a plant might be 
"naturally occurring". They just seem to be there. This means that people use them, 
like them and may consider them in some way to be a professional skill. 
Since that is the case in the design of decision support systems one cannot just dump 
them. The more critical the decision they are applied to, e. g. threats to 
competitiveness, or preventing breakdowns in safety that could lead to loss of life, the 
more important making them better becomes. There are, for the purposes of this 
thesis two ways to make them better. One is replace them e. g. introduce decision 
dialogue conferencing, Bayesian decision analysis etc. The second is to work with 
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them but to change them to be more like something that would satisfy such a decision 
dialogue process. Having chosen the latter route the challenge was to try to do this 
maintaining the "integrity" of what these things already do i. e. make people feel 
useful and listened to, allow people to display their expertise, be manageable in a 
heavy schedule and so on. 
This was being done for an important scientific reason however. That reason was to 
subvert that very benefits package by introducing higher order benefits, increased 
rationality, better accountability, clearer communication. These are being deliberately 
introduced through methods which only ostensibly to "support" the existing 
approaches. I think the case studies in this thesis have shown that to be a very 
powerful approach. This is my idea of expanding the natural heuristics from within. 
I don't dispute the usefulness and value of formal decision science at all. However, it 
has key drawbacks which can be described in a number of ways and it is possible that 
decision science practitioners will agree less or more with these. The mechanics of 
introducing expert decision sciences into live applied settings is very high impact in at 
least three ways: 
1. Overhead: The organising overhead is often huge. This has to create a local 
capability to carry the weight of learning a new methodology. I know from field 
experience, that is a barrier to success. 
2. Complexity: It is normally introducing a completely new expertise to the users 
and usually a mathematical one at that. A barrier in non mathematically 
dominated areas. 
297 
3. World-view: It imprints the decision making with its own world-view. I would 
say this is true even of techniques which try to encapsulate the users world-view 
in their execution. 
If one were to need evidence for this third point then dropping back to the decision 
science definition of `heuristic' provides it. It is very clear that the prevailing 
worldview here is still that human beings are severely limited as rational agents. 
Their capacity for rationality is considered low unless they have been formally trained 
(by decision science gatekeepers) and make use of powerful external computations 
(this is of course notwithstanding upcoming counter-views already discussed). 
These things spell for a psychologist "technology transfer failure" or at least limited 
transfer. When this is compared to the kinds of, sometimes nonsensical, ideas that 
shoot up rapidly in management science this raises a question. Why do these, 
sometimes highly over-simplified, ideas seem to have a higher penetration in 
organisations and a longer half life? 
My thesis is that we have to meet experts (not decision experts) where they are with 
the tools they are using and lead them on a journey to improve these. The journey has 
to end in a demonstrable benefits package which the experts have to venerate and 
own. In the case studies in this thesis I have shown high levels of success at doing 
this. In the next section I want to isolate some of these ideas. 
5.7.3 What Heuristics Have Proved Worthwhile? 
I have stressed that I would like to see natural heuristics of the decision makers and 
general heuristics of the decision landscapes broadened and strengthened. This is as a 
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route to improving rationality whilst keeping decision support within the "natural 
reference grammar" of expert groups. I have suggested that such a process should 
result in "improved heuristics" and I have presented evidence that suggests this has 
been achieved. Using the dual definition of rule of thumb and reasoning in the 
absence of a complete algorithm, I have created tangible heuristic reasoning devices 
which are not just a collection of pre-existing ideas. Let's illustrate that by examples 
in three classes: 
1. The visualised representation: the various plots 
2. The summarised scale: the various multi-attribute scoring systems 
3. The abstract construct: risk, strain and priority. 
The visualised representation 
The standard two dimensional Cartesian plot has an `x' and `y' axis and an equal 
scale on each. Co-ordinates dictate the position of a point, functions dictate the shape 
of a curve and so on. Variations involve mixing scales such as time on one axis and 
money on another. In its proper form it is a representation of ratio level data. 
Both in the NATS project and in the Unilever project Cartesian plots are used and 
some of these are shown: 
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The reason these graphs are heuristic is this, their substance has a communication and 
reasoning purpose only. Any mathematical properties of the scales is at best 
uncertain. The measurement items are not fungible e. g. "competitive advantage" 
cannot have real quantities it is a true "psychometric". The scales are, at best, ordinal 
level data, the increment is not fixed by any mathematical function and is entirely 
relative to a subjective reference point. The use of a Cartesian plot to display this is a 
contrivance. 
This is a convenient and powerful contrivance however, based on a positivist image 
with a borrowed authority from the world of maths. These graphs relate judgements, 
not measurements. From a communication perspective, they are highly expedient in 
comparing judgement data. This is precisely because people are familiar with the real 
thing from school and college and can relate to them. They have soft-wired "rules of 
thumb" about how to interpret what they are saying. 
A further contrivance is the sub-division of the plot into a number of more or less 
equal sized areas. These are used to create higher-level meaning, or some might say 
to focussed attention. Little thought is given however to the uncertainty associated 
with data approaching the boundary line between compartments, or indeed the 
intersection of four compartments. In practice this may be noticed, but it is not 
codified in any way. To do this one would have to collapse back to the "pure" co- 
ordinates which, as we have shown, don't in any case have a true meaning as co- 
ordinates. 
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What makes these plots heuristic judgements? 
These plots are therefore a heuristic formulation of real Cartesian co-ordinates plots. 
The areas or boundaries within them achieve for the user is not the representation of 
real data. It is cognitive support for a shared narrative. These visualisations are the 
vocabulary a sort of shared cognitive short-hand. Once again the interpretation of plot 
points is not about the shaky maths which put them there, it is about comparing the 
relative narratives their positions propose. 
Seeing these sorts of plots in this way is immensely liberating because to improve the 
heuristic reasoning your starting point is not accuracy, it's story. Better plots will tell 
a better story. Improvements in their decision support utility will be borne out of 
looking at what they are not saying. This is precisely how the introduction of time 
(the delta value improvement), the addition of scrolling qualitative data, the capability 
to chunk data together, park it completely or the audit of the history of a point across 
analyses came into being. These were all driven by the stories people wanted to tell 
and the system evolved as people, enabled by its standard functionality, thought up 
their own better heuristic. I helped of course. 
The summarised scale 
Almost all the variables collected in these case studies were on rating scales. These 
scales are psychometrics. They have been derived using research methods such as 
depth interviewing or analysis of pre-existing data, such as strategy documents. The 
Unilever case is the easiest to discuss in terms of how the summarised scale was a 
heuristic measurement device. Four main score-cards were developed, these were: 
- Competitive advantages 
- Reputation advantages 
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- Strategy Into Action fit 
- Unilever influence 
These score-cards all illustrate the essential natural heuristics of the decision makers 
which were expanded for more powerful (meaningful) heuristic reasoning. This was 
achieved using the following principles: 
- Use of behaviourally anchored ratings 
- Absence of any numerical indicator at the point of scoring 
- Direct comparison of present and future proposition on the same scale 
- Hierarchical design which allowed users to move between levels of scoring 
(with associated propagation) 
- Memory function which preserved rationality when the scorer over-wrote 
detailed score profiles with simple ones (as well as indicated prior scores) 
Behaviourally anchored: A typical item in a management survey tool will favour a 
five point scale approach. This will generally vary across some generic bi-polar 
variable from "strongly something", e. g. strongly agree, to strongly something 
opposite e. g. strongly disagree. The terms at either end of the scale are called 
anchors. In a behaviourally anchored rating scale case the anchors relate to real 
behaviours which can be verified. For example in "reputation advantages" scale the 
negative end of the Media Behaviour scale reads: 
"Company heavily and repeatedly criticised in a broad and enduring attack in a key 
range of media". 
No numerical indicator: Experimentally scales in early case studies did not contain 
any numbers. It was expected that this would be unpopular. It wasn't. All scales in 
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the Unilever project adopted it. In the final interface the sliding line did change colour 
from red (very negative end of scale) through amber (mid point) to green (very 
positive end). This was another low-key example of expanding a general heuristic 
(the traffic light approach). 
Direct comparison: This tool is all about stylised comparisons between narratives. 
This is the basis for a reasoning platform argument. The direct comparison of a 
"now" and a "future' narrative was reflected in the scales. The proposition for the 
future score was simply "if we manage this really well in the future". For each 
individual scale the `now and the future' were compared directly at the point of 
scoring and remained in view thereafter. The length of time between the now and 
future scores varied within and between analyses and was frequently not set at all. 
Users were happy with a nebulous ideal of a future state. 
Hierarchical question sets: The scales in both Unilever and NATS case studies 
always resolved to two variables which were then plotted on an `XY' graph. Users 
were offered a hierarchical scoring choice. Direct manipulation of a data point on the 
plot was the most basic. Next, users could score the same two variables, this time 
with the benefit of the anchors (simple scoring). Finally an "intermediate 
proposition", which contained up to ten scale items per variable could be used. In all 
cases a scoring action in one mode affected the scores shown in all others. 
The intermediate scoring followed by a simple scoring makes the most informative 
description. In the intermediate case users will provide a range of scores on detailed 
variables. These are rolled up to the top level. If a user were then at a different time 
to re-score using the simple variables options the subtlety of that detailed argument 
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would in a simpler case be over-written by some sort of mean score. To avoid this 
loss of data the underlying scale scores were coded in software to preserve their 
relative shape as much as was possible. 
Memory function: "Memory triangles" small point indicators on the scales always 
recorded the position of the last intermediate scoring round. Thus if the data was 
over-written it was possible to retain, until the next detailed scoring round, both sets 
of scores. 
What makes these scales heuristic judgements? 
The power of behaviourally anchoring scales rather than just using bi-polar markers is 
in the rationality. Where the scales are going to be used in plenary you avoid the `one 
woman's high is another man's medium' fallacy. People have to rate and, if 
necessary, defend an exact agreed behaviour, not a subjectively referenced variable. 
These judgements were still elicited from people however, as subjectively referenced 
beliefs or preferences. Although people are being asked for data this "measured 
world" does not equate to a "formal model world" in the scientific. It does equate to a 
model in the social science sense however. Scaling techniques, like those here, 
reduce the cognitive complexity and uncertainty associated with highly complex 
measurement propositions. This they do with an associated loss in accuracy. Like the 
plots which represent the outcomes of this cognitive activity therefore, the scaling 
concepts here are over-simplifications of the world and the measurement components 
are introduced in the absence of a complete(ly controlling) algorithm. 
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The Abstract Concepts 
Risk 
I have argued, hopefully without reaching for too post-modern a philosophical 
position, that concepts like probability and risk in this applied area are abstract 
collectives. Each of these, in the many arena where they are discussed has no 
definitive position. Rather the concepts reference a complex of disputed ideas. There 
is no doubt that they are very powerful ideas, but there is similarly no doubt that they 
are constructed. 
I have argued earlier that risk then is always model-based ideal. To put that another 
way, if risk has no fixed definition we can stipulate one. In the NATS case study, this 
is my precise conclusion. It is a short step from there to argue, using our same two 
standards of reduced complexity and incomplete algorithm, that the risk construct 
which I created for NATS is a heuristic reasoning device. 
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The eight component risk model made good sense to the users in NATS. Scores on 
these were created using the "clock faced dials" metaphor shown. Three 
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measurements made up risk, three local algorithms introduced uncertainty to those 
measurements. These six combined to make up two summary variables which 
combined via a global uncertainty algorithm to create a final risk score 
How was this concept heuristic? 
There are three key levels to the heuristic nature of this concept. First and easiest to 
describe is the notion of a changeable risk tolerance score. This score operated an 
algorithm which altered the absolute value for a users risk depending on how they 
were feeling at a given point. It also operated like a scenario based weighting factor. 
This is because users could change the value speculatively to address a scenario 
within which they may feel more or less risk tolerant. Risk, in this sense is a decision 
support idea, not a measurable object. 
The second reason why this concept can be thought of as heuristic lies with the fact 
that just as risk tolerance is a cardinal algorithm for the overall risk score, knowledge 
mediates the local individual scores in the same way. The users are not being asked 
to measure risk in and of itself. User are having probability, control and effect 
elicited from them for a particular state of the world and then arbitrated by how much 
they personally believe they know about that world in this case. The object of risk 
scoring, as is the case in scoring issues in the Unilever case, is that this measurement 
technique requires the user to explore and expose their own reasoning as well as 
provide their elicited value. 
The third reason has already been discussed. An algorithm which combines 
knowledge and elicited judgements arbitrated by a changeable emotive component is 
very close to the idea of a mathematical rendition of a cognition. The users are laying 
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out their thoughts, and the potential variance within those, and over time, to create a 
state value for a risk model. The model itself is not "risk" and neither is the value. It 
is a conceptualisation of judgements and feelings about a shared definition of risk. In 
a more complex way this risk concept is simplifying a complicated measurement 
process to create a judgement based system which is faster and more simple. 
Likewise the reasoning that people are committing to in this case is in the absence of 
a complete algorithm in two ways. First, there cannot be a complete algorithm for a 
social construct. Second, the users are not aware of the properties of the algorithms in 
the Hurisk tool. This satisfies our two sided argument for a heuristic reasoning 
device. 
How is strain heuristic? 
Strain is really another form of risk since the paradigm is still threat to safe operation. 
In the system it acts as a "sister" to risk, which is why they are displayed together at 
the high level summary. The incompleteness of the algorithm controlling strain 
scores reasoning goes without saying a 111 item psychometric questionnaire is a 
complex matrix of ideas to form an algorithm with. What it does have is a 
combination rule for the scores. What the combination rule does therefore is describe 
the world in a shorter story than necessary. The scores are shorthand narrative blocks, 
and that, in other words, is a heuristic reasoning form. 
Like the risk case it is the reasoning itself which is the value of doing the scoring, 
because the end score is virtually meaningless without the narrative which gave rise to 
it. In these and many other examples within these systems what is happening over 
and over is that measurements are made, metrics are applied and the results are 
combined, usually visually into a complex heuristic. Algorithms replace real 
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mathematical models, judgements replace the real measurements and narrative 
analyses replace the real long-hand narrative that is being conceptualised. That fulfils 
my idea of being heuristic. It raises the philosophical possibility that other decision 
modelling, even mathematically more coherent modelling, might be more than a bit 
heuristic too. 
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5.8 Concluding argument 
In the applied world in question in this thesis we have a condition of high-volume, 
small-scale rapid-turnover group risk reasoning. The theoretically very formal and 
heavy approaches from normative techniques would tend to de-construct and criticise 
the reasoning forms and point out their errors. The methodologically very heavy 
approaches from real world decision making would tend to build very large 
superstructures around the reasoning agents and, in so doing, potentially increase the 
available data and disagreement. 
Starting from a "content led" approach however, what people have to hand and what 
people do already think and do to reason about risk, and improving that is arguably a 
highly legitimate approach. This is especially the case if what people are already 
doing can be made more elegant in terms of exposing available data and 
disagreements in a focussed way. This is especially the case if what people are 
already doing could be put onto a more sound, transparent and auditable reasoning 
platform. 
I have harnessed risk, and decisions about it, in a way which those who have a high 
stake in these terms recognise and approve of. These people are not theoretical 
decision makers in a laboratory experiment on probability (valuable as this essential 
work is to understanding how humans do reason), they are risk users. The 
formulations of risk and decisions in these studies have been wrought through 
operational partnership and applied social science. 
These people recognise the risks and the decisions at the end of this process as their 
own and therefore seem happy to drive the quality of the operational application of 
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these concepts. The decision support systems I have developed are not costly, 
financially or in terms of operational disruption. Most importantly they do not cost a 
lot in terms of intellectual transfer into the live setting. The systems are recognised 
for their contribution to more efficient process, more effective reasoning and creating 
better results than the existing methods and tools had done. 
This work has, I believe, spanned, comfortably or otherwise, the gap between 
normative and descriptive decision science. The maths it uses is good maths and 
makes sense, but it is also elegant and fit for user-defined purposes. To develop an 
effective definitions base for this maths we have looked very carefully at its 
psychological meaning to real decision makers. This has taken me into the area of 
heuristic reasoning. 
I have expanded the existing concepts of heuristic reasoning and taken them back to 
something more like their original philosophical roots. These expanded notions of 
heuristic have then been applied to decision support systems. These have been tested 
and proved to have value to the host organisations. I have also developed novel forms 
of heuristics for applied reasoning and have contributed to the theory in this area 
therefore. 
I have suggested that heuristics might be worthwhile way to conceptualise a more 
general class of approaches and tools which one sees working in the industrial world. 
Irrespective of origin, or legitimacy, there are a wide range of general natural 
heuristics which have high resonance with the way people are used to working and 
want to work. Heuristics of this kind can have a huge influence on the way that 
people reason. Therefore they need to be included in any model, if only to take 
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advantage of their high perceived validity as a transport mechanisms for better 
versions and thus better reasoning. 
I propose that an observation science which looks at what people are thinking, feeling 
and doing is a key starting point. Providing reflection on these is a tool to support 
these decision makers through augmentation of their existing expertise in order to 
promote effective technology transfer. I propose that the resultant `for experts' 
system transfers better than an, arguably intellectually superior, expert system. These 
often fail to be transferred other than in highly risky, complex and multi-stakeholder 
processes, which are rare. 
I have contributed meaningfully to understanding how people in applied safety, and 
business critical, settings can see and work with risk concepts. This has been done 
whilst respecting the idea that these people are subject matter experts, not risk experts. 
They look for tools to support their work rather than risk or decision science 
expertise. They do not, in my observations, feel the need to use the `model 
completeness' standards which come from those exacting disciplines. 
New definitions and measurements for risk have been designed, accepted and valued 
in formal operational contexts. The challenge is now to improve them. My 
methodology, based as it is on a social science approach whilst attempting to utilise 
mathematical benefits from consistent measurement and meaningful use of 
algorithms, is pretty close to subjective Bayesian thinking. To me however, it is a 
more proto-Bayes because it seeks to be more applied and be a servant of experts' 
own worldviews. I'd argue, that to do a really thorough subjective Bayes analysis of 
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risks and decisions it would, in fact, be better to start from a position which is a lot 
more like the one I have taken. 
The support offered by prescriptive decision science can be offered more effectively, 
in my view, from within the decision reference grammar of an organisation. This 
stands in contrast to teaching them a new one. In the rarefied setting of building a 
Bayes model this new grammar might be accepted, but I believe it will (and does) 
struggle outside of that. Utilising the technologies and the languages already 
available in an organisation (their natural heuristics) makes a lot more sense to me 
because these have a track record of being considered useful. Importantly they are 
already accepted. I'd suggest this is more than an opinion, this research has proved 
the case, in two concrete examples of heuristic risk and decision support phrased into 
`for experts' systems. 
I'd suggest that what has been achieved here is similar to what the forms of subjective 
Bayes approaches I have reviewed are trying to achieve. I'd go further and insist that 
the two approaches could be developed into a mutually beneficial hybrid. My 
systems could improve in their mathematic consistency and evidence base for long 
term insights particularly into the way that people are actually using them to reason. 
Subjective Bayes thinking could benefit from the way these systems have managed to 
have a high penetration into the host organisations and become established and valued 
working practices. The Bayes approach would also benefit from being placed into an 
arena which is about more small-scale technical risks and ordinary work a day 
decision making about risk, where I think it has a great deal to contribute, rather than 
being confined to complex modelling environments for large decisions. 
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A hybrid of my approach to definition and reasoning and subjective Bayes analytical 
power might generate that elusive set of evidentially "fast and effective heuristics" 
that this area is in need of. Together these could further shape the world of applied 
risk reasoning. That reasoning could better meet the challenges in the extant research 
by blending the complimentary power bases of applied psychology (of the kind I 
recommend) and applied mathematics. This could produce accepted and proven 
effective `for experts' systems which are deployed, valued and, above all, used. 
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5.9 Future research direction 
The tools introduced in this research have two things in common, they are highly 
detailed pieces and they were both developed in a live setting under the supervision of 
sponsors who wished to direct the outcome and application. The resultant study is 
highly descriptive in nature and leaves open therefore a number of interesting research 
avenues which have not been explored. These are in four categories: 
More formal statistical treatment of the effects 
In the Unilever case study the following effect was observed. The introduction of a 
computer tool which delays group interaction via a process which causes people to 
reason their arguments in advance is considered highly desirable by the busy target 
audience. 
In academic terms however, such evidence would convey an important face validity 
to the system in question. A desirable comparison exercise still to be done would be 
to look at actual construct validity. The effects of the use of the tool as outlined 
compared to a control condition wherein participants meet and discuss risks in their 
usual modality would achieve this. The balance of individual and group contributions 
to the final risk profile would be extremely informative as a differentiation of the 
effects of any particular elements of the tool and their interactions. This would give a 
more detailed analysis of the benefits and problems of the on-line and off-line modes 
for this group activity. 
A deeper psychological assessment of the value of the effects 
In the NATS case study the value of the risk assessment approach was differentiated 
across three target audiences using a small exercise looking at opinion data and 
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subjective weighting structures for a similar problem. The results of this work 
suggested that these groups viewed the functionality and reliability of the tools very 
differently. 
The air traffic controllers valued the systematic rigour of approach and the blanket 
assessment of risk and strains as being equally valid. This seemed to conform to their 
operational training to do with the systematic reduction of all uncertainties. They 
were noted to be particularly interested in the system's ability to convey this 
complexity back to a management who could be viewed as over simplifying. 
The managers in the study, conversely, tended to focus on the systems ability to "roll 
up" ideas into larger summaries. The possibility that this system could be used as a 
replacement for (tiresome) brainstorming exercises was seen as a key feature. Very 
little in depth engagement with the tools was noted in the interviews. 
The engineers in NATS were the focus of a much more detailed study of the use of 
the tool. At the end of the trials they adopted the prototype risk assessment as an 
operational tool and rejected their existing (less rigorous) approach. The features of 
the system which clearly attracted this group were to be found in its ability to 
compare views with peers and in its exactness. 
Further work into the effects of these different perceptions of the tool would be 
insightful in relation to its effect on risk assessment and mitigation. This work could 
explain the value to different staff groups of the scoring and recording of reasoning, 
and the effect this has on confidence in recommendations. From a statistical point of 
view, it would be useful to have an analysis of whether it is possible to attribute 
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perceived improvements in risk-assessment unambiguously to the tool or its effect on 
the balance of opinion which might conceivably be arrived at by a different method. 
An explanation of tool acceptance (as a function of effect) 
This study places a lot of emphasis on technology transfer. The acceptance of the 
heuristic approaches to reasoning are seen as a key finding. This is especially when 
compared to the lesser levels of acceptance of more involved formal methods. 
The adoption of a risk assessment tool and management approval of it does not 
necessarily connote that the tool has improved risk assessment. In cases where very 
poor risk reasoning was observed such a tool is a clear step change and this has been 
discussed. Where things are less clear is in a more detailed analysis of how we might 
judge the tool to have improved risk-assessment. 
Where possible this further research should be under controlled conditions with 
reference to standard statistical techniques for establishing causal effects. Candidate 
variables for such an examination are: testing who is using the tools, what the 
alternatives were, and tracing the decisions, in order to see whether decisions were 
made more quickly, supported by better reasoning, and effective in ensuring that 
relevant, rather than irrelevant contributions were elicited from users. 
The improvement of the statistical elements of the tool 
Throughout the discussion a clear parallel between the heuristic approaches and 
subjective Bayes decision modelling is drawn. In essence there is an attempt to 
suggest that heuristic reasoning is to subject Bayes as subjective Bayes is to formal 
Bayes. That is to say that the process of accommodation needed to adapt formal 
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Bayes for more applied settings could be extrapolated to those settings where even 
subjective Bayes is prohibitively complex or time consuming. 
An investigation of the way in which the very powerful mathematical conditioning of 
the subjective Bayes approach could somehow be accommodated in the highly 
transferable skin of heuristic approaches is a hugely attractive research area. 
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Appendix one: Unilever comment 
Issues Management and Issue Prioritisation 
-A Unilever Communications perspective 
I have worked with Jon Arthur for over 3 years and, most notably and 
appropriately for this text, we have worked together on a project to prioritise 
Unilever's global issues. 
When I met Jon in 2004, we were in the process of bringing Issues 
Management together, at a global level, in Unilever. We were standardising 
the way we managed issues, individually, and how we shared information and 
position statements throughout the business. We also had ambitions to 
improve our overall governance of key global themes in order to find ways to 
improve our response to public policy. We wanted to make sure that the 
senior decision-makers in the business were aware of the issues that have 
greatest business value - and that they were more involved with them. We 
also wanted them to be kept updated on the status of these issues and to 
champion issues through important stages, whenever needed. Jon had 
applied his stakeholder and risk models to smaller projects in Europe and it 
was clear at a very early stage that he had a skill-set which could be applied 
to our global requirements and the appetite for a much greater challenge. 
In the early stages, Jon consulted widely and developed a scoring system to 
set priorities for issues. He focused on speaking to practitioners and tried to 
match their skills with the brief from senior stakeholders, which was, to be fair, 
an evolving one. 
Together we made issues prioritisation one of the pillars of global issues 
management. 
One of the important aspects developed in the early stages was the dual 
focus on present and future. This meant that although we could find 
ourselves in a state of disarray on a particular issue at the current time the 
tool still allowed our experts to justify the possibility of managing an issue to 
the business' benefit in the future. This in itself justified the need to put some 
resources behind that issue. In contrast, this also allowed us to identify that 
there are some issues where even if we manage them really well, we're not 
going to be able to deliver any significant business benefit in the future. This 
provided a step-change in the way we considered issues. 
By the time the Unilever Issues Group had assumed the governance of global 
issues for the business, they were ready to use Jon's methodology to 
evaluate issues with a more strategic mindset. This meant that the Unilever 
global issues portfolio was shaped by the key elements of business strategy, 
(e. g. implications on our supply chain, implications for marketing products in 
key areas, implications on consumer confidence). - considerations on which 
Unilever Issues Group had a clearer insight than individual Global Issue 
Leaders. 
Through the first issue prioritisation process in 2006, which was initially 
designed as a pilot, Unilever narrowed an initial portfolio of over 70 issues 
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down to around 25 high priority issues. This was then narrowed through 
discussion to 11 specific key issues and presented the results to the Unilever 
Executive and Board. They endorsed the results in their entirety and since 
that time, the model and Jon's expertise have been used to support decision- 
making and resource-setting at European and Americas regional level, and in 
many countries, including the UK - where the 2008 Public Affairs plan is based on Descartes analysis. 
At a practical level, the key benefit of the system Jon has developed for 
issues priortisation is that it takes away the lobbying and horse-trading of the 
`post-it' on the wall group exercises. It allows recordable measurement- 
either individually or in plenary - against the most important business criteria 
and then gives those in the business with the best overview an opportunity to 
discuss how to manage a well-designed high priority set. It actively 
encourages thinking about issues in a systematic, rather than political, way 
and drives good definition of the issue and how it impacts your business. 
The success of Descartes in Unilever Issues Management is down to the 
potent combination of the model and its architect. Jon deserves enormous 
credit for what he has achieved in driving through a unique system through 
times of both high expectation and good support and some periods where 
there were doubts about the value of the programme against competing 
priorities. I am confident that in the years to come - because it is over that 
range of timescale that the value of our global issues strategy will be borne 
out - the introduction and utilisation of Jon's Descartes model will be seen as 
a key factor in Unilever's successful management of key global issues. 
G. J. Gordon (11 December 2007) 
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